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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS IN CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY: POST BANKRUPTCY 
PERFORMANCE, BANKRUPT STOCK PERFORMANCE AND 
RELATIONSHIP WITH HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER VULTURE INVESTORS 
 
SEPTEMBER 2010 
MIN XU 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Ben Branch 
 
Firms that emerged from Chapter 11 as public companies have tons of characteristics. 
The first essay analyzes their post bankruptcy performance, duration effect, and the quality of 
their projection information. While the sample’s post bankruptcy performance does show 
improvement, their projections tend to be optimistic. Firms with shorter durations in Chapter 
11generally achieve better performance than those with longer durations, in terms of Z-scores, 
but not in excess returns. Compared to firms that did not provide (complete) projection 
information, the sample firms generally exhibit better improvement, as measured by Z-scores and 
short term excess returns.  
The second essay tracks the holding period return in investing in bankrupt stocks 
using a buy-and-hold strategy. Holding period return using stock price alone cannot show 
the entire story, as when considering final distributions plus the stock price, we see a 
much severe loss. In the regression analysis, the results reveal that liquidity is always a 
key factor in explaining the returns. Profitability and information uncertainty plays a 
significant role in explaining the positive returns, while liquidity and (un)profitability are 
the two key issues in negative returns. In addition, the involvement of hedge funds does 
not show signs of better stock performance. 
vii 
 
The third essay explores the role hedge funds play as investors in bankrupt firms. 
The results show that their major contributions are to provide liquidity for and help the 
troubled firms improve their profitability. Compared the performances in post bankruptcy 
to pre-bankruptcy level, bankrupt firms with hedge funds involvement tend to be in better 
shape compared to the ones without any vulture investments, however, firms with hedge 
fund show comparable results with the ones with other vulture investors, such as private 
equities. In addition, the above improvements only appear in the short run, and the 
involvement of hedge funds does not guarantee a better stock performance. Therefore, 
hedge funds are more of financial players, rather than strategic players, as hedge funds do 
not help the troubled firms go through a systematic restructuring to achieve sustainable 
improvements. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CAN PROJECTION INFORMATION SHED LIGHT ON  
POST BANKRUPTCY PERFORMANCE? 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 11’s effectiveness has been much debated. Hotchkiss (1995) finds that 
over 40% of the firms exhibit continuing operating losses in the first three years after 
they emerge from Chapter 11. On the other hand, Mooradian (1994) finds that a stint in 
Chapter 11 generally increases efficiency by allowing viable firms to renegotiate and 
continue. Eberhart, Altman, and Aggarwal (1999) find large positive excess stock returns 
over 200 trading days following emergence using difference benchmarks. Kalay, Singhal, 
and Tashjian(2007) also show that sample firms experience significant operating 
performance improvements.  
The related literature has largely focused on post bankruptcy performance. Only a 
few studies have utilized the important information (e.g. the plan of reorganization and 
disclosure statement) revealed during Chapter 11.  None the less, the feasibility and 
effectiveness of the restructuring plan actually plays an important role in the 
reorganization plan’s success or lack thereof. The disclosure statement is supposed to 
provide adequate information for the bankruptcy case’s claimants to vote on the 
reorganization plan. If present in the disclosure statement, the financial projections act 
like a roadmap for the reorganization plan.  
Our paper is focused on a sample of firms that not only successfully emerged 
from Chapter 11 as public companies but also produced complete projection information 
during the process. Our goal is to investigate the performance of these sample firms, the 
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duration effect, and performance comparison between our sample firms and the firms that 
also emerged as public companies but without projection information.  
We use Altman’s Z-score as our bankruptcy probability measure. The overall Z-
score of our sample improved from their pre- to post-Chapter 11 levels. The average 
values, however, did not reach the safe zone after emergence. The overall correlation 
tests between the projected Z-score and the actual post bankruptcy Z-score are 
significantly positive, indicating that the projections are associated with the firms’ post 
bankruptcy performance. The error term, which is the gap between the actual post 
performance and projected performance, is, however, significantly negative. When we 
decompose the overall performance into different financial aspects, we find that the 
improvement in liquidity and leverage are the most important factors to a successful 
reorganization. Firm size, measured by total assets, is not a significant factor.  
Next, we analyze the effect of the duration of the Chapter 11 process. Duration 
proxy for the feasibility of the reorganization plan, as more feasible plan would generally 
take a shorter time to pass through the approval process. Our sample, on average, spends 
409 days in Chapter 11. Using the mean as a dividing line, we decompose our sample 
into two sub-groups. We find the correlation is stronger for the short duration group, 
indicating that firms that can emerge faster than average tend to have more consistent 
performance with their projection plan than do those with longer durations. In part one, 
we show that non-manufacturing firms generally exhibit better performance than do 
manufacturing firms. In duration tests, the non-manufacturing firms in the short duration 
group generally exhibit the best performance. We also find that duration is related to firm 
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size, although not in the linear way. Larger firms tend to spend more time in Chapter 11. 
However, we do not find significant duration effect in the excess returns.  
We hypothesize that a firm that files a disclosure statement which contains 
complete projection information is likely to have a systematic well thought out 
reorganization plan. Accordingly, we compare our primary sample with another pool of 
firms that also emerged as public companies with reorganization plans that do not have 
projection information. The Z-score performance shows that the without-projection group 
underperforms the with-projection group in both the pre- and post-Chapter 11 periods. 
Moreover, the improvement in leverage is limited for the without-projection group. The 
without-projection group also has the longer average duration. Not only is the financial 
performance of the without-projection group not as favorable as that of the with-
projection group, their stock performance also differs. We find significant positive excess 
returns for the with-projection group in first year after emergence.  We do not, however, 
find similarly favorable results for the without-projection group.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the literature 
review. Section 3 discusses data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 reports the overall 
performance for our sample. Section 5 focuses on the duration effect. Section 6 contains 
the group comparison between with-projection group and without-projection group. The 
conclusion is in Section 7. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
The outcomes of Chapter 11 vary. Some companies liquidate during Chapter 11, 
some may be acquired or merged with another company, and some may successfully 
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emerged from Chapter 11, either as a private or public companies. Hotchkiss (1995) 
examined a sample of 806 public companies that filed for Chapter 11 between 1979 and 
1988, finding that 197 (24%) emerged as public companies. Eberhart, Altman, Aggarwal 
(1999) investigated 546 chapter 11 filing from 1980 to 1993, finding that 131(24%) 
emerged as public companies. Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) tested 225 Chapter 11 cases 
and 61 Chapter 7 cases from the bankruptcy courts of Arizona and the Southern District 
of NY from 1995 to 2001. They found that 52% companies continued as independent 
companies when they emerge from Chapter 11. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) 
examined 1200 public companies who filed for Ch 11 between Oct 1979 and Dec 1992. 
They found 339 (28%) reorganized as independent public companies, 111 (9%) were 
acquired, of which 55 were acquired by public companies. Morrision (2007) assembled a 
sample of 95 relatively small Ch 11 bankruptcy filings in the Northern District of Illinois 
in 1998. He found 9 (9%) were sold as going concerns, 27 (28%) exit as reorganized 
entities, 29 (30%) shut down in bankruptcy, and 30 (33%) liquidate.  
Some studies have examined factors influencing whether a firm can successfully 
emerge from Chapter 11. Hotchkiss (1993) showed that firm size, measured by pre-
petition assets, is the most important characteristic determining whether a firm will 
successfully reorganized. Many of the emerging firms downsize during Chapter 11. 
Denis and Rodgers (2007) find that larger firms are more likely to survive the Chapter 11 
process and emerge as independent companies because they have greater resources for 
survival. He also finds that firms are more likely to reorganize and emerge as 
independent firms if they significantly reduce their liabilities while in Chapter 11. Das 
and LeClere (working paper, 2008) also conclude that larger firms have a higher 
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likelihood of turnaround because they have greater flexibility and are more resilient in the 
face of sudden shocks.  
Duration is also an interesting aspect in Chapter 11. Li (1999) shows that the 
longer a firm stays in chapter 11, the less likely is it to exit as a reorganized firm. The 
length of time a firm is in Chapter 11 is significantly affected by whether or not it uses a 
prepackaged Chapter 11, the time it spends in pre-Chapter negotiation, the interruption of 
legal disputes, its gross profit margin, size, and the changing bankruptcy environment of 
the 1990s. Denis and Rodger (working paper, 2002) finds that the time spent in Chapter 
11 does appear to provide valuable information about the firm’s ability to restructure 
effectively. They find that changes in firm size and liability ratios are significantly 
negatively related to the likelihood of reorganizing, suggesting that firms are less likely to 
reorganize if they have not been successfully adjusting their operating or financial 
structure prior to entering Chapter 11. Denis and Rodgers (2007) found that firms with 
smaller size, better operating performance, and higher operating margins spend less time 
in Chapter 11. Firms are more likely to emerge as going concerns and to achieve positive 
post-reorganization profitability if they downsize significantly while in Chapter 11. Bris, 
Welch, Zhu (2006) find that the time in bankruptcy is a useful proxy for indirect 
bankruptcy costs. They also found that firms with more secured creditors tend to spend 
more time in bankruptcy. Moreover, they find the relationship between asset size and 
bankruptcy duration is weak or nonexistent.  Heron, Lie, and Rodgers (2007) report that 
firms with higher pre-filing debt levels tend to emerge faster. They also document a 
strong positive relation between pre- and post-reorganization debt ratios.  
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Heretofore not as much attention has been paid to the projection information 
contained in the disclosure statement submitted during Chapter 11. Hotchkiss (1995) 
shows that the median forecast errors in each year studied are negative and differ 
significantly from zero. The forecast presented at the time of reorganization may reflect 
the reporting incentives of the persons preparing those forecasts. In addition, she also 
found that particularly poor performance before bankruptcy is associated with 
particularly poor performance after bankruptcy. Lehavy (2002) reports two conflicting 
incentives for firms adopting fresh start reporting. One is to overstate the projected equity 
value in order to promote the acceptance of the reorganization plan and expedite 
emergence from bankruptcy. The other one is to underestimate equity value in order to 
enhance reported performance post bankruptcy. Gilson, Hotchkiss, and Ruback (2000) 
found that estimated values are generally unbiased, but that the dispersion of valuation 
errors is very wide. Betker, Ferris, and Lawless (1999) report that the post bankruptcy 
performance forecasts contained in disclosure statements tend to be systematically 
optimistic. Furthermore, they find a negative relation between the forecast error and the 
size of the firms as well as with the firm’s capital intensity.  
Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The projections included in the plan of reorganization tend to be 
too optimistic compared to the actual post-bankruptcy performances. 
Hypothesis 2:  The performances of firms who spent less time in Chapter 11 
process tend to be more consistent with their projections and experience better 
performances in post-bankruptcy period compared to those who spend more time in 
Chapter 11.  
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Hypothesis 3: Firms providing complete projection information in their plan of 
reorganization tend to show stronger post-bankruptcy performances compared to the ones 
without (complete) projection information.  
 
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
1.3.1 Data  
We obtained our initial sample of 1,117 firms that filed for bankruptcy between 
January 1978 and December 2006 from Professor Edward Altman of New York 
University. It contains bankruptcy filing of firms with liabilities at default of $100 million 
or greater. We added 99 filings in 2007 and 237 filings in 2008 from bankruptcydata.com 
to extend our database to the most recent period. Therefore, our starting total is 1,453 
bankruptcy filing cases from 1978 to 2008. Next, we determined the bankruptcy outcome, 
filing date, confirmation date, and emergence date (if any) from Lexis-Nexis, New 
Generation Research, and form 10-K filings with the SEC. We restricted our sample 
period to 1986 to 2008 as the New Generation Research database begins with 1986 
thereby excluding 68 firms that filed before 1986, shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.2 reports the six bankruptcy outcomes of our sample: acquired/purchased, 
liquidated, converted to Chapter 7, reorganized, dismissed and undetermined. 
Reorganization comprises 50% of the sample, in which 254 firms (18.3%) eventually 
emerged as public companies. Acquired/purchased takes 7.9%, liquidated 14.4%, 
converted to Chapter 7 6.3%, dismissed 3.0%, and undetermined case, in which the result 
is unknown or the firm remained in Chapter 11, accounts for 19.2%.  We exclude 110 
firms that were acquired or purchased, 199 firms that were liquidated during bankruptcy 
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process, and 87 firms that converted to Chapter 7 filing. Forty two dismissed cases and 
266 undetermined cases were also dropped.  From the remaining 681 reorganized firms, 
we obtained a sample of 254 firms that successfully emerged as public companies listed 
for trading in NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, or OTC markets.  
We further divided our sample into those firms that provided a complete 
projection plan during Chapter 11 process and those that did not. We collected annual 
accounting variables, including total assets, total liabilities, sales, and EBIT, from 
Compustat and SEC for up to 5 years before and after the Chapter 11 filing. We limited 
our primary sample to 87 firms whose plan of reorganization and disclosure statement 
contain complete projection information as well as both pre- and post-Chapter 11 
accounting information available in the Compustat database and/or from the SEC.  
             For each firm, we collect variables for the pre-Chapter 11, projection and actual 
post-Chapter 11 periods. Our time line is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The pre-1 period 
extends backward from the first fiscal year immediately prior to the Chapter 11 filing. 
Post+1 is the first fiscal year after emergence from Chapter 11. The filing date is the day 
when the company files for, and the emergence date is the day when the company exits 
from Chapter 11. This process produced 1,298 firm-year observations. In Table 1.3, we 
further divide our sample into 33 manufacturing (506 firm-years) and 54 non-
manufacturing firms (792 firm-years). We categorize firms with SIC codes between 2000 
and 3999 as manufacturing and non-manufacturing otherwise.  
1.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 For the pre-Chapter 11 period we have an average of 4.7 years of data, 
corresponding to 4.7 years for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Post-
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Chapter 11 we have an average of 3.1 years of data with 3.3 years for manufacturing 
firms and 3 years for non-manufacturing firms.   
Table 1.4a to 1.4c contain the summary statistics for selected variables of our 
sample firms, with Table 1.4a for all firms, Table 1.4b for manufacturing firms, and 
Table 1.4c for non-manufacturing firms respectively. The numbers are calculated an 
averages across all years and all firms. For example, the mean of total assets in the pre-
Chapter 11 period is calculated in two averaging steps. We first calculate each firm’s pre-
Chapter 11 average total assets, based on all the available years. Second, we calculate the 
average of the averages of all of the sample firms.   
We see that our non-manufacturing firms tend to be larger than our manufacturing 
firms. Our sample contains some commonalities. First, the firms that successfully 
emerged from Chapter 11 tend to downsize from their pre-Chapter 11 levels. The average 
size decreased from $2.74 billion to $2.32 billion. Second, the sample firms have 
generally reduced their total liabilities, overall from $2.34 billion to $1.7 billion. Third, 
overall average working capital increased from $384 million to $455 million after 
Chapter 11. Fourth, income also has risen into positive territory after the reorganization 
process. The pattern is similar for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. The 
asset median is much smaller than the corresponding mean for all the three tables. Thus 
our sample contains some very large firms that dominate the averages.  
We also compare the firm characteristics between manufacturing firms and non-
manufacturing firms in one year before bankruptcy in Table 1.5. Besides total assets, net 
income and book equity, we also calculate four ratios. We use working capital divided by 
total asset as liquidity measure, total liabilities divided by total assets as leverage measure, 
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net income divided by sales as profitability measure and book value of equity divided by 
total assets as solvency measures. We find that manufacturing firms tend to be smaller 
than non-manufacturing firms in one year before bankruptcy. The results show that 
manufacturing firms have better average performance in net income and higher 
profitability, but have poorer performance in book equity, higher leverage, and lower 
solvency compared to non-manufacturing firms.  
 
1.4 Overall Performance for Firms with Projection Information 
1.4.1 Bankruptcy predictor 
The relative effectiveness of the Z-score model has been much debated. The 
biggest competitors are some option-based models. Hillegeist et al. (2004) suggest their 
BSM-PB, which is based on Black Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), carries more 
information about the probability of bankruptcy than models, such as Z-score model, 
which are based on accounting ratios. However, their option-pricing based formula relies 
on some economic assumptions, and one of them assumes no bankruptcy costs. Although 
the model has some theoretical appeal, bankruptcy costs have been well discussed in 
bankruptcy literature. For example, Bris, Welch, Zhu (2006) point out that the time in 
bankruptcy is a useful proxy for indirect bankruptcy costs. Hence, it should not be 
ignored.  Miller (2009) compares the Z-score model to the distance to default model, 
finding that the distance to default model has superior ordinal and cardinal bankruptcy 
prediction power, and its rating durability outperforms the Z-score model over a long 
time span, beyond seven years. On the other hand, Miller (2009) also finds that the 
distance to default model has a more volatile rating, therefore, the Z-score model is more 
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stable than the distance to default model. However, the distance to default model is also 
based on Black Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), hence, Miller (2009) has the same 
disadvantage as Hillegeist et al. (2004). Agarwal and Taffler (2008) point out that 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) does not take into account of differential error misclassification 
costs and the economic benefits of using different credit risk assessment approach. Their 
results demonstrate that traditional accounting-ratio-based bankruptcy risk models are not 
inferior to KMV-type option-based models for credit risk assessment purposes, and 
dominate in terms of potential bank profitability when differential error classification 
costs and loan prices are taken into account. Another disadvantage of option-based model 
is that they require some variables that are not always contained in the projection 
information, the analysis of which is the main target in this paper.  For example, the 
distance to default model in Miller (2009) requires 252 daily values of market cap, total 
liabilities, dividend, and etc. Therefore, we are not able to test the quality of projection 
information based on those option-based models. Some critics such as Shumaway (2001) 
contend that the Z-score model fails to capture the time-varying changes in the 
underlying bankruptcy risk as the model usually just uses the data of one year prior to 
bankruptcy. In our paper, we collect as long as 5 years both before and post Chapter 11 
data in order to capture the dynamics in the bankruptcy risk.  
A number of researchers have found Altman’s Z-score model (1968) useful for 
predicting both bankruptcy and financial distress (Grice and Ingram, 2001). If the Z-
scores computed from projected performance are accurate predictors of the Z-scores that 
appear after the company emerges from bankruptcy, then those projection-based Z-scores 
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are likely to be useful predictors of actual performance. Accordingly, we utilize Altman’s 
model (1968) to explore the projections’ usefulness and accuracy. 
The Z-score for manufacturing firms is calculated as follows: 
                                1 2 3 4 51.2 1.4 3.3 0.6 1.0Z X X X X X= + + + +                                     (1) 
where, 
X1= working capital / total assets, a measure of the firm’s net liquid assets relative 
to its total capitalization 
X2 = retained earnings / total assets, is a measure of cumulative profitability over 
time relative to assets 
X3 = EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) / total assets, a measure of the 
productivity of the firm’s assets, abstracting from any tax or leverage factors 
X4 = market value of equity / book value of total liabilities, a measure of the value 
of firms’ equity from the market perspective   
X5 = sales / total assets, a measure of the sales generating ability of the firm’s 
assets 
Z = overall index or score 
Companies with Z-scores greater than 2.99, less than 1.81, and in between these 
values are said to be in the safe, bankruptcy and uncertainty zones respectively. 
The Z-score model for non-manufacturing firms is followings: 
                     Z=6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4                                     (2) 
where, 
X1=working capital/total assets  
X2=retained earnings/total assets 
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X3=EBIT/total assets 
X4=book value of equity/total liabilities 
Z = overall index or score 
             Firms with Z-scores greater than 2.6, lower than 1.1 and in between these values 
are said to be in the safe, bankruptcy and uncertainty zones respectively. 
Table 1.6 lists the average Z-score of our sample firms. The average Z-score is 
calculated in two steps. First, for each firm, we calculate the average Z-score for that firm 
across all its firm years. Second, we calculate the average Z-score across all our sample 
firms. Therefore, the Z-scores are across all firm years and across all sample firms. We 
see both very large and very small Z-scores. In order to reduce the potential bias 
introduced by extreme outliers, we winsorize our sample at the 5% level. With this 
procedure we retain all of the observations while mitigating the impact of the extreme 
outliers. In addition, we focus particular attention on the median rather than the mean in 
order further to limit the impact of outliers.  
Recall that the lower Z-score boundaries are 1.81 and 1.1 for manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms respectively. The five year average Z-scores of more than half 
of our sample were in the bankruptcy zone before filing Chapter 11. On the other hand, 
their average Z-scores improved substantially during the reorganization process. For all 
firms, the median Z-score changes from 0.328 in pre-Chapter 11 period to 1.330 post-
Chapter 11. For manufacturing firms, the median changed from 0.973 to 1.997, and for 
non-manufacturing firms, it changed from -0.129 to 0.662. The Wilcoxon rank sum tests 
for the median suggest that the differences in the Z-scores between pre- and post-Chapter 
11 are all significant at least at 10% level, indicating that the improvements in the Z-
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scores are substantial for all the three groups. Despite these huge improvements after the 
Chapter 11 reorganization work, the average values of both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing median Z-scores still did not reach the safe zone.  
Table 1.7 contains information on the post-Chapter 11changes in their Z-scores. 
In order to explore the dynamics of the Chapter 11 process we define four scenarios: 
above-to-above, above-to-below, below-to-below and below-to-above. An above-to-
above firm’s Z-score is above the median both pre-Chapter 11 and post-Chapter 11.  The 
other three scenarios are similarly defined. The first line is the number of firms in each 
dynamic scenario. For example in the case of the all firms group, 27 have Z-scores above 
the median in both the pre- and post-Chapter 11 periods, while the Z-scores of 17 firms 
change from above-the-median level in pre-Chapter 11 to below-the-median level after 
Chapter 11.The second line is the change in our Z-score, defined as the difference 
between post- and pre-Chapter 11 Z-scores. We also show the p-values in the bracket. 
The mean difference of Z-score in above-to-above scenario for all the firms is 1.392 
which is significant at the 1% level. Thus, on average, the post-Chapter 11 Z-score is 
significantly higher than the pre-Chapter 11 level for this scenario. In other words, if a 
firm has a Z-score that is above the median in pre-Chapter 11, and if that firm does an 
effective restructuring job, it has a good opportunity to perform better than the median 
level in the post-Chapter 11 period.  
For above-to-below scenario, we obtain negative mean differences, -1.145 for all 
firms and -1.274 for non-manufacturing firms. Both results are significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that the performance of the firm is well represented by the Z-score as we 
expected. For below-to-below scenario, we obtain significant and positive changes in the 
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Z-scores for all firms and non-manufacturing firms, similar to the changes in the above-
to-above scenario. It shows some improvements during the Chapter 11 process, however, 
as this group of firms has a Z-score that is below the median in pre-Chapter 11 period, 
indicating some particularly severe financial problems, the change in the Z-score is not 
sufficient for this group to perform better than the median level.  
The below-to-above group constitutes the most successful scenario. All of the 
mean differences are positive and significant at least at the 5% level. To change from 
below-the-median to above-the-median level is especially challenging. The magnitude of 
the restructuring work should be the largest, which is reflected in the mean difference. 
The mean difference for all firms in the above-to-above scenario is 1.392, while for the 
below-to-above scenario, the mean differences are 5.672, 3.026, and 5.676 for all firms, 
manufacturing firms, and non-manufacturing respectively.  
Non-manufacturing firms exhibit significant Z-score changes in all four scenarios, 
while manufacturing firms only have one significant result for below-to-above scenario. 
Thus compared to manufacturing firms, non-manufacturing firms appear to do a much 
better job at reorganizing.  
In Table 1.8a to 1.8e, we dig further to investigate the source of the change in the 
Z-scores in Table 1.7 above. We explore the change in the leverage (total liabilities/total 
assets) and firm size, the duration for each scenario (the length of time between the 
Chapter 11 filing date and the effective date) and the change in the variables in the Z-
score model. Table 1.8a contains statistics for all firms, Table 1.8b and 1.8c are for 
manufacturing firms, and Table 1.8d and 1.8e are for non-manufacturing firms. These 
results suggest that, the most important factors in an effective restructuring are leverage 
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and liquidity. We see that for companies in the above-the-median zone in the post-
Chapter 11 period, (above-to-above and below-to-above scenarios), improvements in 
leverage and liquidity are significant for all firms, manufacturing firms and non-
manufacturing firms. Clearly, these two key factors need to be carefully addressed during 
the Chapter 11 process. For the particularly challenging below-to-above scenario, a 
successful reorganization involves a thorough restructuring in almost all aspects. In each 
of the table, for the below-to-above scenario, we can see significant improvements in a 
majority of the factors. Comparing manufacturing firms and non-manufacturing firms, 
the latter group did a generally more effective restructuring job, as we can see in Table 
1.8d and 1.8e.  
Table 1.4a to 1.4c showed that successfully reorganized firms tend to downsize 
substantially while in Chapter 11. Size, however, does not show up as a significant factor 
in Table 1.8a-1.8e under all four scenarios. Another interesting factor is duration. We 
find that the most challenging scenario, the below-to-above, involves the shortest 
duration for most of the scenarios. Perhaps the restructuring plans for those firms are 
generally seen as effective so that they can be approved quickly without too much 
negotiation.  
Figure 1.2a to 1.2c show the histograms which allow us to compare actual Z-
scores with the corresponding projected Z-scores. We explore whether the actual Z-score 
is higher or lower than its projected level as well as the size of the deviation. The 
histograms illustrate the distribution of the deviations of all firm-year observations for 
our sample. We find that the actual post-Chapter 11 Z-score is very generally below its 
projected level: 75% of all our sample firms, 83% for manufacturing firms, and 69% for 
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non-manufacturing firms, have actual Z-scores below their projected levels. For all firms, 
36.5% of all our firm-year observations have actual Z-scores which are between the 
predicted and half of the predicted levels. Clearly the projected Z-score obtained during 
the reorganization period tends to be too optimistic. 
1.4.2 Correlation tests between projected performance and post Chapter 11 
performance 
Table 1.9 contains the correlations for projected and actual post-Chapter 11 
performances across all firm-year observations. The overall correlation, which includes 
all sample firms, is positive, 0.14, and significant at the 5% level. For non-manufacturing 
firms we find a positive correlation of .22 between projected Z-score and actual post 
bankruptcy Z-score which is also significant at 5% level. We obtained a negative but 
insignificant correlation for manufacturing firms.  Therefore, the post bankruptcy 
performance for manufacturing firms tends to be unrelated to their projections. In short, 
non-manufacturing firms generally provide reasonably useful projections whereas those 
from manufactures tend to be unreliable.  
Table 1.10 contains statistics for the prediction error defined as the difference 
between the post-Chapter 11 and projected Z-score. The prediction error means are -0.66, 
-1.32, and -0.52 for all firms, manufacturing firms, and non-manufacturing firms 
respectively.  All are significant at the 5% level or better. These results are consistent 
with Gilson, Hotchkiss, and Ruback (2000) in that the projected values are generally 
unbiased, but the estimates are not very precise. These negative error terms imply that 
when firms file plans of reorganization and disclosure statements, they tend to be 
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optimistic about their after-emergence performance, which is also shown in Betker, Ferris, 
and Lawless (1999).  
 
1.5 Duration Effects 
Denis and Rodgers (2002) find that time spent in Chapter 11 appears to provide 
valuable information about a firm’s ability to restructure effectively. Li (1999) reports 
that the length of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is significantly affected by the time it spends 
in pre-Chapter 11 negotiation, the interruption of legal disputes, its gross profit margin, 
and firms size. Denis and Rodgers (working paper, 2002) find firms are more likely to 
emerge as going concerns and to achieve positive post-reorganization profitability if they 
significantly downsize while in Chapter 11.  
Starting from Table 1.11, we show the results for the impact of duration (the 
number of days between a firm’s bankruptcy filing date and its reorganization plan’s 
effective date) on the performance of our sample firms. Table 1.11 reports our sample 
firms’ average duration to be 409 days. This is much shorter than the 828 day average 
duration reported in Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), indicating that the companies which 
can successfully emerged as public firms, generally spend much less time than average in 
Chapter 11. The extreme cases include one firm which spent 2,217 days, and another 
which only spent 33 days in Chapter 11. We would expect a longer duration period for 
some companies, especially larger ones as they generally have more parties to deal with 
in their reorganization plans. The extreme durations impact the overall mean such that 
that the duration median is substantially below the mean. For example, in Table 1.11, the 
overall median is 266 days, compared to a mean of 409 days. Thus half of our sample 
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firms complete their reorganization process in less than a year. The average durations of 
our sample also differ for manufacturing (522 days) and non-manufacturing (336 days) 
firms. The maximum duration of manufacturing firms is 2,217 days, while only 1,257 for 
non-manufacturing firms. Manufacturers may be more complicated to reorganize with 
inventories, work in process, raw materials, etc. to deal with. 
In Table 1.12, we repeat our correlation test of projected and post-Chapter 11 Z-
scores for different durations. We divide the two groups based on their own group 
duration medians. A firm having a longer duration (shorter) than the median, is defined as 
a long (short) duration case. For example, the median duration for all the firms is 266 
days. Thus a firm whose duration is longer than 266 days is assigned to the long duration 
group. We find a positive correlation between the projected and the post bankruptcy Z-
score for our short duration group. The results are significant at least at the 5% level. The 
correlation between all the firms in the short duration group is 0.318, and 0.391 for 
manufacturing firms and 0.306 for non-manufacturing firms, which is stronger than the 
overall correlation shown in Table 1.9. In contrast, the correlations are positive but not 
significant for all firms and non-manufacturing firms and weakly significantly negative in 
the long duration group.  
Another interesting result in Table 1.12 is the correlation for manufacturing firms 
of short and long duration. When we divide manufacturing firms based on their durations 
in Chapter 11, our correlation results differ. Shorter duration firms have a positive 
correlation, 0.391, between projected information and actual post-bankruptcy information, 
and it is significant at 5% level. Longer duration firms actually have a negative 
correlation this time, -0.288, which is significant at 10% level. Thus a manufacturing firm 
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spending less time in Chapter 11 generally has a much more reliable forecast of post-
Chapter 11 performance than a firm that spends a longer time in the reorganization 
process. For non-manufacturing firms, the correlation remains positive for short duration 
group, which is consistent with the overall result. Firms with short durations show 
stronger forecasting accuracy, a correlation of 0.306. The correlation for firms with long 
durations is also positive, but that result is not significant.  
In Table 1.13, we repeat the univariate tests of the predicting errors. Table 1.12 
reveals differences between short and long duration cases. In Table 1.13, we explore the 
different duration effects more closely. The mean error is the difference between actual 
and projected post-Chapter 11 Z-score. First, we find that all the mean errors are negative. 
For all firms, the mean errors are -0.541 and -1.401 for firms with short duration and long 
duration respectively. The results are significant at least at the 5% level. For 
manufacturing firms, the mean errors are -0.540 and -2.703 for short and long duration 
firms respectively.  For non-manufacturing firms, the mean errors are -0.538 and -0.846 
for short and long duration firms respectively. The negative mean errors are all consistent 
with the results of Table 1.10, indicating that for all categories, the actual post 
performance is less favorable than predicted in the disclosure statement. We obtain all 
significant results except for non-manufacturing firms with short durations. Second, the 
long duration firms always generate larger mean errors. For example, for all firms, the 
mean error for short duration group is -0.541, compared to -1.401 for all firms with long 
duration, and the difference is 0.860, which is significant at 5% level. This result is 
consistent with Table 1.12 that the short duration firms generally provide more reliable 
projections. The mean errors are not as large as those with long durations, although still 
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the post-bankruptcy performance is generally below the predicted level. Third, we find 
that the non-manufacturing firms have a smaller mean error, no matter what duration 
groups they belong to. For the short duration group, the non-manufacturing group has a 
mean error of -0.538, which is a little smaller than the one for manufacturing firms, -
0.540. For the long duration group, non-manufacturing firms have a mean error of -0.846, 
compared to -2.073 for manufacturing firms. Hence, the post-bankruptcy performances of 
non-manufacturing firms are more likely to be consistent with their projections. 
Moreover, if we combine what we have found so far in this section, we would prefer 
short duration group and non-manufacturing firms. The non-manufacturing firms with 
short durations have a mean error of -0.538. That is, the actual post-bankruptcy 
performance for non-manufacturing firms with short durations would be the most in line 
with its prediction.   
In Table 1.14 we divide our sample into quartiles based on their total assets with 
Q1 defined as those firms that are in the below 25% quartile and Q2, Q3 and Q4 for 50%, 
75% and 100% cut points respectively. We find that, in general, duration increases with 
size, although not monotonically. For all firms, Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 have average 
durations of 354, 276, 328, and 679 days, respectively. The most significant result comes 
from Q4 groups, which has the longest average duration, especially for manufacturing 
firms (1037 days). The Q3-Q4 magnitude increases from 328 to 1037 days for 
manufacturing firms. The trend is similar for the duration median numbers. The results 
are consistent with Denis and Rodgers (working paper, 2002) that larger firms and firms 
with higher liability ratios spend more time in Chapter 11, consistent with bankruptcies 
being more complex for firms that are larger or that have more debt.  
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In Table 1.15 we explore the relationship between duration and excess stock 
return, (stock return less the corresponding S&P 500 return). Duration itself is possibly 
an indicator of the efficiency of the reorganization plan process. The first interesting 
result is the significant large positive excess returns for the long duration group in the 
first year after emergence, both for means and medians. The mean of excess returns for 
all firms in the long duration group is 49.2% and the median is 18.7%. This is mainly 
contributed from the non-manufacturing firms, with 50.9% in mean and 18.8% in median. 
The significant short-term positive returns do not exist in manufacturing firms. However, 
the differences between the short and long duration groups are not significant at almost 
all year and all firm levels, indicating that even though some short-term excess return is 
possible, the two duration groups’ excess returns do not differ significantly.  
In Table 1.16, we take a deeper look at the period between the confirmation date 
and the Chapter 11 effective date. This is the period between the time when a company 
has its reorganization plan approved by the court and it officially emerges from Chapter 
11. For all our sample firms, they spent an average of 37 days during this period. The 
median is 22 days. One firm took 348 days, and another only 1 day, to emerge from 
Chapter 11 after plan confirmation.  
Stock trading for some companies starts right after their reorganization plan 
receives court approval, while some may wait until they officially emerge from Chapter 
11. In Table 1.17, we identify 7, 3 manufacturing firms and 4 non-manufacturing firms, 
with a trading history between their confirmation and effective dates. The median of the 
daily excess return, which is the difference between the daily absolute return and the 
daily S&P500 returns, is -0.02% for all the sample firms, -0.81% for manufacturing firms, 
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and 0.22% for non-manufacturing firms.  The mean excess returns are not significant for 
any of the groups. 
 
1.6 Group Comparison - With Projection and Without Projection 
 For comparison we identify 85 firms which did not provide projection 
information during the Chapter 11 process that have both pre-Chapter 11 and post-
Chapter 11 financial data available in the Compustat database and/or in SEC filings from 
our 254 emerged public firms. Providing a projection plan in the Chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization and disclosure statement process may indicate that the company has an 
effective systematic restructuring plan. We shall now examine the Z-scores, duration, 
leverages, and excess stock returns for the with- and without-projection groups. 
Table 1.18 shows the overall Z-scores in both the pre- and post-Chapter 11 
periods. We find that the median Z-scores for the without-projection groups are lower 
than the median Z-scores for the with-projection group in the pre-Chapter 11 period, 
except for manufacturing firms. The pre-Chapter 11 median of all firms for the with-
projection group is 0.328, which is higher than the corresponding median, 0.198, for the 
without-projection group. However, both the mean and median differences between two 
groups are not significance in the pre-Chapter 11 Z-scores. It seems that overall there is 
no substantial difference between with-projection and without-projection group before 
bankruptcy filing. In the post-Chapter 11 period, the Z-scores for the without-projection 
group are lower than the with-projection group for all firm categories in medians. For 
example, after Chapter 11, the median of all firms for the with-projection group increases 
to 1.330, compared to the median of 0.283 for the without-projection group. The median 
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differences between the groups in the post-Chapter 11 Z-scores are significantly positive 
for all firms and non-manufacturing firms, suggesting that with-projection group did the 
better restructuring job during the Chapter 11 process. The improvement in the Z-scores 
for the with-projection group is obvious. The improvement for the without-projection 
group is, however, much smaller. If a company is in especially poor shape before filing 
for Chapter 11, and does not put together a systematic restructuring plan with projections, 
it is likely to continue to suffer from the distress in the post bankruptcy period. 
In Table 1.19a and 1.19b, we decompose the Z-score into 5 years before and after 
Chapter 11 in order to explore the dynamics of the change in Z-scores over time. Not 
surprisingly as firms move toward their Chapter 11 filings, their overall mean and median 
of Z-scores decrease for both the with-projection and without-projection groups. The 
magnitude of decrease in the Z-scores is especially large for the without-projection group 
in the last year before filing. For example, for all firms, the mean Z-score for the without-
projection group decrease from -2.753 to -6.525 in the last year compared to 0.008 to -
1.854 for the with-projection group. The median Z-score decreases from 0.688 to -2.143 
for the without-projection group, compared to 0.242 to -1.147 for the with-projection 
group. In the year prior to the Chapter 11 filing, the without-projection group generally 
has a lower Z-score than the with-projection group, and the difference between two 
groups are significantly positive for almost all categories. Even though we do not find a 
substantial difference in the overall results in Table 1.18a, a closer look at the year by 
year results do reveal that the with-projection group is actually stronger than the without-
projection group one year before the bankruptcy filing. When they emerge from Chapter 
11 protection, the median Z-scores for the with-projection group generally increase over 
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the next 5 years. However, for the without-projection group in post-Chapter 11, the 
median Z-scores for al firms are literally not significantly different from zero for all five 
years. When we compared their Z-scores on a year by year base, we also find that the 
with-projection group does a better job in the post Chapter 11 period. We find 
significantly higher Z-score for the with-projection group in all firms and manufacturing 
firms, and they outperform the without-projection group for up to three years after 
emergence. The without-projection group enters Chapter 11 in worse shape compared to 
with-projection group. When those two groups emerge from Chapter 11, the with-
projection group still performs better than the without-projection group, which is 
consistent with Table 1.18a and 1.18b that the distress in without-projection group tends 
to persist in the long-run. Moreover, we find that only about half of the firms that 
emerging from Chapter 11 survives 5 or more years. The rest may be acquired, liquidated 
or file for bankruptcy again. 
In Table 1.20a and 1.21b, we report the components of Z-scores by year both 
before and after Chapter 11, for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms respectively. 
As the results may be biased by extreme outliers, as we did before, we only focus on the 
median numbers. We multiply the value for each factor by their Z-score coefficients in 
order to evaluate how each factor impacts the Z-score. In Table 1.20a and 1.20b, overall, 
the with-projection group is generally in a bit better shape pre-Chapter 11 than the 
without-projection group even though all the factors are decreasing as they approach their 
filing. The Z-scores for the without-projection group decrease at a faster pace than the 
ones for with-projection group. In addition to the Z-scores for with-projection group, 
three of their five factors, RE/TA, a profitability measure, EBIT/TA, a productivity 
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measure and Sales/TA, a turnover measure, are higher on a year-by-year basis than the 
ones for without-projection group. MktEquity/TL, a solvency measure, decreased 
substantially for without-projection group before Chapter 11. Perhaps the debt burden is 
heavier or the value of the stock is shrinking more quickly, or both.    
The post-Chapter 11 performance difference for manufacturing firms between the 
with-projection and without-projection groups is even more obvious. The Z-scores for the 
with-projection group are increasing over time, while for the without-projection group, 
are decreasing. The with-projection group still has better performance in profitability, 
productivity, and turnover measure. Most of the factors are increasing for the with-
projection group, however, the profitability and productivity measures are decreasing for 
the without-projection group. 
Table 1.21a and 1.21b contains the results for non-manufacturing firms. As the Z-
score models differ for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms, the factors and 
coefficients are different for them. None the less, the big picture revealed in Table 1.20a-
1.20b and 1.21a-1.21b is consistent. Pre-Chapter 11, the with-projection group exhibits 
better performance. This is not only revealed in the overall Z-scores, but also in RE/TA 
and EBIT/TA. Moreover, the without-projection group’s Z-scores and four factors all 
decrease substantially. Post-Chapter 11 the with-projection group tends to do better than 
the without-projection group in the first three years. The WC/TA, a liquidity measure, is 
also better for the with-projection group. Moreover, the BookEquity/TL, which is a 
solvency measure for non-manufacturing firms, improves more for the with-projection 
group than the without-projection group. To improve this solvency measure, the company 
needs either to increase the book value of shareholder’s equity, or decrease the total debt 
27 
 
burden. One important advantage of Chapter 11 is that it may help the company reduce 
its debt burden. Therefore, improvement in this measure may suggest that the 
reorganization is effective for the with-projection group.  For the without-projection 
group, however, the restructuring work is not as effective. Starting in the fourth year, the 
median Z-scores for the without-projection group outperform the ones for the with-
projection group. This is consistent with the U-shape in Z-scores that we found in Table 
1.19b that the third year after emerging from Chapter 11 might be critical for the without-
projection group.  
Table 1.22 reports the duration differences between the with- and without-
projection groups. Both groups have some extreme maximum duration numbers. For 
example, the longest duration of all firms for the with-projection group reaches 2,235 
days, more than 6 years. Accordingly, we focus on the medians. For the without-
projection group, the median duration of all firms is 390 days, compared to 211 days for 
the with-projection group. Median durations for manufacturing firms are 405 days for the 
without-projection group, compared to 264 for the with-projection group. For non-
manufacturing firms, we obtain 390 for without-projection group compared with 195 for 
with-projection group. Hence, all the median durations for the without-projection group 
are longer than those of the with-projection group. These results suggest that approval of 
a reorganization plan lacking detailed projection information is more difficult. 
Table 1.23a and 1.23b show the post-Chapter 11 5-year excess return and duration 
between with- and without- projection groups. We found that the overall long duration 
group of with-projection firms offers some significant positive excess returns in the short-
term, one year after emergence. However, short and long duration groups do differ for 
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with-projection firms. The excess returns for the without-projection group are similar. 
We do not find significant group difference, or any short-term excess returns for either 
one of the duration groups, indicating that the duration effect is not obvious in the excess 
returns between different duration groups. 
In addition to the Z-score model’s liquidity, profitability, productivity, solvency 
and turnover variables, another important factor for distress firms is leverage (total 
liabilities divided by total assets). In Table 1.24, we compare the leverage in pre- and 
post-Chapter 11 for both with- and the without-projection groups. We find that for both 
groups the overall leverage decreases from pre- to post-Chapter 11, indicating a certain 
level of debt relief. The median leverage of all firms are similar between these two 
groups, from 0.846 pre-Chapter 11 to 0.727 post-Chapter 11 for with-projection group, 
and from 0.840 to 0.743 for the without-projection group.  The decreases are -0.118 and -
0.098 of all firms in with- and without-projection group respectively, which are 
significant at least at 5% level.  
Table 1.25 compares the leverage across two groups for both pre- and post-
Chapter 11 period. We find no significant differences between two groups in both pre- 
and post-Chapter 11. However, manufacturing firms in the with-projection group have 
the higher leverage before Chapter 11, 0.133 higher in median which is significant at 5% 
level. After Chapter 11, the situation continues, in which the leverage for manufacturing 
firms in with-projection group is 0.329 higher in median compared to the one in the 
without-projection group. For non-manufacturing firms, the leverage of with-projection 
groups is 0.045 higher than the one of without-projection group.  
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We examine leverage for 5 years before and after Chapter 11 for these two groups 
and display the results in Table 1.26a and 1.26b respectively. We find that leverage 
increases as the firms approach a Chapter 11 filing for both groups. In all firms, the with-
projection group has higher leverage in pre-2 and pre-3 compared to without-projection 
group, but the difference disappears one year before bankruptcy, when both groups suffer 
from higher a leverage burden. Particularly in manufacturing firms, the higher leverage in 
the with-projection group persists for up to four years before bankruptcy, while the 
differences are insignificant for non-manufacturing firms. Table 1.26b contains the post-
Chapter 11 results. Comparing the medians, the with-projection group shows a certain 
level of leverage improvement post-Chapter 11. For example, for all firms, the leverage is 
1.028 one year before bankruptcy, but it decreases to 0.690 in the year after emergence 
from bankruptcy. We can see that decrease in leverage for the with-projection group for 
all firms, manufacturing firms, and non-manufacturing firms in the post-Chapter 11 
period. However, the decrease in the without-projection group is not obvious. For all 
firms, two groups do not show a significant difference in both mean and median leverage 
for up to five year after bankruptcy. For manufacturing firms, both groups have a 
comparable level of leverage. For non-manufacturing firms, the with-projection group 
has lower leverage than the without-projection group for up to two years after Chapter 11. 
Therefore, the year by year results show that the higher leverage in the with-projection 
group in pre-Chapter 11 disappears in the post-Chapter 11 period such that the leverage is 
comparable for all firms between two groups, or even lower in non-manufacturing firms.   
In Table 1.27, we report similar tests regarding the excess return (ERi,t = ri,t – rmkt,t)  
where ERi, t is the excess return for company i at time t, ri,t is the absolute return for 
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company i at time t, and rmkt,t is the market (S&P 500) return at time t. We collect the 
monthly return information for our sample from CRSP. The excess return results are 
mixed. Our objective is to check the performance over time in each group. All the mean 
and median excess returns in pre-Chapter 11 for both with- and without-projection groups 
are negative, and significantly different from zero. Their post-performance is not 
distinguishable from zero. However, the pre- to post-Chapter 11 improvement for each 
individual group is substantial. The differences in both mean and median are significantly 
positive at least at 10% level.  
In Table 1.28, we compare between with- and without-projection group in both 
pre- and post-Chapter 11 period. The only significant results in group comparison are the 
mean difference in pre-Chapter 11. Therefore, even though for each group, they 
improved significantly throughout Chapter 11, the overall performance between different 
groups seems not substantial.  
In Table 1.29a, we decompose the excess return into the five individual years 
before the Chapter 11 filing. Both groups’ mean and median excess returns are not only 
negative but also decreasing as they approach Chapter 11. For the with-projection group, 
the median excess return decreases from -53.1% two years before bankruptcy to -77.9% 
one year before bankruptcy. For the without-projection group, the excess return changes 
from -71.2% two years before their bankruptcy filing to -74.5% one year before the 
bankruptcy filing. The mean and median differences between two groups are significantly 
positive two years before the bankruptcy filing, but they both suffer from poor 
performance one year before the filing, indicating that the stock performance of the with-
projection group did not outperform the without-projection group before Chapter 11.  
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Table 1.29b shows the excess return results in the post-Chapter 11 period. The 
with-projection group reports a large positive excess return in the first year after Chapter 
11, 38.1% for all firms, which is significant at the 1% level and 41.6% for non-
manufacturing firms, which is significant at 5% level. The median numbers show the 
same pattern. This result is consistent with Eberhart, Altman, and Aggarwal (1999) who 
find that the firms emerging from Chapter 11 generally offer a positive excess return in 
the 200 days following emergence. On the other hand, the favorable performance is not 
sustainable in the long run. For all the following years, the results are not different from 
zero. This second result is consistent with Alderson and Better (1999). They find that the 
reorganized firms on average neither underperform nor outperform S&P500 index over 
the five years after emerging. In group comparison, the with-projection group did a better 
job compared to the without-projection group also in the short-run, as the mean and 
median difference between groups are significant one year after emergence. However, all 
the other mean and median differences between the two groups are not significantly 
different from zero for the remaining four years after Chapter 11.  
Even though the results show improvement and some positive median excess 
returns, especially for the with-projection group, we need to be cautious as the raw excess 
returns reported here are not risk-adjusted. Firms that file and then emerge from Chapter 
11 are usually viewed as quite risky. 
Starting from Table 1.30, we show Sharpe ratio results in order to take risk into 
account. The Sharpe ratio results are consistent with the excess return results. Both 
groups did make some significant improvements throughout the restructuring process, 
shown in the medians.  
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We decompose the Sharpe ratio into the 5 years before bankruptcy in Table 1.31a. 
The results show that these ratios are decreasing for both the with- and without-projection 
groups as they approach the filing. The without-projection group experiences some 
significant negative Sharpe ratios as they approach filing Chapter 11, while the Sharpe 
ratios for the with-projection are not distinguishable from zero. Again, the with-
projection group did not outperform without-projection one year before the official 
filings. 
When we compare the post-Chapter 11filing date Sharpe ratios of two groups in 
Table 1.31b, we find that, the with-projection group still enjoy significant positive Sharpe 
ratios in the short-term, but not the without-projection group, which is consistent with the 
excess return results shown in Table 1.29b . However, when we take risk into 
consideration, the evidence of the difference between two groups is weaker. Now only 
the difference in medians between two groups shows some evidence of better 
performance for the with-projection group, at a 10% level of significance. This weak 
advantage also disappears in the following years. 
Besides the Sharpe ratio, we also take a look at the Treynor ratio starting in Table 
1.32. Treynor ratio is similar to the Sharpe ratio in that both of them are measures of 
excess return per unit of risk. The risk in Sharpe ratio is measured by the volatility, while 
in Treynor ratio it is measured by beta. The big picture in the Treynor ratio is consistent 
with that of the Sharpe ratio. The overall results in Table 1.32 show that Treynor ratios 
are negative for both groups pre-Chapter 11, -0.137 of all firms in the with-projection 
group and -0.205 of all firms in the without-projection group. Comparing the mean and 
median differences, we see some signs of improvement for all firms, 0.621 improvement 
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in means for with-projection group and 0.222 improvement in medians for without-
projection group, which are significant at least at 10% level.  
In Table 1.33a and 1.33b, we decompose the Treynor ratio into five years pre- and 
post-Chapter 11. Both mean and median Treynor ratios show the deterioration over the 
five years before Chapter 11. For the with-projection group, the Treynor ratios are even 
lower than the ones for without-projection group. We find that for all firms, the with-
projection group has a significantly lower Treynor ratio, -2.773 in means, than the 
without-projection group, and the difference comes from the non-manufacturing firms.  
On the other hand, post-Chapter 11, the with-projection group did the better job, 
mainly in the first two years after emergence from Chapter 11. In the first year in post-
Chapter 11 period, the Treynor ratio of all firms in the with-projection group is -0.025, 
compared to -0.220 for the without-projection group, with a significant advantage of 
0.195 higher in medians. However, as we have found in previous analysis, the advantage 
is not sustainable over the next few years. The difference between Treynor and Sharpe 
ratio results is that although we see some improvement after Chapter 11, the short-term 
abnormal return phenomenon is not strong in the Treynor ratio results. However, the path 
of Treynor ratio in the five years after emergence is consistent with the Sharpe ratio. That 
is, for the with-projection group, the performance is ok in the first two years after 
emergence, but in the long term, we get negative Treynor ratios from the third year after 
Chapter 11, indicating the long-term distress continues. For the without-projection group, 
the first year Treynor ratio is not as good as the one for with-projection group. In the long 
term, it has no consistent pattern. Therefore, the with-projection group still outperforms 
the without-projection group, especially in the short term. 
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In summary, when we compare all these tables between the with- and without-
projection groups, we find that in both pre- and post-Chapter 11 periods, the with-
projection group outperforms the without-projection group with strong evidence in the Z-
scores and some evidence in the excess returns, Sharpe and Teynor Ratios. Thus a 
company that files detailed projection information provides a  signal to the market that it 
has probably put in place an effective reorganization plan designed to improve its 
performance. Therefore, the projection information acts like a roadmap for the 
reorganized company. It may help them to emerge as a stronger company.  
 
1.7 Regression Tests 
In this section, we run a regression on the excess returns against some variables 
we investigated above.  
Excess Return = α + β1*Firm Characteristic + β2*Chapter 11 Characteristic +                   
                           β3*Duration                                                                         (3) 
where, firm characteristic is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm is 
a manufacturer and zero otherwise. Chapter 11 characteristic is also a dummy variable 
which takes the value of one if the company has a projection in its reorganization plan 
and zero otherwise. For duration, we use the log of number of days in Chapter 11.  
Table 1.34 contains the results of our regression tests. The dependent variable is 
the post-Chapter 11 excess return for all years, which is a function of duration and two 
dummy variables that we have looked into in the previous analysis. Curiously, none of 
these three variables are significant in explaining the excess return in the post-Chapter 11 
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period. The R square, 0.0022, is very low. It shows that for all years of data, not much 
can be explained using our three variables alone.   
In Table 1.35, we repeat the above regression test, but using only the first year 
excess return after emergence, as we find some large positive excess returns in the short 
term in previous analysis. As we can see from the results, all the t-values of our three 
parameters increase when using the first year after emergence data. The most obvious one 
is for Chapter 11 characteristics, for which 1 represents firms with complete projection 
information, and 0 otherwise. It is marginally significant at 10% level. That is, among 
manufacturing or non-manufacturing, with projection or without projection, and the 
length of the duration, the projection dummy is the most significant variable in explaining 
the first year excess return in post Chapter 11. The R square increases to 0.0559, 
indicating about 5.5% can be explained by the marginally significant variable, Chapter 11 
characteristics. However, the other two variables are still insignificant. 
In Table 1.36, we use the market model to estimate the beta for our samples. Beta 
is a measure of systematic risk designed to capture the volatility of one stock relative to 
market volatility. We regress the monthly returns for each firm-year observation against 
the S&P 500 monthly return. Most of our results are in the range of 1 to 2. If we compare 
the pre-Chapter 11 beta and post-Chapter 11 beta, we find that all the betas decrease from 
their pre-Chapter 11 levels. For example, for all the firms with a projection, the beta 
before Chapter 11 is 1.37, and it decreases to 1.27 after Chapter 11. For all the firms 
without a projection, the beta also decreases from 1.36 to 1.04. The good news is that a 
successful reorganization can help to stabilize the business and operation, which can 
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further help to decrease the risks of the stocks. However, the bad news is that the amount 
of the alleviation in the risks is limited.  
 
1.8 Conclusion 
We analyze the firms that emerged from Chapter 11 as a public companies and 
the quality of the projection information contained in the disclosure statements submitted 
during Chapter 11. The overall results show that the performance improved from pre-
Chapter 11 to post-Chapter 11. However, based on the Z-scores, the performance has 
generally not reached the safe zone. We show that the post-bankruptcy performance tends 
to be in line with the projections contained in the disclosure statement. The significant 
and negative error terms indicate that the projections are usually optimistic. Moreover, 
we show that leverage and liquidity are the most important factors in the success of the 
reorganization, but size is not a significant factor.  
We also analyze the duration effect during the Chapter 11, as duration itself may 
serve as a proxy for the quality of the reorganization plan. We find that the short duration 
group shows a stronger positive correlation between the projected information and the 
actual post-bankruptcy performance, especially for non-manufacturing firms. Firm size is 
also related to duration, as larger firms tend to spend more time in Chapter 11. However, 
duration does not have a strong influence on the stock performance, as the excess returns 
do not behave significantly between short duration and long duration group.  
The presence of complete projection information also serves as a proxy for the 
effectiveness of the reorganization plan. We compare our sample with those firms that 
also emerged as public firms but did not provide, or provided incomplete projection 
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information in Chapter 11.  We find that the Z-scores are higher for the with-projection 
group in both pre- and post-Chapter 11 periods. Duration is shorter for the with-
projection group and the decrease in leverage is greater for the with-projection group 
during Chapter 11. Regarding the stock performance after emergence, we find that the 
with-projection group provides positive excess return in the first year after emergence, 
but not in the long term. 
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Figure 1.1 Time Line 
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Figure 1.2a Histograms of Deviation  
between Actual and Projected Post-Chapter 11 Z-scores: All Firms 
The percentage is the level of deviation between actual Z-score and its projected level, which is  
((actual Z-score /projected Z-score) – 1) *100%.  
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Figure 1.2b Histograms of Deviation  
between Actual and Projected Post-Chapter 11 Z-scores: Manufacturing Firms 
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Figure 1.2c Histograms of Deviation 
between Actual and Projected Post-Chapter 11 Z-scores: Non-Manufacturing Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
28.1%
18.0%
22.7%
11.7%
3.1%
16.4%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
<=-100% (-100%, -50%] (-50%, 0%] (0%, 50%] (50%, 100%] >100%
Non-Manufacturing Firms
   
 
 
42
Ta
bl
e 
1.
1 
Sa
m
pl
e 
Th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f t
he
 b
an
kr
up
tc
y 
fil
in
gs
 w
ith
 li
ab
ili
tie
s o
f $
10
0 
m
ill
io
n 
or
 m
or
e 
at
 d
ef
au
lt 
be
tw
ee
n 
19
78
 a
nd
 2
00
8.
 W
e 
re
str
ic
te
d 
ou
r s
am
pl
e 
pe
rio
d 
to
 1
98
6 
to
 2
00
8 
as
 th
e 
N
ew
 G
en
er
at
io
n 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
da
ta
ba
se
 b
eg
in
s w
ith
 1
98
6 
th
er
eb
y 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
68
 fi
rm
s t
ha
t f
ile
d 
be
fo
re
 1
98
6.
  
 
Y
ea
r o
f F
ili
ng
 
N
um
be
r o
f F
irm
s 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
19
78
-1
98
5 
   
 6
8 
   
 4
.7
%
 
19
86
-2
00
8 
13
85
 
  9
5.
3%
 
To
ta
l 
14
53
 
10
0.
0%
 
   
 
  
 
 
43 
T
ab
le
 1
.2
 B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
Fi
lin
g 
O
ut
co
m
es
 
B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
ou
tc
om
es
 a
re
 c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 in
to
 si
x 
gr
ou
ps
: a
cq
ui
re
d/
pu
rc
ha
se
d,
 li
qu
id
at
ed
, c
on
ve
rt 
to
 C
ha
pt
er
 7
, r
eo
rg
an
iz
ed
, d
is
m
is
se
d 
an
d 
un
de
te
rm
in
ed
. 
A
cq
ui
re
d/
pu
rc
ha
se
d 
fir
m
s s
el
l s
ub
st
an
tia
lly
 a
ll 
of
 it
s a
ss
et
s t
o 
a 
si
ng
le
 b
uy
er
 w
hi
le
 in
 b
an
kr
up
tc
y.
 U
nd
et
er
m
in
ed
 o
ut
co
m
es
 a
re
 th
os
e 
fo
r w
hi
ch
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
is
 
un
kn
ow
n 
or
 th
e 
fir
m
 re
m
ai
ne
d 
in
 C
ha
pt
er
 1
1a
s o
f y
ea
r e
nd
 2
00
8.
 W
e 
fo
cu
s o
n 
th
e 
fir
m
s t
ha
t s
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 e
m
er
ge
d 
fr
om
 C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
as
 p
ub
lic
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 li
st
ed
 in
 
N
Y
SE
, N
A
SD
A
Q
, A
M
EX
, o
r O
TC
 m
ar
ke
ts
. 
 
O
ut
co
m
e 
N
um
be
r o
f F
irm
s 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
A
cq
ui
re
d/
Pu
rc
ha
se
d 
  1
10
 
   
 7
.9
%
 
Li
qu
id
at
ed
 
  1
99
 
  1
4.
4%
 
C
on
ve
rt 
to
 C
ha
pt
er
 7
 
   
 8
7 
   
 6
.3
%
 
R
eo
rg
an
iz
ed
 
  6
81
 
  
   
   
   
- p
ub
lic
 fi
rm
s 
  2
54
 
  1
8.
3%
 
   
   
   
- p
riv
at
e 
fir
m
s 
  1
39
 
  1
0.
0%
 
   
   
   
- o
th
er
s 
  2
88
 
  2
0.
8%
 
D
is
m
is
se
d 
   
 4
2 
   
 3
.0
%
 
U
nd
et
er
m
in
ed
 
  2
66
 
  1
9.
2%
 
To
ta
l  
13
85
 
10
0.
0%
 
  
 
  
 
 
44 
T
ab
le
 1
.3
 F
in
al
 S
am
pl
es
 a
nd
 F
ir
m
-Y
ea
r 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
Fi
rm
s m
us
t a
ls
o 
ha
ve
 c
om
pl
et
e 
pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 th
ei
r p
la
n 
of
 re
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 st
at
em
en
t a
nd
 b
ot
h 
pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
an
d 
po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
C
om
pu
st
at
 d
at
ab
as
e.
 W
e 
fu
rth
er
 d
iv
id
e 
ou
r s
am
pl
e 
in
to
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
an
d 
no
n-
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
ei
r S
IC
 c
od
e.
 If
 it
s 
SI
C
 c
od
e 
is
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
00
 a
nd
 3
99
9,
 th
e 
fir
m
 is
 c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 a
s a
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r. 
O
th
er
w
is
e,
 n
on
-m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r. 
B
as
ed
 o
n 
C
om
pu
st
at
 a
nd
 S
EC
, w
e 
al
so
 c
ol
le
ct
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fo
r 5
 y
ea
rs
 b
ef
or
e 
an
d 
af
te
r t
he
 C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
fil
in
g 
(if
 n
ot
, t
he
n 
w
e 
ju
st
 u
se
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f y
ea
rs
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
in
 th
e 
da
ta
ba
se
), 
w
hi
ch
 g
iv
es
 u
s 
to
ta
l o
f 1
29
8 
fir
m
-y
ea
r o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
.  
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
N
um
be
r o
f F
irm
s 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
N
um
be
r o
f F
irm
 
Y
ea
r O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
33
 
  3
7.
9%
 
  5
06
 
  3
9.
0%
 
N
on
-m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
54
 
  6
2.
1%
 
  7
92
 
  6
1.
0%
 
To
ta
l 
87
 
10
0.
0%
 
12
98
 
10
0.
0%
 
 
  
 
 
45 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
4a
 D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
ist
ic
s f
or
 A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
W
e 
co
lle
ct
 e
ig
ht
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 fo
r e
ac
h 
fir
m
 in
 o
ur
 sa
m
pl
e,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
to
ta
l l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s, 
m
ar
ke
t e
qu
ity
, b
oo
k 
va
lu
e 
of
 e
qu
ity
, w
or
ki
ng
 c
ap
ita
l, 
re
ta
in
ed
 
ea
rn
in
gs
, s
al
es
, E
B
IT
, a
nd
 n
et
 in
co
m
e.
 W
e 
ob
ta
in
 th
e 
da
ta
 m
ai
nl
y 
fr
om
 C
om
pu
st
at
, a
nd
 h
an
d 
co
lle
ct
 th
e 
re
st
 fr
om
 1
0-
K
 fi
lin
gs
. M
ar
ke
t e
qu
ity
 e
qu
al
s t
he
 n
um
be
r 
of
 c
om
m
on
 sh
ar
es
 o
ut
st
an
di
ng
 a
t t
he
 e
nd
 o
f f
is
ca
l y
ea
r, 
tim
es
 th
e 
cl
os
in
g 
pr
ic
e 
of
 it
s c
om
m
on
 sh
ar
es
 a
t t
he
 la
st
 d
ay
 o
f i
ts
 fi
sc
al
 y
ea
r. 
A
ll 
th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 a
re
 in
 
th
ou
sa
nd
s. 
 
 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N
 
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n 
M
in
im
um
M
ax
im
um
St
d 
de
v
  
  
Pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s 
87
 
2,
74
9,
52
1
81
7,
93
4 
2,
07
7
50
,3
36
,4
20
6,
61
0,
12
6
To
ta
l L
ia
bi
lit
ie
s 
87
 
2,
34
5,
18
4
88
1,
16
1 
87
0
45
,5
66
,8
20
5,
81
8,
43
2
M
ar
ke
t E
qu
ity
 
87
 
1,
02
9,
15
9
24
5,
67
1 
-1
4,
46
5
15
,0
70
,4
97
2,
09
7,
58
0
B
oo
k 
V
al
ue
 o
f E
qu
ity
 
87
 
38
1,
93
5
89
,8
60
 
-1
,0
87
,6
37
6,
89
6,
91
8
1,
11
7,
26
9
W
or
ki
ng
 C
ap
ita
l 
87
 
38
4,
47
8
11
,0
27
 
-2
,5
03
,6
00
39
,5
96
,7
00
4,
36
0,
89
3
R
et
ai
ne
d 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
87
 
-2
32
,8
86
-1
05
,7
49
 
-2
,5
40
,0
20
1,
53
1,
90
0
60
2,
21
4
Sa
le
s 
87
 
1,
59
4,
73
6
60
7,
65
9 
16
4
17
,6
91
,2
00
3,
01
6,
62
4
EB
IT
 
87
 
37
,3
21
19
,0
56
 
-6
12
,1
15
1,
42
4,
94
0
23
4,
09
5
N
et
 In
co
m
e 
87
 
-1
32
,1
96
-3
7,
58
0 
-1
,5
26
,2
00
18
2,
00
0
26
4,
70
9
  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 P
os
t-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s 
87
 
2,
32
8,
97
3
54
8,
48
1 
8,
41
2
32
,4
23
,0
00
5,
71
4,
64
0
To
ta
l L
ia
bi
lit
ie
s 
87
 
1,
70
0,
84
7
43
4,
38
1 
42
9
27
,7
93
,4
75
4,
48
9,
06
0
M
ar
ke
t E
qu
ity
 
87
 
93
6,
32
4
32
4,
21
7 
-1
2,
53
0
8,
36
4,
34
4
1,
55
1,
11
7
B
oo
k 
V
al
ue
 o
f E
qu
ity
 
87
 
62
2,
21
0
12
6,
29
4 
-2
98
,1
21
10
,1
13
,0
00
1,
47
1,
67
9
W
or
ki
ng
 C
ap
ita
l 
87
 
45
5,
55
8
37
,0
60
 
-1
,8
84
,0
00
27
,0
72
,0
00
2,
97
8,
32
1
R
et
ai
ne
d 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
87
 
-1
13
,3
95
-3
2,
64
8 
-4
,5
40
,0
00
80
4,
18
0
55
6,
11
2
Sa
le
s 
87
 
1,
62
9,
15
3
54
9,
41
5 
1,
52
8
20
,0
98
,0
00
3,
27
9,
97
1
EB
IT
 
87
 
79
,1
84
23
,3
37
 
-2
92
,7
00
1,
01
5,
00
0
20
7,
56
0
N
et
 In
co
m
e 
87
 
41
,9
97
-7
02
 
-4
60
,1
00
1,
92
9,
50
0
29
0,
42
8
   
  
 
 
46 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
4b
 D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
ist
ic
s f
or
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N
 
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n 
M
in
im
um
M
ax
im
um
St
d 
de
v
  
  
Pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s 
33
 
91
0,
48
7
61
8,
96
8 
15
,5
44
4,
75
3,
00
0
98
9,
29
8
To
ta
l L
ia
bi
lit
ie
s 
33
 
90
4,
39
2
61
4,
93
5 
21
,7
29
5,
36
1,
80
0
1,
02
3,
65
3
M
ar
ke
t E
qu
ity
 
33
 
41
1,
86
3
15
7,
79
6 
13
,9
78
2,
38
7,
40
8
63
1,
29
4
B
oo
k 
V
al
ue
 o
f E
qu
ity
 
33
 
5,
30
8
3,
27
2 
-7
82
,4
00
75
2,
90
0
27
9,
00
9
W
or
ki
ng
 C
ap
ita
l 
33
 
-1
7,
41
5
27
,2
49
 
-1
,2
62
,6
00
28
2,
94
0
24
7,
18
4
R
et
ai
ne
d 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
33
 
-2
04
,2
58
-7
6,
23
7 
-1
,5
76
,6
13
1,
22
9,
84
0
47
2,
24
5
Sa
le
s 
33
 
93
8,
06
5
68
1,
02
5 
4,
35
8
4,
37
4,
80
0
95
6,
48
9
EB
IT
 
33
 
61
,7
15
30
,2
66
 
-1
08
,4
76
50
7,
20
0
12
0,
75
4
N
et
 In
co
m
e 
33
 
-3
8,
67
4
-2
9,
73
1 
-3
17
,1
50
13
1,
40
0
75
,8
41
  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  P
os
t-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s 
33
 
1,
01
1,
00
2
51
3,
78
1 
10
,4
87
7,
87
2,
00
0
1,
61
4,
02
0
To
ta
l L
ia
bi
lit
ie
s 
33
 
66
0,
55
0
43
4,
38
1 
5,
88
7
3,
84
7,
00
0
80
2,
67
0
M
ar
ke
t E
qu
ity
 
33
 
57
1,
24
9
16
1,
06
3 
1,
24
1
3,
54
5,
03
5
95
3,
22
5
B
oo
k 
V
al
ue
 o
f E
qu
ity
 
33
 
34
6,
31
8
78
,2
21
 
-2
98
,1
21
3,
98
8,
00
0
84
7,
91
5
W
or
ki
ng
 C
ap
ita
l 
33
 
15
5,
16
8
98
,6
84
 
-8
5,
23
0
93
9,
90
0
23
1,
48
9
R
et
ai
ne
d 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
33
 
-7
8,
91
5
-1
4,
88
4 
-6
70
,6
41
32
9,
05
3
22
4,
83
7
Sa
le
s 
33
 
1,
03
5,
19
1
54
9,
41
5 
14
,5
14
5,
20
2,
00
0
1,
31
4,
56
3
EB
IT
 
33
 
53
,4
20
30
,4
20
 
-1
08
,1
50
30
0,
00
0
79
,2
70
N
et
 In
co
m
e 
33
 
9,
89
0
8,
29
0 
-8
2,
18
4
11
3,
15
0
46
,9
23
   
 
  
 
 
47 
T
ab
le
 1
.4
c 
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
is
tic
s f
or
 N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
N
 
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n 
M
in
im
um
M
ax
im
um
St
d 
de
v
  
  
Pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s 
33
 
1,
01
1,
00
2
51
3,
78
1 
10
,4
87
7,
87
2,
00
0
1,
61
4,
02
0
To
ta
l L
ia
bi
lit
ie
s 
33
 
66
0,
55
0
43
4,
38
1 
5,
88
7
3,
84
7,
00
0
80
2,
67
0
M
ar
ke
t E
qu
ity
 
33
 
57
1,
24
9
16
1,
06
3 
1,
24
1
3,
54
5,
03
5
95
3,
22
5
B
oo
k 
V
al
ue
 o
f E
qu
ity
 
33
 
34
6,
31
8
78
,2
21
 
-2
98
,1
21
3,
98
8,
00
0
84
7,
91
5
W
or
ki
ng
 C
ap
ita
l 
33
 
15
5,
16
8
98
,6
84
 
-8
5,
23
0
93
9,
90
0
23
1,
48
9
R
et
ai
ne
d 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
33
 
-7
8,
91
5
-1
4,
88
4 
-6
70
,6
41
32
9,
05
3
22
4,
83
7
Sa
le
s 
33
 
1,
03
5,
19
1
54
9,
41
5 
14
,5
14
5,
20
2,
00
0
1,
31
4,
56
3
EB
IT
 
33
 
53
,4
20
30
,4
20
 
-1
08
,1
50
30
0,
00
0
79
,2
70
N
et
 In
co
m
e 
33
 
9,
89
0
8,
29
0 
-8
2,
18
4
11
3,
15
0
46
,9
23
  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  P
os
t-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s 
54
 
3,
87
3,
37
6
1,
01
0,
88
5 
2,
07
7
50
,3
36
,4
20
8,
18
0,
20
2
To
ta
l L
ia
bi
lit
ie
s 
54
 
3,
22
5,
66
8
92
9,
73
3 
87
0
45
,5
66
,8
20
7,
22
6,
20
7
M
ar
ke
t E
qu
ity
 
54
 
1,
38
9,
24
9
31
1,
99
0 
-1
4,
46
5
15
,0
70
,4
97
2,
53
6,
26
7
B
oo
k 
V
al
ue
 o
f E
qu
ity
 
54
61
2,
09
7
17
3,
16
8 
-1
,0
87
,6
37
6,
89
6,
91
8
1,
35
5,
07
6
W
or
ki
ng
 C
ap
ita
l 
54
 
64
4,
52
6
58
8 
-2
,5
03
,6
00
39
,5
96
,7
00
5,
59
9,
48
1
R
et
ai
ne
d 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
54
 
-2
50
,7
10
-1
33
,5
40
 
-2
,5
40
,0
20
1,
53
1,
90
0
67
4,
33
6
Sa
le
s 
54
 
1,
99
6,
03
5
50
8,
87
2 
16
4
17
,6
91
,2
00
3,
71
2,
29
4
EB
IT
 
54
 
22
,4
14
8,
52
7 
-6
12
,1
15
1,
42
4,
94
0
28
1,
99
3
N
et
 In
co
m
e 
54
-1
89
,3
49
-5
8,
77
1 
-1
,5
26
,2
00
18
2,
00
0
31
8,
51
7
   
  
 
 
48 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
5 
Fi
rm
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s i
n 
O
ne
 Y
ea
r 
be
fo
re
 B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
To
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
ne
t i
nc
om
e 
an
d 
bo
ok
 e
qu
ity
 a
re
 in
 th
ou
sa
nd
s. 
W
e 
us
e 
w
or
ki
ng
 c
ap
ita
l d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s a
s l
iq
ui
di
ty
 m
ea
su
re
, t
ot
al
 li
ab
ili
tie
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
 a
s l
ev
er
ag
e 
m
ea
su
re
, n
et
 in
co
m
e 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 sa
le
s a
s p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 m
ea
su
re
 a
nd
 b
oo
k 
va
lu
e 
of
 e
qu
ity
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s a
s s
ol
ve
nc
y 
m
ea
su
re
s. 
 
  
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
  M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
an
u 
- N
on
-M
an
u
M
an
u 
- N
on
-M
an
u
To
ta
l A
ss
et
s 
   
20
66
21
3 
  8
31
83
8 
  1
03
48
59
   
   
46
11
52
 
  2
70
56
52
 
   
  1
04
08
27
 
   
-1
67
07
93
**
* 
   
   
-5
79
67
5*
* 
N
et
 In
co
m
e 
   
 -3
92
61
7 
 -1
05
56
3 
   
-1
04
44
4
   
   
 -7
60
08
 
   
-5
71
28
5 
   
   
-1
56
13
5 
   
   
46
68
41
**
* 
 
   
   
   
80
12
7*
* 
B
oo
k 
Eq
ui
ty
   
   
 -1
27
72
 
   
-1
16
30
 
   
-1
10
66
8
   
   
 -5
59
36
 
   
   
47
92
3 
   
   
   
15
37
8 
   
  -
15
85
91
 
   
   
  -
71
31
4*
 
Li
qu
id
ity
 
   
   
 -0
.3
25
 
   
 -0
.0
96
 
   
   
-0
.3
31
   
   
  -
0.
23
8 
   
   
-0
.3
22
 
   
   
   
-0
.0
83
 
   
   
  -
0.
01
0 
   
   
   
-0
.1
55
 
Le
ve
ra
ge
 
   
   
  1
.1
32
 
   
  1
.0
28
 
   
   
 1
.2
28
   
   
   
1.
12
2 
   
   
 1
.0
72
 
   
   
   
 0
.9
44
 
   
   
   
0.
15
6*
 
   
   
   
 0
.1
78
**
 
Pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
   
   
 -0
.5
38
 
   
 -0
.1
78
 
   
   
-0
.2
04
   
   
  -
0.
12
2 
   
   
-0
.7
46
 
   
   
   
-0
.3
71
 
   
   
   
0.
54
1*
**
 
   
   
   
 0
.2
49
**
 
So
lv
en
cy
 
   
   
 -0
.1
41
 
   
 -0
.0
28
 
   
   
-0
.2
25
   
   
  -
0.
12
2 
   
   
-0
.0
89
 
   
   
   
 0
.0
40
 
   
   
  -
0.
13
6 
   
   
   
-0
.1
62
**
 
  
 
  
 
 
49 
T
ab
le
 1
.6
 Z
-s
co
re
: P
re
 v
s. 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Th
e 
Z-
sc
or
e 
is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
ba
se
d 
on
 A
ltm
an
’s
 Z
-s
co
re
 m
od
el
, w
hi
ch
 c
om
es
 in
 tw
o 
ve
rs
io
ns
. O
ne
 is
 fo
r m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g,
 a
nd
 th
e 
ot
he
r i
s f
or
 n
on
-m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
“*
”,
 “
**
”,
 a
nd
 “
**
*”
 re
pr
es
en
t s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
ve
l a
t 1
0%
, 5
%
, a
nd
 1
%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
 
  
M
ea
n  
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n  
D
iff
 
  
Pr
e  
Po
st
 
Po
st
 - 
 P
re
 
Pr
e  
Po
st
 
Po
st
 - 
Pr
e  
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s  
   
-1
.8
15
   
  2
.5
21
* 
 
   
   
   
4.
33
5*
**
   
   
0.
32
8 
 
   
1.
33
0*
**
 
   
 1
.0
02
**
* 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
   
   
0.
78
8*
  0
.6
32
  
 -0
.1
57
  
   
  0
.9
73
**
* 
   
 1
.9
97
 *
**
1.
02
4*
  
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
   
-3
.4
06
  3
.6
75
  
   
   
7.
08
0*
* 
  
   
-0
.1
29
 
   
 0
.6
62
 *
**
   
  0
.7
91
**
* 
  
 
  
 
 
50 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
7 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 Z
-s
co
re
 
W
e 
ca
lc
ul
at
e 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 o
ur
 Z
-s
co
re
, w
hi
ch
 is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s t
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Z-
sc
or
e 
an
d 
pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Z-
sc
or
e.
 F
ou
r p
os
si
bl
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 
ar
e:
 A
bo
ve
-to
-a
bo
ve
, t
he
 c
as
e 
w
he
n 
a 
fir
m
’s
 Z
-s
co
re
 is
 a
bo
ve
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
in
 p
re
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
an
d 
re
m
ai
ns
 a
bo
ve
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
af
te
r C
ha
pt
er
 1
1;
 A
bo
ve
-to
-b
el
ow
, t
he
 
ca
se
 w
he
n 
a 
fir
m
’s
 Z
-s
co
re
 is
 a
bo
ve
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
in
 p
re
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1,
 b
ut
 fa
lls
 b
el
ow
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
af
te
r C
ha
pt
er
 1
1;
 B
el
ow
-to
-b
el
ow
, t
he
 c
as
e 
w
he
n 
a 
fir
m
’s
 Z
-s
co
re
 
is
 b
el
ow
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
in
 p
re
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
pe
rio
d 
an
d 
st
ay
s b
el
ow
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
af
te
r C
ha
pt
er
 1
1;
 B
el
ow
-to
-a
bo
ve
, t
he
 c
as
e 
w
he
n 
a 
fir
m
’s
 Z
-s
co
re
 is
 b
el
ow
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
in
 p
re
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
pe
rio
d 
bu
t c
ha
ng
es
 to
 a
bo
ve
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
le
ve
l a
fte
r C
ha
pt
er
 1
1.
 T
he
 fi
rs
t l
in
e 
fo
r e
ac
h 
fir
m
 c
at
eg
or
y 
re
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f f
irm
s t
ha
t c
ha
ng
es
 
in
 d
iff
er
en
t s
ce
na
rio
s, 
an
d 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 li
ne
 is
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
Z-
sc
or
e.
 T
he
 n
um
be
rs
 in
 th
e 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s a
re
 th
e 
p-
va
lu
es
. “
*”
, “
**
”,
 a
nd
 “
**
*”
 re
pr
es
en
t 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
le
ve
l a
t 1
0%
, 5
%
, a
nd
 1
%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
 
  
A
bo
ve
 to
 
A
bo
ve
 
A
bo
ve
 to
 
B
el
ow
 
B
el
ow
 to
 
B
el
ow
 
B
el
ow
 to
 
A
bo
ve
 
To
ta
l F
irm
s 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
 2
7 
   
 1
7 
   
 2
7 
   
 1
6 
87
 
  
   
 1
.3
92
**
* 
  -
1.
14
5*
**
 
   
 1
.4
84
**
* 
   
 5
.6
72
**
* 
  
   
(0
.0
00
6)
 
   
(0
.0
05
8)
 
(0
.0
07
4)
 
   
(<
.0
00
1)
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
 1
0 
   
 7
 
   
 1
0 
   
 6
 
33
 
  
   
0.
79
4
  -
0.
54
1
   
 0
.6
58
 3
.0
26
**
  
   
(0
.1
32
1)
 
 (0
.2
15
0)
 
(0
.4
12
0)
 
(0
.0
10
3)
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
 1
4 
   
 1
3 
   
 1
4 
   
 1
3 
54
 
  
   
 2
.3
16
**
* 
  -
1.
27
4*
**
 
  2
.1
71
**
 
   
 5
.6
76
**
* 
  
   
(0
.0
02
4)
 
  (
0.
00
61
) 
(0
.0
16
9)
 
(0
.0
00
3)
 
   
 
51
Ta
bl
e 
1.
8a
 D
ec
om
po
sit
io
n 
of
 th
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 Z
-s
co
re
s f
or
 A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
W
e 
de
co
m
po
se
 th
e 
Z-
sc
or
es
 in
to
 se
ve
ra
l f
ac
to
rs
. T
he
 “
di
ff”
 re
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 o
f e
ac
h 
fa
ct
or
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
le
ve
l a
nd
 th
e 
pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
le
ve
l. 
W
e 
de
fin
e 
le
ve
ra
ge
 a
s t
ot
al
 li
ab
ili
tie
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s. 
W
C
/T
A
 is
 w
or
ki
ng
 c
ap
ita
l d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 li
qu
id
ity
 m
ea
su
re
. R
E/
TA
 is
 
re
ta
in
ed
 e
ar
ni
ng
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 m
ea
su
re
. E
B
IT
/T
A
 is
 e
ar
ni
ng
s b
ef
or
e 
in
te
re
st
 a
nd
 ta
xe
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 m
ea
su
re
. M
kt
Eq
ui
ty
/T
L 
is
 m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 so
lv
en
cy
 m
ea
su
re
 in
 th
e 
Z-
sc
or
e 
m
od
el
 fo
r m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
Sa
le
s/
TA
 is
 sa
le
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 tu
rn
ov
er
 m
ea
su
re
 in
 th
e 
Z-
sc
or
e 
m
od
el
 fo
r m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
B
oo
kE
qu
ity
/T
L 
is
 b
oo
k 
va
lu
e 
of
 
eq
ui
ty
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 so
lv
en
cy
 m
ea
su
re
 in
 th
e 
Z-
sc
or
e 
m
od
el
 fo
r n
on
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
Si
ze
 is
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
d 
in
 th
ou
sa
nd
s. 
D
ur
at
io
n 
is
 
th
e 
da
ys
 a
 fi
rm
 sp
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
 fi
lin
g 
da
te
 a
nd
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
da
te
.  
 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
Z_
di
ff
 
Le
ve
ra
ge
_d
iff
 
W
C
/T
A
_d
iff
 
R
E/
TA
_d
iff
 
EB
IT
/T
A
_d
iff
 
Si
ze
_d
iff
 
D
ur
at
io
n 
A
bo
ve
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
 1
.3
92
**
* 
   
   
-0
.1
43
**
 
   
  0
.1
51
**
* 
   
  -
0.
09
1 
   
   
  0
.0
14
 
-1
00
08
74
 
52
2 
(0
.0
00
6)
 
   
   
(0
.0
10
3)
 
   
  (
<.
00
01
) 
 (0
.2
82
4)
 
 (0
.5
84
0)
 
(0
.1
75
7)
 
A
bo
ve
 to
 B
el
ow
 
-1
.1
45
**
* 
   
   
 0
.2
42
 
   
  -
0.
24
0 
   
  -
1.
36
7 
   
   
 -0
.0
10
 
-2
24
26
6 
57
7 
(0
.0
05
8)
 
   
   
(0
.3
35
4)
 
(0
.2
32
0)
 
 (0
.3
00
0)
 
   
   
 (0
.5
79
2)
 
(0
.7
86
9)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 B
el
ow
 
 1
.4
84
**
* 
   
   
-0
.0
77
 
   
   
0.
00
2 
   
   
0.
41
0 
   
   
  0
.3
14
 
-5
52
14
 
28
6 
(0
.0
07
4)
 
   
   
(0
.2
57
4)
 
(0
.9
58
0)
 
 (0
.2
33
0)
 
 (0
.3
10
8)
 
(0
.8
94
0)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
 5
.6
72
**
* 
   
-0
.4
98
**
* 
   
 0
.2
74
**
* 
   
0.
59
8*
* 
   
  0
.1
30
**
* 
-2
66
29
7 
26
2 
(<
.0
00
1)
 
   
   
(<
.0
00
1)
 
(0
.0
02
8)
 
 (0
.0
15
7)
 
 (0
.0
08
0)
 
(0
.7
10
5)
 
 
 
   
 
52
Ta
bl
e 
1.
8b
 D
ec
om
po
sit
io
n 
of
 th
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 Z
-s
co
re
s f
or
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s 
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
Z_
di
ff
 
Le
ve
ra
ge
_d
iff
 
W
C
/T
A
_d
iff
 
R
E/
TA
_d
iff
 
EB
IT
/T
A
_d
iff
 
M
kt
Eq
ui
ty
/T
L_
di
ff
 
Sa
le
/T
A
_d
iff
 
Si
ze
_d
iff
 
D
ur
at
io
n 
A
bo
ve
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
  0
.7
94
 
   
 -0
.0
59
 
 0
.1
38
**
 
   
-0
.0
97
 
   
  0
.0
35
 
   
   
   
  0
.5
47
* 
   
  0
.2
21
 
20
26
54
 
69
4 
(0
.1
32
1)
 
   
 (0
.5
20
3)
 
   
(0
.0
21
3)
 
(0
.3
80
5)
 
   
 (0
.5
76
8)
 
  (
0.
07
23
) 
(0
.1
13
0)
 
(0
.4
60
7)
 
A
bo
ve
 to
 B
el
ow
 
 -0
.5
41
 
   
  0
.0
20
 
   
 0
.0
46
 
   
-0
.3
90
 
   
 -0
.0
17
 
   
   
   
 -0
.0
51
 
   
  0
.0
87
 
39
10
25
 
66
8 
(0
.2
15
0)
 
   
 (0
.9
10
2)
 
   
(0
.6
45
2)
 
   
(0
.1
34
8)
 
   
 (0
.4
18
1)
 
  (
0.
81
79
) 
(0
.6
17
6)
 
(0
.4
36
9)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 B
el
ow
 
  0
.6
58
 
   
  0
.2
55
 
   
-0
.3
30
 
   
-2
.0
72
 
   
  0
.0
19
 
   
   
   
 -0
.0
80
 
   
  0
.1
98
 
-7
09
03
 
36
2 
(0
.4
12
0)
 
   
 (0
.5
55
3)
 
   
(0
.3
25
3)
 
   
(0
.3
72
0)
 
   
 (0
.6
62
7)
 
  (
0.
67
72
) 
(0
.3
15
8)
 
(0
.3
93
9)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
  3
.0
26
**
 
   
 -0
.4
67
**
 
   
 0
.3
28
 
   
 0
.8
89
 
   
  0
.1
14
 
   
   
   
  0
.6
42
**
 
   
  0
.5
53
**
 
-1
22
94
8 
29
1 
(0
.0
10
3)
 
   
 (0
.0
31
8)
 
   
(0
.1
10
5)
 
   
(0
.1
79
2)
 
   
 (0
.2
34
9)
 
  (
0.
02
26
) 
(0
.0
25
2)
 
(0
.5
22
1)
 
   
Ta
bl
e 
1.
8c
 D
ec
om
po
sit
io
n 
of
 th
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 Z
-s
co
re
s f
or
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s, 
w
ith
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
Z_
di
ff
 
1.
2*
W
C
/T
A
_d
iff
 
1.
4*
R
E/
TA
_d
iff
 
3.
3*
EB
IT
/T
A
_d
iff
 
0.
6*
M
kt
Eq
ui
ty
/T
L_
di
ff
 
1.
0*
Sa
le
/T
A
_d
iff
 
A
bo
ve
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
  0
.7
94
 
  0
.1
66
**
 
   
   
   
-0
.1
36
 
   
   
   
   
  0
.1
17
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 0
.3
28
 
   
   
   
   
 0
.2
21
 
(0
.1
32
1)
 
(0
.0
21
3)
 
(0
.3
80
5)
 
   
   
   
   
 (0
.5
76
8)
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
(0
.0
72
3)
 
   
   
   
   
(0
.1
13
0)
 
A
bo
ve
 to
 B
el
ow
 
 -0
.5
41
 
   
   
   
  0
.0
55
 
   
   
   
-0
.5
46
 
   
   
   
   
 -0
.0
57
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
-0
.0
31
 
   
   
   
   
 0
.0
87
 
(0
.2
15
0)
 
(0
.6
45
2)
 
(0
.1
34
8)
 
   
   
   
   
 (0
.4
18
1)
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
(0
.8
17
9)
 
   
   
   
   
(0
.6
17
6)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 B
el
ow
 
  0
.6
58
 
   
   
   
 -0
.3
96
 
   
   
   
-2
.9
01
 
   
   
   
   
  0
.0
62
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
-0
.0
48
 
   
   
   
   
 0
.1
98
 
(0
.4
12
0)
 
(0
.3
25
3)
 
(0
.3
72
0)
 
   
   
   
   
 (0
.6
62
7)
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
(0
.6
77
2)
 
   
   
   
   
(0
.3
15
8)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
  3
.0
26
**
 
   
   
   
  0
.3
93
 
   
   
   
 1
.2
44
 
   
   
   
   
  0
.3
76
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 0
.3
85
**
 
   
   
   
   
 0
.5
53
**
 
(0
.0
10
3)
 
(0
.1
10
5)
 
(0
.1
79
2)
 
   
   
   
   
 (0
.2
34
9)
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
(0
.0
22
6)
 
   
   
   
   
(0
.0
25
2)
 
 
     
   
 
53
Ta
bl
e 
1.
8d
 D
ec
om
po
sit
io
n 
of
 th
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 Z
-s
co
re
s f
or
 N
on
-m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
 Z
_d
iff
 
Le
ve
ra
ge
_d
iff
 
W
C
/T
A
_d
iff
 
R
E/
TA
_d
iff
 
EB
IT
/T
A
_d
iff
 
B
oo
kE
qu
ity
/T
L_
di
ff
 
Si
ze
_d
iff
 
D
ur
at
io
n 
A
bo
ve
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
 2
.3
16
**
* 
   
 -0
.1
77
* 
   
 0
.1
29
* 
   
0.
00
5 
   
   
-0
.0
02
 
   
   
   
  0
.3
39
 
-1
57
87
52
 
26
8 
(0
.0
02
4)
 
   
 (0
.0
76
7)
 
   
(0
.0
53
9)
 
  (
0.
93
63
) 
(0
.9
32
4)
 
(0
.2
75
0)
 
(0
.3
00
3)
 
A
bo
ve
 to
 B
el
ow
 
-1
.2
74
**
* 
   
  0
.0
61
 
   
-0
.0
53
* 
  -
0.
17
7*
* 
   
   
 0
.0
02
 
   
   
   
 -0
.0
78
 
-1
38
55
37
 
42
4 
 (0
.0
06
1)
 
   
 (0
.3
82
8)
 
   
(0
.0
69
4)
 
  (
0.
02
43
) 
(0
.8
90
3)
 
(0
.4
95
6)
 
(0
.1
41
3)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 B
el
ow
 
  2
.1
71
**
 
   
 -0
.1
66
 
   
 0
.0
06
 
   
0.
85
1 
   
   
 0
.5
83
 
0.
42
2*
 
28
88
55
 
34
8 
(0
.0
16
9)
 
   
 (0
.1
41
2)
 
   
(0
.8
49
0)
 
  (
0.
18
17
) 
(0
.3
39
3)
 
(0
.0
95
5)
 
(0
.7
05
1)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
 5
.6
76
**
* 
 -0
.3
92
**
* 
   
0.
22
1*
**
 
0.
34
4*
**
 
  0
.1
17
**
 
   
 1
.2
63
**
* 
-2
94
93
2 
34
4 
(0
.0
00
3)
 
   
 (0
.0
00
1)
 
   
(0
.0
01
3)
 
  (
0.
00
31
) 
(0
.0
13
1)
 
(0
.0
02
3)
 
(0
.7
39
6)
 
   
Ta
bl
e 
1.
8e
 D
ec
om
po
si
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 Z
-s
co
re
s i
nt
o 
fo
r 
N
on
-m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s, 
w
ith
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
 Z
_d
iff
 
6.
56
*W
C
/T
A
_d
iff
 
3.
26
*R
E/
TA
_d
iff
 
6.
72
*E
B
IT
/T
A
_d
iff
 
1.
05
*B
oo
kE
qu
ity
/T
L_
di
ff
 
A
bo
ve
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
 2
.3
16
**
* 
   
   
   
   
0.
84
8*
 
   
   
   
   
0.
01
5 
   
   
   
   
 -0
.0
12
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
  0
.3
56
 
(0
.0
02
4)
 
   
   
   
  (
0.
05
39
) 
(0
.9
36
3)
 
(0
.9
32
4)
 
(0
.2
75
0)
 
A
bo
ve
 to
 B
el
ow
 
-1
.2
74
**
* 
   
   
   
  -
0.
34
7*
 
 -0
.5
76
**
 
   
   
   
   
  0
.0
12
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 -0
.0
81
 
(0
.0
06
1)
 
   
   
   
  (
0.
06
94
) 
(0
.0
24
3)
 
(0
.8
90
3)
 
(0
.4
96
5)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 B
el
ow
 
 2
.1
71
**
   
   
   
  0
.0
37
   
   
   
  2
.7
75
   
   
   
   
  3
.9
16
0.
44
3*
(0
.0
16
9)
 
   
   
   
  (
0.
84
90
) 
(0
.1
81
7)
 
(0
.3
39
3)
 
(0
.0
95
5)
 
B
el
ow
 to
 A
bo
ve
 
 5
.6
76
**
* 
   
1.
45
1*
**
 
   
 1
.1
21
**
* 
  0
.7
88
**
 
   
 1
.3
27
**
* 
(0
.0
00
3)
 
   
   
   
  (
0.
00
13
) 
(0
.0
03
1)
 
(0
.0
13
1)
 
(0
.0
02
3)
 
   
 
   
 
54
T
ab
le
 1
.9
 C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
A
ct
ua
l a
nd
 P
ro
je
ct
ed
 P
os
t C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Z-
sc
or
es
 
 
  
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
0.
14
**
 
  
(0
.0
43
8)
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  -
0.
15
 
  
(0
.1
65
6)
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
0.
22
**
 
  
(0
.0
11
8)
 
   
 
   
 
55
Ta
bl
e 
1.
10
 U
ni
va
ri
at
e 
T
es
t R
eg
ar
di
ng
 th
e 
Pr
ed
ic
tio
n 
E
rr
or
 
Th
e 
pr
ed
ic
tio
n 
er
ro
r i
s d
ef
in
ed
 a
s t
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Z-
sc
or
e 
an
d 
pr
oj
ec
te
d 
Z-
sc
or
e.
 
 
  
M
ea
n 
Er
ro
r 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
-0
.6
6*
**
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (<
.0
00
1)
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 -1
.3
2*
* 
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (0
.0
28
6)
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 -0
.5
2*
* 
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (0
.0
17
9)
 
  
 
   
 
56
Ta
bl
e 
1.
11
 D
ur
at
io
n 
fo
r 
A
ll 
G
ro
up
s 
D
ur
at
io
n 
is
 th
e 
da
ys
 a
 fi
rm
 sp
en
t b
et
w
ee
n 
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
 fi
lin
g 
da
te
 a
nd
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
da
te
. 
 
M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ax
im
um
 
M
in
im
um
 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
40
9 
26
6 
22
17
 
33
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
52
2 
29
8 
22
17
 
37
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
33
6 
25
0 
12
57
 
33
 
    
 
   
 
57
Ta
bl
e 
1.
12
 C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
A
ct
ua
l a
nd
 P
ro
je
ct
ed
 P
os
t C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Z-
sc
or
es
: S
ho
rt
 v
s. 
Lo
ng
 D
ur
at
io
n 
If
 th
e 
fir
m
 h
as
 a
 d
ur
at
io
n 
th
at
 is
 g
re
at
er
 th
an
 it
s g
ro
up
 m
ed
ia
n,
 th
at
 fi
rm
 h
as
 a
 lo
ng
 d
ur
at
io
n.
 O
th
er
w
is
e,
 it
 h
as
 a
 sh
or
t d
ur
at
io
n.
 
 
  
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
  
Sh
or
t D
ur
at
io
n 
Lo
ng
-D
ur
at
io
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
  0
.3
18
**
* 
   
   
   
   
   
  -
0.
04
1 
  
 (0
.0
00
7)
 
   
   
   
   
   
  (
0.
68
26
) 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
0.
39
1*
* 
   
   
   
   
   
  -
0.
28
8*
 
  
 (0
.0
15
3)
 
   
   
   
   
   
  (
0.
05
54
) 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
  0
.3
06
**
* 
   
   
   
   
   
   
0.
09
2 
  
 (0
.0
09
4)
 
   
   
   
   
   
  (
0.
49
57
) 
         
 
   
 
58
T
ab
le
 1
.1
3 
U
ni
va
ri
at
e 
T
es
t o
f P
re
di
ct
io
n 
E
rr
or
: S
ho
rt
 v
s. 
Lo
ng
 D
ur
at
io
n 
Pr
ed
ic
tio
n 
m
ea
n 
er
ro
r i
s t
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
ac
tu
al
 p
os
t C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Z-
sc
or
e 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
te
d 
Z-
sc
or
e.
 D
iff
 is
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
sh
or
t d
ur
at
io
n 
an
d 
lo
ng
 d
ur
at
io
n.
 
 
  
M
ea
n 
Er
ro
r 
  
Sh
or
t D
ur
at
io
n 
Lo
ng
 D
ur
at
io
n 
   
D
iff
 
A
ll 
fir
m
s 
   
  -
0.
54
1*
* 
   
 -1
.4
01
**
* 
  0
.8
60
**
 
   
  (
0.
04
05
) 
   
 (<
.0
00
1)
 
 (0
.0
44
3)
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
  -
0.
54
0*
 
   
 -2
.0
73
**
* 
  1
.5
33
**
* 
   
  (
0.
05
46
) 
   
 (<
.0
00
1)
 
 (0
.0
07
1)
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
  -
0.
53
8 
   
 -0
.8
46
* 
  0
.3
08
 
  
   
  (
0.
16
47
) 
   
 (0
.0
58
9)
 
 (0
.5
97
6)
 
     
 
   
 
59
T
ab
le
 1
.1
4 
Si
ze
 a
nd
 D
ur
at
io
n 
 
  
O
ve
ra
ll 
Q
1 
(2
5%
) 
Q
2 
(5
0%
) 
Q
3 
(7
5%
) 
Q
4 
M
ea
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
40
9 
35
4 
27
6 
32
8 
67
9 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s
52
2
43
8
20
8 
32
8
10
37
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
33
6 
29
1 
31
3 
24
2 
48
9 
M
ed
ia
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
26
6 
25
8 
16
2 
29
8 
49
1 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
29
8 
25
8 
15
8 
29
8 
75
1 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
25
0 
21
6 
21
2 
19
5 
41
5 
           
 
   
 
60
T
ab
le
 1
.1
5 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
E
xc
es
s S
to
ck
 R
et
ur
n:
 S
ho
rt
 v
s. 
L
on
g 
D
ur
at
io
n 
Ex
ce
ss
 re
tu
rn
 is
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
 o
f e
ac
h 
fir
m
 in
 e
ac
h 
ye
ar
 a
nd
 th
e 
S&
P 
50
0 
re
tu
rn
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
ye
ar
. P
os
t+
1,
 p
os
t+
2,
 p
os
t+
3,
 p
os
t+
4,
 a
nd
 
po
st
+5
 a
re
 1
 y
ea
r, 
2 
ye
ar
s, 
3 
ye
ar
s, 
4 
ye
ar
s a
nd
 5
 y
ea
rs
 a
fte
r e
m
er
gi
ng
 fr
om
 C
ha
pt
er
 1
1.
 
 
  
  
M
ea
n  
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n  
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
  
   
   
 S
ho
rt 
 
   
 L
on
g 
 
Sh
or
t -
 L
on
g
 S
ho
rt 
 
 L
on
g  
Sh
or
t -
 L
on
g  
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s  
  
   
   
  8
.6
%
  
   
  3
.4
%
 
   
  5
.2
%
 
  -
5.
9%
 
   
0.
6%
 
  -
6.
6%
 
  
po
st
+1
 
   
   
24
.2
%
  
   
49
.2
%
**
* 
  -
24
.9
%
 
 1
5.
5%
 
   
   
18
.7
%
**
 
  -
3.
2%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
   
   
  0
.3
%
 
   
- 8
.2
%
 
   
  8
.5
%
 
   
2.
1%
 
  -
8.
1%
 
 1
0.
2%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
   
 -3
.8
%
 
   
  4
.0
%
 
   
 -7
.8
%
 
-1
1.
2%
 
  -
2.
7%
 
 -8
.5
%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
   
   
  7
.1
%
 
   
 -4
.0
%
 
   
11
.1
%
 
-2
1.
9%
 
-1
9.
8%
 
 -2
.0
%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
   
   
  3
.7
%
 
   
 -7
.1
%
 
   
10
.9
%
 
   
-9
.0
%
 
  -
8.
9%
 
  0
.0
%
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
  
   
   
19
.4
%
* 
 
   
 -3
.2
%
 
   
22
.6
%
 
   
  2
2.
2%
* 
 
  -
7.
7%
 
29
.9
%
 
  
po
st
+1
 
   
   
31
.4
%
 
   
31
.9
%
 
   
 -0
.5
%
 
   
22
.4
%
 
  -
6.
2%
 
28
.6
%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
   
   
16
.0
%
 
  -
15
.2
%
 
   
 3
1.
2%
 
   
40
.4
%
 
-2
6.
9%
 
67
.2
%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
   
37
.8
%
 
  -
16
.4
%
 
   
   
54
.1
%
* 
   
 6
.6
%
 
-1
7.
6%
 
24
.2
%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
   
   
19
.5
%
 
   
12
.7
%
 
   
   
6.
8%
 
-1
7.
9%
 
  -
6.
6%
 
-1
1.
3%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
   
   
  4
.2
%
 
   
  1
.2
%
 
   
   
3.
0%
 
-1
0.
3%
 
  -
5.
1%
 
  -
5.
2%
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
   
   
  6
.8
%
 
   
  3
.6
%
 
   
   
3.
2%
 
  -
6.
2%
 
  -
1.
1%
 
  -
5.
1%
 
  
po
st
+1
 
   
   
31
.7
%
  
   
50
.9
%
**
  
   
-1
9.
2%
 
  1
5.
5%
 
   
 1
8.
7%
* 
 
  -
3.
2%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
   
   
 -8
.5
%
 
   
 -3
.2
%
  
   
  -
5.
3%
 
-1
3.
7%
 
  -
4.
4%
 
  -
9.
3%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
  -
15
.8
%
 
   
  5
.6
%
 
   
-2
1.
4%
 
  -
26
.4
%
* 
 
  -
6.
2%
 
   
-2
0.
2%
* 
 
  
po
st
+4
 
   
   
 -1
.1
%
 
  -
13
.9
%
 
   
 1
2.
8%
 
-2
5.
2%
 
  -
27
.4
%
* 
 
   
2.
2%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
   
  
 3
.8
%
 
 -1
4.
2%
 
   
18
.0
%
 
  -
8.
3%
 
-1
3.
7%
 
  5
.4
%
 
    
   
 
61
T
ab
le
 1
.1
6 
N
um
be
r 
of
 D
ay
s b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
fo
rm
at
io
n 
D
at
e 
an
d 
E
ffe
ct
iv
e 
D
at
e 
  
M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ax
im
um
 
M
in
im
um
 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
37
 
22
 
34
8 
1 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
27
 
22
 
13
1 
3 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
42
 
22
 
34
8 
1 
   
 
   
 
62
T
ab
le
 1
.1
7 
E
xc
es
s S
to
ck
 R
et
ur
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
C
on
fir
m
at
io
n 
D
at
e 
an
d 
E
ffe
ct
iv
e 
D
at
e 
  
D
ai
ly
 E
xc
es
s R
et
ur
n 
  
N
 
M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ax
im
um
 
M
in
im
um
 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
7 
 0
.2
2%
 
-0
.0
2%
 
7.
07
%
 
-6
.1
5%
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
3 
-1
.8
2%
 
-0
.8
1%
 
1.
46
%
 
-6
.1
0%
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
4 
 1
.7
5%
 
0.
22
%
 
6.
73
%
 
-0
.1
9%
 
  
 
 
63
T
ab
le
 1
.1
8 
W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n:
 O
ve
ra
ll 
Z-
sc
or
e 
“W
 P
ro
j”
 re
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
of
 fi
rm
s w
ith
 p
ro
je
ct
io
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 “
W
/O
 P
ro
j”
 re
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
of
 fi
rm
s t
ha
t d
id
 n
ot
 p
ro
vi
de
 p
ro
je
ct
io
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
du
rin
g 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
pr
oc
es
s. 
Pr
e-
1,
 p
re
-2
, p
re
-3
, p
re
-4
, a
nd
 p
re
-5
 a
re
 1
 y
ea
r, 
2 
ye
ar
s, 
3 
ye
ar
s, 
4 
ye
ar
s a
nd
 5
 y
ea
rs
 b
ef
or
e 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
fil
in
g.
 P
os
t+
1,
 p
os
t+
2,
 p
os
t+
3,
 
po
st
+4
, a
nd
 p
os
t+
5 
ar
e 
1 
ye
ar
, 2
 y
ea
rs
, 3
 y
ea
rs
, 4
 y
ea
rs
 a
nd
 5
 y
ea
rs
 a
fte
r e
m
er
gi
ng
 fr
om
 C
ha
pt
er
 1
1.
  
  
  
   
   
   
   
   
 M
ea
n 
   
  M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
   
   
   
   
   
  M
ed
ia
n 
   
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
W
 P
ro
j 
W
/O
 P
ro
j 
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
  W
 P
ro
j 
W
/O
 P
ro
j 
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
Pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
 -1
.8
15
 
 -1
7.
77
1 
   
   
  1
5.
95
6 
   
  0
.3
28
 
  0
.1
98
 
   
   
  0
.1
29
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
  0
.7
88
 
   
 0
.2
49
 
   
   
   
 0
.5
39
 
   
  0
.9
73
 
  1
.1
73
 
   
   
 -0
.2
01
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
 -3
.4
06
 
 -2
6.
62
3 
   
   
  2
3.
21
7 
   
 -0
.1
29
 
 -0
.1
89
 
   
   
  0
.0
61
 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
11
 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
  2
.5
21
 
   
-0
.2
99
 
   
   
   
 2
.8
19
 
   
  1
.3
30
 
  0
.2
83
 
   
   
  1
.0
47
**
* 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
  0
.6
32
 
  1
7.
51
4 
   
   
 -1
6.
88
2 
   
  1
.9
97
 
  1
.6
26
 
   
   
  0
.3
71
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
  3
.6
75
 
   
-9
.0
49
 
   
   
  1
2.
72
3 
   
  0
.6
62
 
 -0
.4
02
 
   
   
  1
.0
64
**
* 
            
  
 
 
64
 
T
ab
le
 1
.1
9a
: W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n:
 5
-Y
ea
r 
Z-
sc
or
es
 b
ef
or
e 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
 
 
  
  
M
ea
n  
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n  
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
  
   
W
 P
ro
j  
 W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j   
  W
 P
ro
j  
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s  
pr
e-
5  
   
1.
11
5*
**
  
  -
1.
10
5  
   
 2
.2
20
**
  
   
1.
28
9*
**
  
  1
.2
72
  
  0
.0
18
  
  
pr
e-
4  
   
0.
93
4*
**
  
  -
1.
36
4  
2.
29
7  
   
1.
23
2*
**
  
  1
.2
43
* 
 
-0
.0
11
 
  
pr
e-
3  
   
0.
75
2*
**
  
  -
0.
92
7  
1.
67
8  
   
1.
07
2*
**
  
  0
.7
55
  
  0
.3
17
  
  
pr
e-
2  
   
0.
00
8 
 
  -
2.
75
3*
**
 
   
 2
.7
61
**
  
   
0.
24
2 
 
  0
.6
88
  
 -0
.4
46
 
  
pr
e-
1  
  -
1.
85
4*
**
  
  -
6.
52
5*
**
 
   
   
4.
67
1*
**
  
  -
1.
14
7*
**
  
 -2
.1
43
**
* 
   
   
0.
99
6*
* 
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
pr
e-
5  
   
1.
93
2*
**
  
  -
0.
87
1  
2.
80
3  
   
1.
94
3*
**
  
  1
.7
51
  
  0
.1
92
  
  
pr
e-
4  
   
1.
20
7*
* 
 
  -
0.
86
4  
2.
07
0  
   
1.
34
5*
**
  
  1
.4
52
**
  
 -0
.1
07
 
  
pr
e-
3  
   
1.
01
8*
* 
 
   
0.
59
5 
 
0.
42
3  
   
1.
32
6*
**
  
  1
.2
70
**
  
  0
.0
56
  
  
pr
e-
2  
   
0.
59
3 
 
  -
0.
14
5  
0.
73
7  
   
0.
90
4*
**
  
  1
.8
24
* 
 
 -0
.9
19
 
  
pr
e-
1  
  -
0.
39
7  
  -
3.
02
1*
* 
 
  2
.6
24
* 
 
  -
0.
01
6  
  0
.1
83
  
 -0
.1
99
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
pr
e-
5  
   
0.
65
6*
  
  -
1.
21
4  
1.
87
0  
   
0.
95
0*
**
  
  0
.8
58
  
  0
.0
92
  
  
pr
e-
4  
   
0.
76
4*
**
  
  -
1.
59
4  
2.
35
8  
   
1.
03
5*
**
  
  1
.0
23
  
  0
.0
13
  
  
pr
e-
3  
   
0.
58
5*
* 
 
  -
1.
58
7  
  2
.1
72
* 
 
   
0.
81
1*
* 
 
  0
.4
11
  
  0
.4
00
  
  
pr
e-
2  
  -
0.
35
6  
  -
3.
91
7*
**
 
   
 3
.5
61
**
  
   
0.
07
9 
 
  0
.1
73
* 
 
 -0
.0
94
 
  
pr
e-
1 
  -
2.
75
7*
**
  
  -
8.
27
6*
**
 
   
   
5.
52
0*
**
  
  -
2.
79
8*
**
  
 -3
.9
12
**
* 
   
 1
.1
14
* 
 
    
  
 
 
65
T
ab
le
 1
.1
9b
: W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n:
 5
-Y
ea
r 
Z-
sc
or
es
 a
fte
r 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
 
  
  
M
ea
n  
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n  
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
  
   
W
 P
ro
j  
 W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j   
  W
 P
ro
j  
 W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s  
po
st
+1
 
   
 1
.3
41
**
* 
 
   
 -3
.1
07
**
* 
   
   
4.
44
8*
**
  
   
1.
23
8*
**
 
  0
.6
46
  
   
 0
.5
92
**
  
  
po
st
+2
 
   
 1
.5
99
**
* 
 
   
 -0
.4
62
 
   
 2
.0
61
**
  
   
1.
44
7*
**
 
  0
.9
03
  
   
 0
.5
44
**
  
  
po
st
+3
 
   
 1
.6
20
**
* 
 
   
 -1
.0
38
 
   
   
2.
65
8*
**
  
   
1.
48
2*
**
 
  0
.4
77
  
   
 1
.0
04
**
  
  
po
st
+4
 
   
 1
.6
30
**
* 
 
   
 -0
.9
37
 
   
 2
.5
67
**
  
   
1.
47
4*
**
 
  0
.9
84
  
 0
.4
90
  
  
po
st
+5
 
   
 1
.5
64
* 
 
   
 -2
.4
57
 
  4
.0
21
* 
 
   
1.
38
7*
  
  1
.0
69
  
 0
.3
17
  
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
po
st
+1
 
   
 1
.5
72
**
* 
 
   
 -1
.3
80
 
2.
95
2  
   
1.
74
8*
**
 
  1
.3
89
  
 0
.3
59
  
  
po
st
+2
 
   
 1
.7
59
**
* 
 
   
  1
.7
28
* 
 
0.
03
1  
   
1.
61
9*
**
 
   
  1
.8
96
**
 
-0
.2
77
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
 1
.9
04
**
* 
 
   
  0
.4
96
  
1.
40
8  
   
1.
99
6*
**
 
  1
.7
59
  
 0
.2
37
  
  
po
st
+4
 
   
 1
.8
02
**
* 
 
   
 -0
.4
94
 
2.
29
6  
   
2.
01
1*
**
 
  1
.5
15
  
 0
.4
96
  
  
po
st
+5
 
   
 2
.8
12
**
* 
 
   
 -4
.3
58
 
7.
17
1  
   
2.
81
4*
**
 
  1
.4
86
  
 1
.3
28
  
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
po
st
+1
 
   
 1
.1
73
**
* 
 
   
 -3
.9
71
**
* 
   
   
5.
14
4*
**
  
   
0.
55
2*
**
 
  0
.0
38
  
   
  0
.5
14
**
  
  
po
st
+2
 
   
 1
.4
96
**
* 
 
   
 -1
.6
49
* 
 
   
   
3.
14
4*
**
  
   
0.
85
3*
**
 
-0
.2
01
 
   
  1
.0
54
**
  
  
po
st
+3
 
   
 1
.4
42
**
  
   
 -2
.0
07
* 
 
   
   
3.
44
9*
**
  
   
0.
80
6*
* 
 
-0
.1
56
 
   
  0
.9
62
**
  
  
po
st
+4
 
   
 1
.5
04
* 
 
   
 -1
.2
18
 
  2
.7
22
* 
 
   
0.
95
9 
 
  0
.6
39
  
 0
.3
21
  
  
po
st
+5
 
   
 0
.9
76
  
   
 -1
.2
56
 
2.
23
2  
   
0.
44
0 
 
  1
.0
69
  
-0
.6
30
 
  
 
     
 
66
Ta
bl
e 
1.
20
a:
 C
om
po
ne
nt
s o
f Z
-s
co
re
: M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s i
n 
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
G
ro
up
  
A
ll 
th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 sh
ow
n 
be
lo
w
 a
re
 m
ed
ia
ns
. M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s h
av
e 
fiv
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s i
n 
th
ei
r Z
-s
co
re
 m
od
el
. W
C
/T
A
 is
 w
or
ki
ng
 c
ap
ita
l d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 li
qu
id
ity
 m
ea
su
re
. R
E/
TA
 is
 re
ta
in
ed
 e
ar
ni
ng
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 m
ea
su
re
. E
B
IT
/T
A
 is
 e
ar
ni
ng
s b
ef
or
e 
in
te
re
st
 a
nd
 ta
xe
s 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 m
ea
su
re
. M
kt
Eq
ui
ty
/T
L 
is
 m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 so
lv
en
cy
 m
ea
su
re
. 
Sa
le
s/
TA
 is
 sa
le
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 tu
rn
ov
er
 m
ea
su
re
. W
e 
re
po
rt 
th
e 
‘n
et
” 
nu
m
be
rs
 fo
r p
re
- a
nd
 p
os
t- 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1.
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
, w
e 
al
so
 re
po
rt 
th
es
e 
‘n
et
’ n
um
be
rs
 m
ul
tip
ly
 th
ei
r c
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
Z-
sc
or
e 
m
od
el
. T
he
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s a
re
 1
.2
, 1
.4
, 3
.3
, 0
.6
 a
nd
 1
 fo
r t
he
 fi
ve
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s i
n 
th
e 
Z-
sc
or
e 
m
od
el
 fo
r 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
   
  
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
  
  
N
 
W
C
/T
A
 
R
E/
TA
 
EB
IT
/T
A
 
M
kt
Eq
ui
ty
/T
L
Sa
le
s/
TA
Z-
sc
or
e
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
pr
e-
5 
27
 
  0
.1
61
 
-0
.0
64
 
0.
08
2 
0.
66
4 
1.
14
7 
pr
e-
4 
31
 
  0
.1
66
 
-0
.0
5 
0.
08
1 
0.
40
2 
1.
07
6 
pr
e-
3 
32
 
  0
.1
42
 
-0
.1
09
 
0.
06
6 
0.
25
3 
1.
00
5 
pr
e-
2 
33
 
  0
.1
16
 
-0
.2
74
 
0.
04
4 
0.
16
2 
1.
05
8 
  
pr
e-
1 
33
 
 -0
.2
38
 
-0
.3
83
 
0.
01
7 
0.
04
7 
1.
08
9 
  
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
w
. 
pr
e-
5 
27
 
  0
.1
94
 
-0
.0
89
 
0.
27
 
0.
39
8 
1.
14
6 
1.
91
8 
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
pr
e-
4 
31
 
  0
.1
99
 
-0
.0
7 
0.
26
9 
0.
24
1 
1.
07
5 
1.
71
4 
pr
e-
3 
32
 
  0
.1
71
 
-0
.1
52
 
0.
21
6 
0.
15
2 
1.
00
4 
1.
39
1 
pr
e-
2 
33
 
  0
.1
39
 
-0
.3
84
 
0.
14
4 
0.
09
7 
1.
05
7 
1.
05
4 
  
pr
e-
1 
33
 
 -0
.2
86
 
-0
.5
36
 
0.
05
7 
0.
02
8 
1.
08
8 
0.
35
1 
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
po
st
+1
 
33
 
  0
.1
61
 
-0
.0
61
 
0.
04
6 
0.
48
4 
1.
15
6 
po
st
+2
 
32
 
  0
.1
79
 
-0
.0
7 
0.
05
9 
0.
39
3 
1.
18
5 
po
st
+3
 
27
 
  0
.2
12
 
-0
.0
28
 
0.
05
8 
0.
54
7 
1.
39
3 
po
st
+4
 
22
 
  0
.1
84
 
-0
.1
22
 
0.
09
1 
0.
66
1 
1.
29
3 
  
po
st
+5
 
19
 
  0
.1
38
 
-0
.0
67
 
0.
10
5 
1.
03
9 
1.
29
9 
  
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
w
  
po
st
+1
 
33
 
  0
.1
93
 
-0
.0
85
 
0.
15
 
0.
29
 
1.
15
5 
1.
70
3 
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
po
st
+2
 
32
 
  0
.2
15
 
-0
.0
98
 
0.
19
6 
0.
23
6 
1.
18
4 
1.
73
2 
po
st
+3
 
27
 
  0
.2
54
 
-0
.0
4 
0.
19
3 
0.
32
8 
1.
39
2 
2.
12
7 
po
st
+4
 
22
 
  0
.2
21
 
-0
.1
71
 
0.
30
1 
0.
39
6 
1.
29
1 
2.
03
9 
  
po
st
+5
 
19
 
  0
.1
65
 
-0
.0
93
 
0.
34
8 
0.
62
4 
1.
29
8 
2.
34
1 
  
     
 
67
Ta
bl
e 
1.
20
b 
C
om
po
ne
nt
s o
f Z
-s
co
re
: M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s i
n 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
G
ro
up
  
 
  
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
  
  
N
 
W
C
/T
A
 
R
E/
TA
 
EB
IT
/T
A
 
M
kt
Eq
ui
ty
/T
L 
Sa
le
s/
TA
 
Z-
sc
or
e 
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
pr
e-
5 
20
 
  0
.1
96
 
-0
.2
11
 
  0
.0
24
 
1.
78
1 
0.
79
1 
pr
e-
4 
23
 
  0
.2
4 
-0
.2
51
 
  0
.0
15
 
1.
98
9 
0.
88
7 
pr
e-
3 
23
 
  0
.2
46
 
-0
.3
76
 
  0
.0
35
 
1.
19
3 
0.
83
6 
pr
e-
2 
25
 
  0
.1
46
 
-0
.6
36
 
 -0
.0
93
 
0.
78
8 
0.
75
 
  
pr
e-
1
28
-0
.0
37
-0
.7
43
-0
.0
7 
0.
22
8
0.
78
2
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
w
. 
pr
e-
5 
20
 
  0
.2
35
 
-0
.2
95
 
  0
.0
81
 
1.
06
8 
0.
79
 
  1
.8
79
 
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
pr
e-
4 
23
 
  0
.2
88
 
-0
.3
51
 
  0
.0
49
 
1.
19
3 
0.
88
6 
  2
.0
65
 
pr
e-
3 
23
 
  0
.2
95
 
-0
.5
27
 
  0
.1
14
 
0.
71
6 
0.
83
5 
  1
.4
32
 
pr
e-
2 
25
 
  0
.1
75
 
-0
.8
91
 
 -0
.3
05
 
0.
47
3 
0.
75
 
  0
.2
01
 
  
pr
e-
1 
28
 
 -0
.0
44
 
-1
.0
4 
 -0
.2
29
 
0.
13
7 
0.
78
1 
 -0
.3
96
 
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
po
st
+1
 
28
 
  0
.2
14
 
-0
.3
1 
  0
 
0.
64
2 
1.
00
4 
po
st
+2
 
27
 
  0
.3
22
 
-0
.2
56
 
 -0
.0
24
 
1.
67
9 
1.
1 
po
st
+3
 
26
 
  0
.2
5 
-0
.4
16
 
 -0
.0
3 
1.
66
9 
1.
05
7 
po
st
+4
 
24
 
  0
.1
64
 
-0
.3
77
 
  0
.0
15
 
1.
30
7 
1.
08
9 
  
po
st
+5
 
19
 
  0
.2
5 
-1
.3
09
 
 -0
.0
72
 
1.
89
3 
0.
92
7 
  
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
w
  
po
st
+1
28
 0
.2
57
-0
.4
33
 0
 
0.
38
5
1.
00
3
 1
.2
11
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
po
st
+2
 
27
 
  0
.3
86
 
-0
.3
59
 
 -0
.0
78
 
1.
00
7 
1.
09
9 
  2
.0
55
 
po
st
+3
 
26
 
  0
.3
 
-0
.5
83
 
 -0
.1
 
1.
00
2 
1.
05
6 
  1
.6
75
 
po
st
+4
 
24
 
  0
.1
96
 
-0
.5
28
 
  0
.0
5 
0.
78
4 
1.
08
8 
  1
.5
91
 
  
po
st
+5
 
19
 
  0
.3
 
-1
.8
33
 
 -0
.2
38
 
1.
13
6 
0.
92
6 
  0
.2
91
 
  
 
     
 
68
T
ab
le
 1
.2
1a
 C
om
po
ne
nt
s o
f Z
-s
co
re
: N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s i
n 
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
G
ro
up
  
A
ll 
th
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 sh
ow
n 
be
lo
w
 a
re
 m
ed
ia
ns
. N
on
-m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s h
av
e 
fo
ur
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s i
n 
th
ei
r Z
-s
co
re
 m
od
el
, W
C
/T
A
 is
 w
or
ki
ng
 c
ap
ita
l d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
, w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 li
qu
id
ity
 m
ea
su
re
. R
E/
TA
 is
 re
ta
in
ed
 e
ar
ni
ng
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 m
ea
su
re
. E
B
IT
/T
A
 is
 e
ar
ni
ng
s b
ef
or
e 
in
te
re
st
 a
nd
 
ta
xe
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 m
ea
su
re
. B
oo
kE
qu
ity
/T
L 
is
 b
oo
k 
va
lu
e 
of
 e
qu
ity
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 so
lv
en
cy
 m
ea
su
re
. 
W
e 
re
po
rt 
th
e 
‘n
et
” 
nu
m
be
rs
 fo
r p
re
- a
nd
 p
os
t- 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1.
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
, w
e 
al
so
 re
po
rt 
th
es
e 
‘n
et
’ n
um
be
rs
 m
ul
tip
ly
 th
ei
r c
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
Z-
sc
or
e 
m
od
el
. T
he
 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s a
re
 6
.5
6,
 3
.2
6,
 6
.7
2,
 a
nd
 1
.0
5 
fo
r t
he
 fo
ur
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s i
n 
th
e 
Z-
sc
or
e 
m
od
el
 fo
r n
on
-m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
 
 
  
  
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
  
  
N
 
W
C
/T
A
 
R
E/
TA
 
EB
IT
/T
A
 
B
oo
kE
qu
ity
/T
L 
Z-
sc
or
e 
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
pr
e-
5 
48
 
  0
.0
18
 
-0
.0
07
 
  0
.0
41
 
0.
29
7 
pr
e-
4 
50
 
  0
.0
59
 
-0
.0
59
 
  0
.0
52
 
0.
30
1 
pr
e-
3 
51
 
  0
.0
51
 
-0
.0
98
 
  0
.0
30
 
0.
30
7 
pr
e-
2 
53
 
  0
.0
20
 
-0
.1
60
 
 -0
.0
10
 
0.
20
8 
  
pr
e-
1 
54
 
 -0
.0
53
 
-0
.3
31
 
 -0
.0
31
 
0.
04
1 
  
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
 
pr
e-
5 
48
 
  0
.1
20
 
-0
.0
23
 
  0
.2
76
 
0.
31
2 
  0
.6
85
 
 w
.c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
pr
e-
4 
50
 
  0
.3
84
 
-0
.1
92
 
  0
.3
52
 
0.
31
6 
  0
.8
60
 
pr
e-
3 
51
 
  0
.3
34
 
-0
.3
20
 
  0
.2
03
 
0.
32
3 
  0
.5
39
 
pr
e-
2 
53
 
  0
.1
32
 
-0
.5
20
 
 -0
.0
66
 
0.
21
8 
 -0
.2
36
 
  
pr
e-
1 
54
 
 -0
.3
49
 
-1
.0
80
 
 -0
.2
11
 
0.
04
3 
 -1
.5
96
 
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
po
st
+1
54
 0
.0
46
-0
.0
27
  0
.0
28
0.
53
4
po
st
+2
44
 0
.0
84
-0
.0
27
  0
.0
28
0.
66
8
po
st
+3
 
42
 
  0
.0
61
 
-0
.0
81
 
  0
.0
08
 
0.
47
7 
po
st
+4
 
35
 
  0
.0
69
 
-0
.2
11
 
  0
.0
07
 
0.
55
2 
  
po
st
+5
 
26
 
  0
.0
88
 
-0
.3
67
 
  0
.0
02
 
0.
52
 
  
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
w
  
po
st
+1
 
54
 
  0
.3
00
 
-0
.0
87
 
  0
.1
86
 
0.
56
1 
  0
.9
60
 
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
po
st
+2
 
44
 
  0
.5
53
 
-0
.0
89
 
  0
.1
90
 
0.
70
1 
  1
.3
55
 
po
st
+3
 
42
 
  0
.4
03
 
-0
.2
64
 
  0
.0
53
 
0.
50
1 
  0
.6
94
 
po
st
+4
 
35
 
  0
.4
54
 
-0
.6
88
 
  0
.0
49
 
0.
58
0 
  0
.3
94
 
  
po
st
+5
 
26
 
  0
.5
74
 
-1
.1
95
 
  0
.0
11
 
0.
54
6 
 -0
.0
64
 
 
 
     
 
69
T
ab
le
 1
.2
1b
 C
om
po
ne
nt
s o
f Z
-s
co
re
: N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 F
ir
m
s i
n 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
G
ro
up
  
 
  
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
  
  
N
 
W
C
/T
A
 
R
E/
TA
 
EB
IT
/T
A
 
B
oo
kE
qu
ity
/T
L 
Z-
sc
or
e 
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
pr
e-
5 
43
 
  0
.0
69
 
-0
.0
56
 
  0
.0
00
 
0.
35
3 
pr
e-
4 
50
 
  0
.0
58
 
-0
.0
46
 
  0
.0
05
 
0.
28
2 
pr
e-
3 
53
 
  0
.1
10
 
-0
.1
16
 
 -0
.0
18
 
0.
33
7 
pr
e-
2 
56
 
  0
.0
59
 
-0
.1
81
 
 -0
.0
13
 
0.
26
0 
  
pr
e-
1 
57
 
 -0
.2
23
 
-0
.5
59
 
 -0
.0
71
 
0.
01
3 
  
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
 
pr
e-
5 
43
 
  0
.4
55
 
-0
.1
83
 
  0
.0
03
 
0.
37
0 
  0
.6
45
 
 w
.c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
pr
e-
4 
50
 
  0
.3
80
 
-0
.1
50
 
  0
.0
32
 
0.
29
6 
  0
.5
59
 
pr
e-
3 
53
 
  0
.7
22
 
-0
.3
78
 
 -0
.1
19
 
0.
35
4 
  0
.5
79
 
pr
e-
2 
56
 
  0
.3
89
 
-0
.5
90
 
 -0
.0
88
 
0.
27
3 
 -0
.0
17
 
  
pr
e-
1 
57
 
 -1
.4
6 
-1
.8
21
 
 -0
.4
78
 
0.
01
3 
 -3
.7
46
 
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
po
st
+1
 
57
 
  0
.0
56
 
-0
.2
06
 
 -0
.0
12
 
0.
26
4 
po
st
+2
 
54
 
  0
.0
29
 
-0
.1
92
  
  0
.0
12
 
0.
31
0 
po
st
+3
 
48
 
  0
.0
24
 
-0
.2
07
 
  0
.0
29
 
0.
30
7 
po
st
+4
 
38
 
  0
.0
28
 
-0
.1
18
 
  0
.0
46
 
0.
39
3 
  
po
st
+5
 
30
 
  0
.0
30
 
-0
.1
55
 
  0
.0
44
 
0.
39
7 
  
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
w
  
po
st
+1
 
57
 
  0
.3
66
 
-0
.6
71
 
 -0
.0
82
 
0.
27
7 
 -0
.1
1 
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
po
st
+2
 
54
 
  0
.1
88
 
-0
.6
25
 
  0
.0
80
 
0.
32
6 
 -0
.0
31
 
po
st
+3
 
48
 
  0
.1
58
 
-0
.6
74
 
  0
.1
92
 
0.
32
3 
 -0
.0
02
 
po
st
+4
 
38
 
  0
.1
82
 
-0
.3
83
 
  0
.3
12
 
0.
41
3 
  0
.5
23
 
  
po
st
+5
 
30
 
  0
.1
94
 
-0
.5
05
 
  0
.2
93
 
0.
41
7 
  0
.3
99
 
  
 
70
T
ab
le
 1
.2
2 
W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n:
 D
ur
at
io
n 
 
  
M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ax
im
um
 
M
in
im
um
 
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
fir
m
s 
40
4 
21
1 
22
35
 
29
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
56
6 
26
4 
22
35
 
37
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
30
8 
19
5 
12
44
 
29
 
  
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
fir
m
s 
40
9 
39
0 
11
02
 
35
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
45
3 
40
5 
10
89
 
64
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
38
8 
39
0 
11
02
 
35
 
          
 
  
 
71
Ta
bl
e 
1.
23
a 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Ex
ce
ss
 S
to
ck
 R
et
ur
n:
 S
ho
rt
 v
s. 
Lo
ng
 D
ur
at
io
n 
fo
r 
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
G
ro
up
 
Ex
ce
ss
 re
tu
rn
 is
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
 o
f e
ac
h 
fir
m
 in
 e
ac
h 
ye
ar
 a
nd
 th
e 
S&
P 
50
0 
re
tu
rn
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
ye
ar
. P
os
t+
1,
 p
os
t+
2,
 p
os
t+
3,
 p
os
t+
4,
 a
nd
 
po
st
+5
 a
re
 1
 y
ea
r, 
2 
ye
ar
s, 
3 
ye
ar
s, 
4 
ye
ar
s a
nd
 5
 y
ea
rs
 a
fte
r e
m
er
gi
ng
 fr
om
 C
ha
pt
er
 1
1.
 
 
  
  
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
  
   
   
 S
ho
rt 
  L
on
g 
Sh
or
t -
 L
on
g
Sh
or
t 
Lo
ng
 
Sh
or
t -
 L
on
g 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
  
   
   
 8
.6
%
  
   
3.
4%
 
   
5.
2%
 
  -
5.
9%
 
   
0.
6%
 
  -
6.
6%
 
  
po
st
+1
 
   
  2
4.
2%
  
 4
9.
2%
**
* 
-2
4.
9%
 
 1
5.
5%
 
   
   
18
.7
%
**
 
  -
3.
2%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
   
   
 0
.3
%
 
  -
8.
2%
 
   
 8
.5
%
 
   
2.
1%
 
  -
8.
1%
 
 1
0.
2%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
   
-3
.8
%
 
   
4.
0%
 
   
-7
.8
%
 
-1
1.
2%
 
  -
2.
7%
 
 -8
.5
%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
   
   
 7
.1
%
 
  -
4.
0%
 
   
11
.1
%
 
-2
1.
9%
 
-1
9.
8%
 
 -2
.0
%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
   
   
 3
.7
%
 
  -
7.
1%
 
   
10
.9
%
 
   
-9
.0
%
 
  -
8.
9%
 
  0
.0
%
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
  
   
  1
9.
4%
* 
 
  -
3.
2%
 
   
22
.6
%
 
   
  2
2.
2%
* 
 
  -
7.
7%
 
29
.9
%
 
  
po
st
+1
 
   
  3
1.
4%
 
  3
1.
9%
 
   
 -0
.5
%
 
   
22
.4
%
 
  -
6.
2%
 
28
.6
%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
   
  1
6.
0%
 
-1
5.
2%
 
   
 3
1.
2%
 
   
40
.4
%
 
-2
6.
9%
 
67
.2
%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
  3
7.
8%
 
-1
6.
4%
 
   
   
54
.1
%
* 
   
 6
.6
%
 
-1
7.
6%
 
24
.2
%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
   
  1
9.
5%
 
  1
2.
7%
 
   
   
6.
8%
 
-1
7.
9%
 
  -
6.
6%
 
-1
1.
3%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
   
   
 4
.2
%
 
   
 1
.2
%
 
   
   
3.
0%
 
-1
0.
3%
 
  -
5.
1%
 
  -
5.
2%
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
   
 6
.8
%
 
   
 3
.6
%
 
   
   
3.
2%
 
  -
6.
2%
 
  -
1.
1%
 
  -
5.
1%
 
  
po
st
+1
 
   
  3
1.
7%
  
  5
0.
9%
**
  
   
-1
9.
2%
 
  1
5.
5%
 
   
 1
8.
7%
* 
 
  -
3.
2%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
   
  -
8.
5%
 
   
-3
.2
%
  
   
  -
5.
3%
 
-1
3.
7%
 
  -
4.
4%
 
  -
9.
3%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
-1
5.
8%
 
   
 5
.6
%
 
   
-2
1.
4%
 
  -
26
.4
%
* 
 
  -
6.
2%
 
   
-2
0.
2%
* 
 
  
po
st
+4
 
   
  -
1.
1%
 
 -1
3.
9%
 
   
 1
2.
8%
 
-2
5.
2%
 
  -
27
.4
%
* 
 
   
2.
2%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
   
   
3.
8%
 
-1
4.
2%
 
   
 1
8.
0%
 
  -
8.
3%
 
-1
3.
7%
 
   
5.
4%
 
   
 
  
 
72
T
ab
le
 1
.2
3b
 P
os
t-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
E
xc
es
s S
to
ck
 R
et
ur
n:
 S
ho
rt
 v
s. 
L
on
g 
D
ur
at
io
n 
fo
r 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
G
ro
up
 
  
  
M
ea
n  
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n  
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
  
Sh
or
t  
Lo
ng
 
Sh
or
t -
 L
on
g  
Sh
or
t  
Lo
ng
 
Sh
or
t -
 L
on
g  
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s  
  
 -0
.1
%
 
   
7.
6%
 
-7
.7
%
 
  -
9.
0%
 
 1
1.
2%
 
-2
0.
2%
 
  
po
st
+1
 
 -2
.2
%
 
  -
2.
3%
 
  0
.1
%
 
-3
7.
1%
 
-2
3.
9%
 
-1
3.
2%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
15
.5
%
 
-1
8.
4%
 
33
.9
%
 
   
8.
2%
 
   
-3
1.
8%
**
 
40
.0
%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
 2
1.
2%
 
24
.4
%
 
 -3
.2
%
 
  1
5.
9%
 
  -
8.
4%
 
 2
4.
3%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
  -
3.
9%
 
-4
.7
%
 
   
0.
8%
 
-1
0.
8%
 
-1
5.
4%
 
   
4.
6%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
-1
9.
8%
 
   
32
.5
%
**
 
   
 -5
2.
3%
**
  
  -
26
.9
%
* 
 
   
 2
8.
2%
* 
   
  -
55
.1
%
**
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
  
-1
6.
9%
 
  5
.6
%
 
-2
2.
5%
 
-2
1.
3%
 
  1
1.
3%
 
-3
2.
6%
 
  
po
st
+1
 
30
.8
%
 
-1
6.
2%
 
 4
7.
1%
 
  3
0.
8%
 
 -3
2.
6%
 
  6
3.
4%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
28
.8
%
 
-1
6.
2%
 
 4
5.
1%
 
  1
9.
5%
 
 -2
5.
1%
 
  4
4.
7%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
  4
.5
%
 
  1
8.
0%
 
-1
3.
5%
 
   
 4
.5
%
 
-  
6.
8%
 
   
11
.3
%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
-3
.2
%
 
-1
4.
6%
 
 1
1.
5%
 
  -
4.
3%
 
 -1
1.
8%
 
   
 7
.5
%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
-3
4.
3%
* 
  4
8.
0%
 
-8
2.
2%
 
-2
5.
4%
 
   
 8
.5
%
 
-3
3.
8%
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
  
 5
.5
%
 
   
8.
4%
 
  -
2.
9%
 
  -
3.
2%
 
  1
1.
2%
 
-1
4.
5%
 
  
po
st
+1
 
-8
.2
%
 
  4
.2
%
 
 -1
2.
3%
 
-3
7.
1%
 
-2
3.
9%
 
-1
3.
2%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
12
.4
%
 
-1
9.
3%
 
   
31
.7
%
 
   
1.
5%
 
  -
32
.1
%
* 
  3
3.
6%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
23
.7
%
 
 2
7.
0%
 
   
-3
.2
%
 
   
15
.9
%
* 
 
  -
8.
4%
 
  2
4.
3%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
 -4
.1
%
 
 -0
.5
%
 
   
-3
.6
%
 
-2
3.
3%
 
-1
5.
4%
 
   
-7
.9
%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
-1
5.
9%
 
25
.9
%
 
  -
41
.7
%
 
-2
8.
5%
 
 3
2.
1%
 
-6
0.
6%
 
   
 
  
 
73
T
ab
le
 1
.2
4 
L
ev
er
ag
e:
 P
re
- v
s. 
Po
st
- C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
W
e 
de
fin
e 
le
ve
ra
ge
 a
s t
ot
al
 li
ab
ili
tie
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s. 
D
iff
  =
 p
os
t –
 p
re
 
 
  
Pr
e 
M
ea
n 
Po
st
 M
ea
n 
   
  D
iff
 
 P
re
 M
ed
ia
n 
Po
st
 M
ed
ia
n
   
  D
iff
 
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
0.
89
5 
   
0.
78
4 
   
-0
.1
12
 
   
0.
84
6 
   
0.
72
7 
  -
0.
11
8*
**
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
1.
01
0 
   
0.
97
8 
   
-0
.0
32
 
   
0.
97
3 
   
0.
82
1 
  -
0.
15
2*
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
0.
82
5 
   
0.
66
5 
   
-0
.1
61
 
   
0.
80
3 
   
0.
68
4 
  -
0.
11
9*
**
 
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
1.
41
6 
   
0.
99
6 
   
-0
.4
21
 
   
0.
84
0 
   
0.
74
3 
  -
0.
09
8*
* 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
0.
88
3 
   
0.
78
1 
   
-0
.1
02
 
   
0.
68
8 
   
0.
64
4 
  -
0.
04
4 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
   
1.
67
8 
   
1.
10
1 
   
-0
.5
77
 
   
0.
86
8 
   
0.
75
8 
  -
0.
11
0*
* 
   
 
  
 
74
T
ab
le
 1
.2
5 
L
ev
er
ag
e:
 W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
D
iff
 =
 w
ith
-p
ro
je
ct
io
n 
– 
w
ith
ou
t-p
ro
je
ct
io
n 
 
  
   
W
 P
ro
j 
W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
D
iff
 
   
W
 P
ro
j 
W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
 D
iff
 
  
Pr
e 
M
ea
n 
Pr
e 
M
ed
ia
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
0.
89
5 
1.
41
6 
-0
.5
21
 
0.
72
7 
0.
84
 
-0
.1
13
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
1.
01
 
0.
88
3 
0.
12
7 
0.
82
1 
0.
68
8 
   
0.
13
3*
* 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
0.
82
5 
1.
67
8 
-0
.8
53
 
0.
68
4 
0.
86
8 
-0
.1
84
 
  
Po
st
 M
ea
n 
Po
st
 M
ed
ia
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
0.
78
4 
0.
99
6 
-0
.2
12
 
0.
84
6 
0.
74
3 
0.
10
3 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
0.
97
8 
0.
78
1 
0.
19
7 
0.
97
3 
0.
64
4 
 0
.3
29
* 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
0.
66
5 
1.
10
1 
-0
.4
36
 
0.
80
3 
0.
75
8 
 0
.0
45
* 
         
 
  
 
75
T
ab
le
 1
.2
6a
 5
-Y
ea
r 
Pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
L
ev
er
ag
e:
 W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
 
  
  
M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
  
  
   
W
 P
ro
j 
   
 W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
D
iff
 
   
 W
 P
ro
j 
   
W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
 D
iff
 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
pr
e-
5 
0.
77
9 
0.
76
4 
 0
.0
15
 
0.
77
1 
0.
66
2 
  0
.1
10
 
pr
e-
4 
0.
83
8 
0.
88
0 
-0
.0
42
 
0.
82
1 
0.
77
8 
  0
.0
44
 
pr
e-
3 
0.
83
5 
1.
17
2 
-0
.3
37
 
0.
78
4 
0.
72
5 
  0
.0
58
* 
pr
e-
2 
0.
93
5 
1.
83
4 
-0
.9
00
 
0.
85
9 
0.
78
2 
  0
.0
77
**
 
  
pr
e-
1 
1.
04
0 
1.
69
4 
-0
.6
54
 
1.
02
8 
0.
96
6 
  0
.0
62
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
pr
e-
5 
0.
82
4 
0.
76
8 
 0
.0
55
 
0.
84
4 
0.
61
9 
  0
.2
25
 
pr
e-
4 
0.
90
3 
0.
90
8 
-0
.0
05
 
0.
94
5 
0.
73
2 
  0
.2
13
**
 
pr
e-
3 
0.
91
9 
0.
75
7 
 0
.1
62
 
0.
91
6 
0.
69
4 
  0
.2
22
**
* 
pr
e-
2 
1.
06
3 
0.
88
1 
 0
.1
82
 
0.
96
5 
0.
74
3 
  0
.2
21
**
 
  
pr
e-
1 
1.
27
9 
1.
09
6 
 0
.1
84
 
1.
12
2 
0.
87
1 
  0
.2
52
**
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
sp
re
-5
0.
75
4 
0.
76
2 
-0
.0
08
 
0.
74
5
0.
73
9
 0
.0
05
pr
e-
4 
0.
79
8 
0.
86
6 
-0
.0
69
 
0.
76
3 
0.
78
0 
 -0
.0
17
 
pr
e-
3 
0.
78
3 
1.
35
2 
-0
.5
70
 
0.
75
1 
0.
73
8 
  0
.0
13
 
pr
e-
2 
0.
85
5 
2.
26
0 
-1
.4
05
 
0.
80
5 
0.
79
4 
  0
.0
11
 
  
pr
e-
1 
0.
89
2 
1.
99
3 
-1
.1
02
 
0.
94
4 
0.
98
6 
 -0
.0
42
 
      
 
  
 
76
T
ab
le
 1
.2
6b
 5
-Y
ea
r 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
L
ev
er
ag
e:
 W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
 
  
  
M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
  
  
   
W
 P
ro
j 
   
W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
  D
iff
 
  W
 P
ro
j 
   
 W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
  D
iff
 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
po
st
+1
 
0.
76
8 
1.
03
9 
   
-0
.2
72
 
  0
.6
90
 
0.
74
2 
   
-0
.0
52
 
po
st
+2
 
0.
72
4 
0.
73
5 
   
-0
.0
11
 
  0
.6
90
 
0.
70
2 
   
-0
.0
12
 
po
st
+3
 
0.
75
6 
0.
77
1 
   
-0
.0
15
 
  0
.6
94
 
0.
70
9 
   
-0
.0
15
 
po
st
+4
 
0.
81
9 
0.
79
7 
   
 0
.0
22
 
  0
.7
17
 
0.
72
2 
   
-0
.0
04
 
  
po
st
+5
 
0.
72
7 
0.
85
0 
   
-0
.1
23
 
  0
.7
37
 
0.
71
6 
   
 0
.0
21
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
po
st
+1
 
0.
92
2 
0.
82
6 
   
 0
.0
96
 
  0
.7
76
 
0.
58
0 
   
 0
.1
97
 
po
st
+2
 
0.
88
6 
0.
65
7 
   
 0
.2
29
 
  0
.8
06
 
0.
64
5 
   
 0
.1
61
* 
po
st
+3
 
0.
93
2 
0.
66
6 
   
 0
.2
66
 
  0
.7
53
 
0.
63
2 
   
 0
.1
20
 
po
st
+4
 
1.
07
2 
0.
90
5 
   
 0
.1
67
 
  0
.7
63
 
0.
72
2 
   
 0
.0
41
 
  
po
st
+5
 
0.
89
5 
1.
02
2 
   
-0
.1
27
 
  0
.7
61
 
0.
70
2 
   
 0
.0
60
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s
po
st
+1
 
0.
65
5 
1.
14
6 
   
-0
.4
91
* 
  0
.6
51
 
0.
79
2 
   
-0
.1
40
**
 
po
st
+2
 
0.
62
0 
0.
77
7 
   
-0
.1
58
**
 
  0
.6
00
 
0.
76
3 
   
-0
.1
64
* 
po
st
+3
 
0.
64
5 
0.
83
6 
   
-0
.1
92
**
 
  0
.6
77
 
0.
76
5 
   
-0
.0
88
 
po
st
+4
 
0.
63
5 
0.
72
9 
   
-0
.0
94
 
  0
.6
39
 
0.
71
8 
   
-0
.0
79
 
  
po
st
+5
 
0.
64
8 
0.
74
2 
   
-0
.0
94
 
  0
.6
58
 
0.
71
6 
   
-0
.0
58
 
  
 
  
 
77
Ta
bl
e 
1.
27
 E
xc
es
s R
et
ur
n:
 P
re
- v
s. 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Th
e 
ex
ce
ss
 re
tu
rn
 is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s t
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
 a
nd
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t r
et
ur
n.
 W
e 
us
e 
S&
P5
00
 re
tu
rn
 a
s o
ur
 m
ar
ke
t r
et
ur
n 
in
de
x.
 A
ll 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
s b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
fil
in
g 
da
te
s o
f C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
ar
e 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
s i
n 
pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
pe
rio
d,
 a
nd
 a
ll 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
s a
fte
r t
he
 e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
da
te
s i
n 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
ar
e 
th
e 
po
st
-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
re
tu
rn
s. 
 
 
  
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
Pr
e 
Po
st
 
Po
st
 - 
Pr
e 
Pr
e 
Po
st
 
Po
st
 - 
Pr
e 
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
 -2
0.
9%
**
* 
 
   
   
  6
.0
0%
 
   
   
26
.9
%
**
* 
 
   
  -
26
.9
%
**
* 
 
   
   
 -3
.3
0%
 
   
   
23
.5
%
**
* 
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
 -2
9.
1%
**
* 
 
   
   
  7
.6
0%
 
   
   
36
.7
%
**
* 
 
   
  -
27
.2
%
**
* 
 
   
   
17
.4
0%
 
   
   
44
.6
%
**
* 
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
 -1
6.
5%
**
* 
 
   
   
  5
.2
0%
 
   
   
21
.7
%
**
* 
 
   
  -
20
.6
%
**
* 
 
   
   
 -6
.0
0%
 
   
   
14
.5
%
**
* 
 
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
 -3
3.
2%
**
* 
 
   
   
  3
.8
0%
 
   
   
37
.0
%
**
* 
 
   
  -
30
.6
%
**
* 
 
   
   
 8
.4
0%
 
   
   
39
.0
%
**
* 
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
 -3
4.
8%
**
* 
 
   
   
 -4
.6
0%
 
   
   
30
.2
%
* 
 
   
  -
29
.1
%
**
* 
 
   
   
 8
.4
0%
 
   
   
37
.5
0%
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
 -3
2.
7%
**
* 
 
   
   
  7
.0
0%
 
   
   
39
.7
%
**
* 
 
   
  -
30
.6
%
**
* 
 
   
   
 5
.1
0%
 
   
   
35
.6
%
**
* 
 
          
  
 
78
T
ab
le
 1
.2
8 
E
xc
es
s R
et
ur
n:
 W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
 
  
  W
 P
ro
j 
  W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
D
iff
 
  W
 P
ro
j 
  W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
  D
iff
 
  
Pr
e 
M
ea
n 
Pr
e 
M
ed
ia
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
 -2
0.
9%
**
* 
 -3
3.
2%
**
* 
 1
2.
2%
**
  
 -2
6.
9%
**
* 
  -
30
.6
0%
 
   
 3
.7
0%
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
 -2
9.
1%
**
* 
 -3
4.
8%
**
* 
   
5.
70
%
 
 -2
7.
2%
**
* 
  -
29
.1
0%
 
   
 1
.9
0%
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
 -1
6.
5%
**
* 
 -3
2.
7%
**
* 
16
.2
%
**
  
 -2
0.
6%
**
* 
  -
30
.6
0%
 
  1
0.
00
%
 
Po
st
 M
ea
n 
Po
st
 m
ed
ia
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
 6
.0
0%
 
   
 3
.8
0%
 
  2
.1
0%
 
  -
3.
30
%
 
   
  8
.4
0%
 
 -1
1.
80
%
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
 7
.6
0%
 
  -
4.
60
%
 
12
.2
0%
 
 1
7.
40
%
 
   
  8
.4
0%
 
   
 9
.0
0%
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
 5
.2
0%
 
   
7.
00
%
 
 -1
.8
0%
 
  -
6.
00
%
 
   
  5
.1
0%
 
 -1
1.
10
%
 
            
  
 
79
Ta
bl
e 
1.
29
a 
5-
Y
ea
r 
Pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1E
xc
es
s R
et
ur
n:
 W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
 
  
  
M
ea
n  
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n  
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
  
  W
 P
ro
j  
 W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j   
 W
 P
ro
j  
 W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s  
pr
e-
5  
   
-4
.0
%
 
   
 -5
.1
%
 
  1
.2
%
 
-1
9.
9%
* 
 
  -
2.
0%
 
-1
7.
9%
 
  
pr
e-
4  
   
-4
.7
%
 
  -
13
.1
%
 
  8
.4
%
 
-2
3.
6%
**
  
-1
8.
8%
* 
 
  -
4.
8%
 
  
pr
e-
3  
   
-7
.5
%
 
  -
25
.5
%
**
* 
 
18
.1
%
 
-3
0.
8%
**
  
-3
6.
2%
**
* 
 
   
 5
.3
%
 
  
pr
e-
2  
 -4
2.
9%
**
* 
 
  -
63
.5
%
**
* 
 
   
 2
0.
5%
**
  
-5
3.
1%
**
* 
 
-7
1.
2%
**
* 
 
   
   
  1
8.
0%
**
* 
 
  
pr
e-
1  
 -6
1.
4%
**
* 
 
  -
54
.7
%
**
* 
 
-6
.7
%
 
-7
7.
9%
**
* 
 
-7
4.
5%
**
* 
 
   
-3
.4
%
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
pr
e-
5  
   
-7
.9
%
 
   
  8
.2
%
 
-1
6.
2%
 
-2
0.
3%
 
 1
4.
4%
 
  -
34
.7
%
 
  
pr
e-
4  
 -1
7.
7%
 
  -
15
.9
%
 
 -1
.9
%
 
-2
7.
5%
**
  
   
4.
2%
 
  -
31
.7
%
 
  
pr
e-
3  
 -2
1.
7%
* 
 
  -
54
.6
%
**
* 
 
 3
3.
0%
 
-2
6.
2%
**
* 
 
-5
4.
7%
**
  
   
  2
8.
5%
* 
 
  
pr
e-
2  
 -4
1.
4%
**
* 
 
  -
67
.5
%
**
* 
 
 2
6.
1%
 
-4
8.
5%
**
* 
 
-6
8.
9%
**
  
   
  2
0.
4%
* 
 
  
pr
e-
1  
 -7
6.
2%
**
* 
 
  -
60
.2
%
**
  
-1
6.
0%
 
-7
8.
3%
**
* 
 
-7
7.
1%
**
  
   
 -1
.2
%
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
pr
e-
5  
   
-1
.5
%
 
   
 -8
.4
%
 
   
6.
9%
 
-1
9.
1%
 
  -
6.
4%
 
  -
12
.7
%
 
  
pr
e-
4  
   
 2
.8
%
 
  -
12
.3
%
 
15
.2
%
 
-2
2.
8%
 
-1
9.
0%
 
   
 -3
.8
%
 
  
pr
e-
3  
   
 0
.1
%
 
  -
18
.0
%
* 
 
18
.1
%
 
-3
2.
5%
 
-2
7.
2%
* 
 
   
 -5
.4
%
 
  
pr
e-
2  
-4
3.
7%
**
* 
 
  -
62
.5
%
**
* 
 
18
.8
%
 
-5
6.
7%
**
* 
 
-7
1.
4%
**
* 
 
   
  1
4.
7%
* 
 
  
pr
e-
1  
-5
3.
8%
**
* 
 
  -
53
.3
%
**
* 
 
-0
.4
%
 
-7
6.
6%
**
* 
 
-7
0.
7%
**
* 
 
   
 -5
.9
%
 
      
  
 
80
 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
29
b 
5-
Y
ea
r 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1E
xc
es
s R
et
ur
n:
 W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
 
  
  
M
ea
n  
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n  
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
  
  W
 P
ro
j  
   
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
 W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j  
   
W
 P
ro
j  
   
   
W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s  
po
st
+1
 
   
   
 
38
.1
%
**
* 
   
   
-2
.2
%
 
   
  4
0.
3%
**
  
   
18
.7
%
**
 
  -
29
.1
%
 
   
   
47
.9
%
**
  
  
po
st
+2
 
   
-4
.3
%
 
   
   
-3
.8
%
 
 -0
.6
%
 
   
 -5
.3
%
 
  -
26
.7
%
 
  2
1.
4%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
 0
.4
%
 
   
   
23
.1
%
-2
2.
6%
 
   
 -7
.5
%
 
   
10
.8
%
 
-1
8.
3%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
   
 1
.4
%
 
   
   
-4
.4
%
 
   
5.
8%
 
  -
20
.8
%
 
  -
10
.8
%
 
  -
9.
9%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
   
-2
.1
%
 
   
  1
5.
8%
 
-1
8.
0%
 
   
 -9
.0
%
 
   
  7
.1
%
 
-1
6.
1%
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
po
st
+1
 
  3
1.
7%
 
   
  -
4.
5%
 
36
.2
%
 
   
12
.6
%
 
  -
32
.6
%
 
  4
5.
2%
 
  
po
st
+2
 
   
-1
.3
%
 
   
  -
1.
2%
 
-0
.1
%
 
   
 -0
.2
%
 
  -
18
.4
%
 
  1
8.
2%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
 9
.3
%
 
   
 1
4.
7%
 
-5
.4
%
 
   
  3
.9
%
 
   
 -6
.8
%
 
  1
0.
7%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
  1
6.
1%
 
   
-1
0.
8%
 
26
.9
%
 
  -
16
.8
%
 
   
 -4
.3
%
 
  -
12
.5
%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
   
 2
.6
%
 
   
 2
7.
4%
 
-2
4.
8%
 
   
 -6
.8
%
 
   
  5
.2
%
 
  -
12
.0
%
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
po
st
+1
 
  4
1.
6%
**
 
   
 -1
.5
%
 
   
 4
3.
1%
* 
 
   
18
.7
%
**
 
  -
29
.1
%
 
   
   
  4
7.
9%
**
  
  
po
st
+2
 
   
-5
.8
%
 
   
 -4
.6
%
 
  -
1.
2%
 
   
 -5
.3
%
 
  -
28
.0
%
 
   
  2
2.
7%
 
  
po
st
+3
 
   
-4
.5
%
 
   
25
.5
%
 
-3
0.
0%
 
  -
14
.8
%
 
   
13
.4
%
 
   
 -2
8.
1%
 
  
po
st
+4
 
   
-7
.7
%
 
   
-2
.1
%
 
  -
5.
6%
 
  -
26
.7
%
* 
 
  -
16
.0
%
 
   
  -
10
.6
%
 
  
po
st
+5
 
   
-5
.6
%
 
   
11
.5
%
 
-1
7.
1%
 
   
 -9
.0
%
 
   
 1
5.
6%
 
   
   
-2
4.
6%
 
    
  
 
81
T
ab
le
 1
.3
0:
 S
ha
rp
e 
R
at
io
: P
re
- v
s. 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
 
  
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
Pr
e 
Po
st
 
Po
st
 - 
Pr
e 
Pr
e 
Po
st
 
Po
st
 - 
Pr
e 
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
   
  0
.2
51
 
   
   
  0
.7
78
 
   
   
  0
.5
27
 
   
   
-0
.9
67
**
* 
 
   
   
   
0.
28
2 
   
   
 1
.2
49
**
  
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
   
 -1
.1
61
**
* 
 
   
   
  0
.4
78
 
   
   
  1
.6
39
 
   
   
-1
.2
01
**
* 
 
   
   
   
1.
58
5 
   
   
 2
.7
87
**
  
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
   
  1
.0
18
 
   
   
  0
.9
31
 
   
   
 -0
.0
87
 
   
   
-0
.8
07
 
   
   
   
0.
00
6 
   
   
 0
.8
13
 
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
   
  4
.0
99
 
   
   
  1
.7
00
**
* 
 
   
   
 -2
.3
99
 
   
   
-0
.8
83
 
   
   
   
1.
48
7*
**
 
   
   
 2
.3
69
* 
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
   
  5
.1
61
 
   
   
  1
.1
09
 
   
   
 -4
.0
52
 
   
   
 0
.4
50
 
   
   
   
0.
54
1 
   
   
 0
.0
91
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
   
  3
.8
06
 
   
   
  1
.9
17
**
* 
 
   
   
 -1
.8
89
 
   
   
-1
.0
21
 
   
   
   
1.
50
9*
* 
 
   
   
 2
.5
30
**
  
           
 
  
 
82
Ta
bl
e 
1.
31
a 
5-
Y
ea
r 
Pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Sh
ar
pe
 R
at
io
: W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
 
  
  
M
ea
n  
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n  
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
  
  W
 P
ro
j  
 W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j   
   
   
W
 P
ro
j  
   
W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s  
pr
e-
5
 1
.1
21
  
   
 7
.7
60
* 
 
   
   
   
-6
.6
39
**
  
-0
.5
87
 
   
 1
.2
80
  
-1
.8
67
 
  
pr
e-
4
 3
.7
09
  
   
 1
.1
48
  
   
   
   
 2
.5
61
  
-0
.9
59
 
   
-0
.6
09
 
-0
.3
50
 
  
pr
e-
3
-0
.0
33
 
   
-0
.8
75
 
   
   
   
 0
.8
41
  
-1
.5
07
 
   
-2
.2
29
**
  
 0
.7
22
  
  
pr
e-
2
-2
.3
49
 
   
-3
.1
38
**
* 
   
   
   
 0
.7
89
* 
 
-2
.4
32
 
   
-3
.2
57
**
* 
 
   
0.
82
5*
  
  
pr
e-
1
-2
.8
66
 
   
 8
.4
41
  
   
   
 -1
1.
30
7 
 
-2
.9
64
 
   
-2
.3
37
**
* 
 
-0
.6
27
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
pr
e-
5
 0
.8
12
  
  2
4.
62
2 
 
   
   
 -2
3.
80
9*
* 
 
0.
10
5  
   
 1
.9
18
  
-1
.8
13
 
  
pr
e-
4
-0
.6
89
 
   
 4
.9
73
* 
 
   
   
   
-5
.6
63
**
* 
 
-1
.4
12
 
   
 2
.8
65
**
  
   
 -4
.2
77
**
  
  
pr
e-
3
-0
.9
74
 
   
-2
.7
43
**
* 
   
   
   
 1
.7
69
* 
 
-1
.4
48
 
   
-2
.7
12
**
  
   
1.
26
4*
  
  
pr
e-
2
-2
.3
31
 
   
-3
.6
43
**
* 
   
   
   
 1
.3
12
  
-2
.3
99
 
   
-4
.3
09
**
  
 1
.9
10
  
  
pr
e-
1
-4
.2
61
 
   
-2
.4
82
**
  
   
   
   
-1
.7
78
 
-3
.7
24
 
   
-2
.8
75
**
  
-0
.8
50
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
pr
e-
5
 1
.3
17
  
   
 3
.6
59
* 
 
   
   
   
-2
.3
42
 
-0
.6
78
 
   
 0
.6
70
  
-1
.3
48
 
  
pr
e-
4
 6
.3
91
  
   
 0
.0
32
  
   
   
   
 6
.3
58
  
-0
.2
95
 
   
-0
.8
22
 
 0
.5
27
  
  
pr
e-
3
 0
.4
69
  
   
-0
.3
90
 
   
   
   
 0
.8
59
  
-1
.5
07
 
   
-1
.4
50
 
-0
.0
57
 
  
pr
e-
2
-2
.3
58
 
   
-3
.0
12
**
* 
   
   
   
 0
.6
54
  
-2
.5
65
 
   
-3
.1
54
**
* 
 
 0
.5
88
  
  
pr
e-
1
-2
.1
68
 
  1
1.
17
2 
 
   
   
 -1
3.
34
1  
-2
.4
83
 
   
-2
.1
73
**
* 
 
-0
.3
10
 
       
  
 
83
 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
31
b 
5-
Y
ea
r 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Sh
ar
pe
 R
at
io
: W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
 
  
  
M
ea
n  
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n  
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
  
  W
 P
ro
j  
 W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j   
 W
 P
ro
j  
 W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s  
po
st
+1
 
   
4.
95
7*
**
  
   
2.
08
5 
 
   
   
  2
.8
72
  
  1
.7
99
**
* 
 
   
-1
.1
59
 
   
   
  2
.9
58
* 
 
  
po
st
+2
 
   
0.
87
3 
 
   
0.
51
9 
 
   
   
  0
.3
54
  
  0
.0
61
  
   
-1
.0
05
 
   
   
  1
.0
66
  
  
po
st
+3
 
   
1.
57
6 
 
   
3.
46
4*
**
 
   
   
 -1
.8
88
 
 -0
.8
50
 
   
 0
.5
12
**
  
   
   
-1
.3
62
* 
 
  
po
st
+4
 
  -
0.
43
1 
   
1.
47
9 
 
   
   
 -1
.9
10
 
 -1
.3
35
 
   
-0
.9
99
 
   
   
 -0
.3
35
 
  
po
st
+5
 
  -
0.
90
4*
  
   
1.
83
6*
* 
 
   
   
 -2
.7
40
**
* 
 
 -1
.6
02
**
  
   
 0
.9
99
  
   
   
 -2
.6
02
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
po
st
+1
 
   
5.
34
2*
  
   
4.
90
4 
 
   
   
  0
.4
38
  
  2
.0
55
  
   
-1
.0
19
 
   
   
  3
.0
74
  
  
po
st
+2
 
  1
.0
63
  
  0
.2
57
  
   
   
 0
.8
06
  
 0
.3
76
  
  -
1.
25
6  
   
   
 1
.6
32
  
  
po
st
+3
 
   
1.
31
5 
 
   
1.
96
5 
 
   
   
 -0
.6
50
 
  0
.6
60
  
   
-0
.1
32
 
   
   
  0
.7
91
  
  
po
st
+4
 
  -
0.
13
3  
   
0.
68
1 
 
   
   
 -0
.8
14
 
 -0
.4
61
 
   
 0
.3
14
  
   
   
 -0
.7
75
 
  
po
st
+5
 
  -
0.
12
6  
   
1.
82
0 
 
   
   
 -1
.9
46
 
 -1
.5
42
 
   
 0
.5
06
  
   
   
 -2
.0
48
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g  
po
st
+1
 
   
4.
76
4*
* 
 
   
1.
14
5 
 
   
   
  3
.6
20
  
  1
.7
99
**
  
   
-1
.2
12
 
   
   
  3
.0
11
* 
 
  
po
st
+2
 
   
0.
78
0 
 
   
0.
76
8 
 
   
   
  0
.0
12
  
  0
.0
61
  
   
-1
.0
02
 
   
   
  1
.0
63
  
  
po
st
+3
 
   
1.
72
2 
 
   
3.
90
8*
**
 
   
   
 -2
.1
86
 
 -1
.2
71
 
   
 1
.6
16
**
  
   
   
-2
.8
87
**
  
  
po
st
+4
 
  -
0.
61
6  
   
1.
76
6 
 
   
   
 -2
.3
83
 
 -2
.8
86
 
   
-1
.1
46
 
   
   
 -1
.7
40
 
  
po
st
+5
 
  -
1.
48
7*
* 
 
   
1.
84
3*
  
   
   
 -3
.3
30
**
* 
 
 -1
.8
55
**
  
   
 1
.0
06
  
   
   
 -2
.8
60
**
* 
 
   
 
  
 
84
Ta
bl
e 
1.
32
 T
re
yn
or
 R
at
io
: P
re
- v
s. 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
 
  
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  
Pr
e 
Po
st
 
Po
st
 - 
Pr
e 
Pr
e 
Po
st
 
Po
st
 - 
Pr
e 
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
   
-0
.4
50
* 
   
   
 0
.1
71
 
   
   
0.
62
1*
* 
   
  -
0.
13
7*
**
 
   
   
-0
.0
90
 
   
   
 0
.0
46
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
   
-0
.4
50
 
   
   
 0
.1
76
 
   
   
0.
62
6 
   
  -
0.
13
3*
* 
   
   
-0
.0
35
 
   
   
 0
.0
98
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
   
   
-0
.4
50
 
   
   
 0
.1
68
 
   
   
0.
61
8 
   
  -
0.
13
7*
 
   
   
-0
.1
88
 
   
   
-0
.0
52
 
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
   
   
 0
.9
64
 
   
   
-0
.1
4 
   
  -
1.
10
4 
   
  -
0.
20
5*
* 
   
   
 0
.0
17
 
   
   
 0
.2
22
* 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
   
   
-0
.4
21
**
* 
   
   
-0
.6
94
 
   
  -
0.
27
4 
   
  -
0.
40
3*
* 
   
   
-0
.1
34
 
   
   
 0
.2
69
 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
   
   
 1
.3
86
 
   
   
 0
.0
61
 
   
  -
1.
32
4 
   
  -
0.
14
6 
   
   
 0
.1
24
 
   
   
 0
.2
70
 
          
    
  
 
85
T
ab
le
 1
.3
3a
 5
-Y
ea
r 
Pr
e-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
T
re
yn
or
 R
at
io
: W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
 
  
  
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
 W
 P
ro
j  
W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j 
   
W
 P
ro
j  
W
/O
 P
ro
j
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
pr
e-
5 
  0
.2
45
 
  0
.0
75
 
   
   
  0
.1
70
 
   
-0
.0
66
 
  0
.0
64
 
   
   
  -
0.
13
0 
pr
e-
4 
  0
.0
11
 
 -0
.0
16
 
   
   
  0
.0
27
 
   
-0
.1
75
 
 -0
.0
38
 
   
   
  -
0.
13
7 
pr
e-
3 
  0
.1
22
 
  0
.7
26
 
   
   
 -0
.6
04
 
   
-0
.2
49
 
 -0
.0
83
 
   
   
  -
0.
16
6 
pr
e-
2 
 -0
.1
68
 
  0
.4
38
 
   
   
 -0
.6
05
 
   
-0
.2
46
**
 
 -0
.2
44
* 
   
   
  -
0.
00
1 
  
pr
e-
1 
 -2
.7
56
**
 
  0
.0
17
 
   
   
 -2
.7
73
**
 
   
-0
.5
07
**
*
 -0
.4
58
 
   
   
  -
0.
04
9 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
pr
e-
5 
  0
.2
15
 
  0
.0
19
 
   
   
  0
.1
96
 
   
-0
.0
55
 
  0
.0
64
 
   
   
  -
0.
11
9 
pr
e-
4 
  0
.1
85
 
 -0
.3
46
 
   
   
  0
.5
31
 
   
 0
.0
25
 
 -0
.2
13
 
   
   
   
0.
23
8 
pr
e-
3 
  0
.0
48
  
  0
.0
61
 
   
   
 -0
.0
13
 
   
-0
.2
15
**
 
 -0
.1
32
 
   
   
  -
0.
08
3 
pr
e-
2 
 -0
.4
68
 
 -0
.5
12
**
 
   
   
  0
.0
45
 
   
-0
.2
60
* 
 -0
.5
62
 
   
   
   
0.
30
1 
  
pr
e-
1 
 -2
.5
31
 
 -0
.6
69
**
*
   
   
 -1
.8
62
 
   
-0
.5
97
**
*
 -0
.6
90
**
   
   
   
0.
09
3 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s
pr
e-
5 
  0
.2
68
 
  0
.0
89
 
   
   
  0
.1
79
 
   
-0
.0
91
 
 -0
.0
17
 
   
   
  -
0.
07
4 
pr
e-
4 
 -0
.1
27
 
  0
.0
60
 
   
   
 -0
.1
87
 
   
-0
.2
09
 
 -0
.0
37
 
   
   
  -
0.
17
2 
pr
e-
3 
  0
.1
81
 
  0
.7
82
 
   
   
 -0
.6
01
 
   
-0
.2
50
 
 -0
.0
34
 
   
   
  -
0.
21
6 
pr
e-
2 
  0
.0
25
 
  0
.6
88
  
   
   
 -0
.6
62
 
   
-0
.2
46
* 
 -0
.2
36
 
   
   
  -
0.
01
0 
  
pr
e-
1 
 -2
.9
08
* 
  0
.1
72
 
   
   
 -3
.0
80
* 
   
-0
.3
94
**
*
 -0
.3
00
 
   
   
  -
0.
09
4 
     
  
 
86
T
ab
le
 1
.3
3b
 5
-Y
ea
r 
Po
st
-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
T
re
yn
or
 R
at
io
: W
ith
- v
s. 
W
ith
ou
t-
Pr
oj
ec
tio
n 
 
  
  
M
ea
n 
M
ea
n 
D
iff
 
M
ed
ia
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
D
iff
 
  W
 P
ro
j  
W
/O
 P
ro
j
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j 
  W
 P
ro
j  
W
/O
 P
ro
j  
W
 P
ro
j -
 W
/O
 P
ro
j
A
ll 
Fi
rm
s 
po
st
+1
 
  1
.8
22
 
 -0
.4
52
**
   
   
   
2.
27
4 
  -
0.
02
5 
 -0
.2
20
**
 
   
   
   
0.
19
5*
 
po
st
+2
 
  0
.2
32
* 
 -0
.3
64
 
   
   
   
0.
59
7 
   
0.
23
1*
* 
 -0
.0
57
 
   
   
   
0.
28
8 
po
st
+3
 
  0
.9
49
 
 -1
.2
02
 
   
   
   
2.
15
2 
  -
0.
08
2 
 -0
.0
16
 
   
   
  -
0.
06
6 
po
st
+4
 
 -0
.3
66
* 
  0
.0
69
 
   
   
  -
0.
43
6 
  -
0.
19
1*
* 
  0
.0
52
 
   
   
  -
0.
24
2 
  
po
st
+5
 
  0
.0
00
 
  0
.8
81
 
   
   
  -
0.
88
1 
  -
0.
15
8 
  0
.0
54
 
   
   
  -
0.
21
2 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
po
st
+1
 
  3
.6
66
 
 -1
.1
35
 
   
   
   
4.
80
1 
   
0.
86
8 
 -1
.1
35
 
   
   
   
2.
00
3 
po
st
+2
 
  0
.1
24
 
 -0
.8
88
 
   
   
   
1.
01
2 
   
0.
19
3 
 -0
.8
88
  
   
   
   
1.
08
1 
po
st
+3
 
  0
.1
06
 
 -7
.2
34
 
   
   
   
7.
34
0 
  -
0.
07
0 
  0
.0
23
 
   
   
  -
0.
09
3 
po
st
+4
 
 -0
.1
19
 
  0
.0
64
 
   
   
  -
0.
18
2 
  -
0.
06
6 
  0
.0
41
 
   
   
  -
0.
10
7 
  
po
st
+5
 
  0
.0
16
 
  1
.9
56
 
   
   
  -
1.
94
0 
  -
0.
16
8 
 -0
.0
66
 
   
   
  -
0.
10
2 
N
on
-M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
Fi
rm
s 
po
st
+1
 
  0
.4
38
 
 -0
.3
16
 
   
   
   
0.
75
4 
  -
0.
10
2 
 -0
.1
01
 
   
   
   
0.
00
0 
po
st
+2
 
  0
.4
12
 
 -0
.2
69
 
   
   
   
0.
68
1*
 
   
0.
33
5 
 -0
.0
57
 
   
   
   
0.
39
1 
po
st
+3
 
  1
.7
22
 
  0
.8
08
 
   
   
   
0.
91
4 
  -
0.
25
3 
 -0
.0
56
 
   
   
  -
0.
19
7 
po
st
+4
 
 -0
.5
79
* 
  0
.0
72
 
   
   
  -
0.
65
1 
  -
0.
31
4*
**
 
  0
.1
17
 
   
   
  -
0.
43
1*
* 
  
po
st
+5
 
 -0
.0
11
 
  0
.4
78
 
   
   
  -
0.
48
9 
  -
0.
15
0 
  0
.0
83
 
   
   
  -
0.
23
3 
 
 
  
 
87
T
ab
le
 1
.3
4 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
of
 P
os
t-
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
E
xc
es
s R
et
ur
ns
: A
ll 
Y
ea
rs
 
Ex
ce
ss
 R
et
ur
ns
 =
 α
 +
 β
1*
Fi
rm
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
 +
 β
2*
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
 +
 β
3*
D
ur
at
io
n 
Fi
rm
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
 =
 1
 if
 it
 is
 a
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s 
Fi
rm
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
 =
 0
 if
 it
 is
 a
 n
on
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s 
C
ha
pt
er
-1
1 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
 =
 1
 if
 th
e 
fir
m
 h
as
 a
 p
ro
je
ct
io
n 
pl
an
 
C
ha
pt
er
-1
1 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
 =
 0
 if
 th
e 
fir
m
 d
oe
sn
’t 
D
ur
at
io
n 
= 
Lo
g(
nu
m
be
r o
f d
ay
s i
n 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1)
 
 
  
Pa
ra
m
et
er
 
t-v
al
ue
 
Fi
rm
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
0.
07
3 
0.
41
 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
0.
06
0 
0.
36
 
D
ur
at
io
n 
0.
06
8 
0.
77
 
   
 
  
 
88
Ta
bl
e 
1.
35
 R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
of
 P
os
t-C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
Ex
ce
ss
 R
et
ur
ns
: F
ir
st
 Y
ea
r 
af
te
r 
Em
er
ge
nc
e 
 
  
Pa
ra
m
et
er
 
t-v
al
ue
 
Fi
rm
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
0.
52
6 
0.
70
 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
1 
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
1.
11
1 
1.
59
 
D
ur
at
io
n 
0.
36
2 
1.
02
 
        
 
  
 
89
T
ab
le
 1
.3
6 
E
st
im
at
io
n 
of
 β
 
Th
e 
fir
st
 li
ne
 is
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
be
ta
s. 
Th
e 
se
co
nd
 li
ne
 is
 th
e 
t-v
al
ue
s. 
 
 
  
W
ith
-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
W
ith
ou
t-P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
  
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
Pr
e-
C
h1
1 
Po
st
-C
h1
1 
A
ll 
fir
m
s 
1.
37
**
* 
1.
27
**
* 
1.
36
**
* 
1.
04
**
* 
  
   
   
25
.1
4 
   
   
15
.9
3 
   
   
18
.1
7 
   
   
13
.1
8 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s 
1.
29
**
* 
1.
22
**
* 
1.
43
**
* 
1.
39
**
* 
  
   
  1
6.
56
 
   
   
9.
68
 
   
   
10
.1
2 
   
   
8.
30
 
N
on
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s 
1.
41
**
* 
1.
30
**
* 
1.
34
**
* 
0.
91
**
* 
  
   
   
19
.1
5 
   
   
12
.5
6 
   
   
15
.2
4 
   
  1
0.
32
 
          
 
 
90 
 
CHAPTER 2 
INVESTING IN BANKRUPT STOCKS: IS IT A SWEET TRICK? 
2.1 Introduction 
Bankruptcy filing is a significant economic event in a corporation’s life cycle. 
Prior research documents negative market reactions to bankruptcy filing announcements 
(Clark and Weistein (1983), Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995), Dawkins and Rose-Green 
(1998), and Coelho and Taffler (working paper, 2008)). The securities of a publicly 
owned firm that files for Chapter 11 often continue to trade. If such a firm’s securities are 
delisted by the NYSE, Nasdaq or AMEX, their trading may move to the Pink Sheets.   
One of the most noticeable characteristics of the stocks of bankrupt firms is how 
much their price has fallen from prior levels. These very low prices often draw attention 
from unsophisticated investors who rush in to buy these stocks. Such investors may 
expect, or at least hope, for a huge profit when the company reorganizes and emerges 
from Chapter 11. They may believe that even if they don’t make a killing, any loss will 
be limited due to the already depressed current level of the stock price. Such investors 
may not contemplate the likelihood that the stock will become worthless. A stock that 
falls from pennies a share to zero is still a 100% loss, a not uncommon result.  
Herein we explore both the performance and the major factors which help explain 
the performance of these bankrupt stocks. The holding period return performance is 
measured in three ways: 1. The simple holding period return which only uses the price 
information: 2. The comprehensive holding period return which takes account of both 
price and final distributions specified in the reorganization or liquidation plan, and; 3. 
Alpha estimated from Carhart four-factor model (Carhart,1997). 
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We find that a strategy of buying such stocks on their bankruptcy filing day and 
holding until the final resolution date has produced significant negative returns for all 
three measures. The stock price alone may provide an illusion of limited loss exposure. 
The final distribution, however, reveals that investors will generally suffer severe losses. 
Over half of our sample, for which the plan of reorganization can be identified, cancel or 
extinguish their pre filing shares. As a result the common stock holders receive nothing 
and their stocks become worthless on the final resolution date.  
In our multivariate regression analysis, we test three accounting variables, 
liquidity, profitability, and leverage, plus one dummy representing whether a firm suffers 
from financial distress pre bankruptcy, and one proxy for information uncertainty. The 
uncertainties of the Chapter 11 process add significant risk to investing in bankrupt 
stocks. We find liquidity to be the key factor in explaining stock returns. Profitability and 
information uncertainty are significant in explaining the positive returns, while liquidity 
and (un)profitability are the two major concerns for negative returns. Another interesting 
factor, the involvement of hedge funds, also draws our attention as hedge fund managers 
are experienced investors. They may have been able to select stocks with more attractive 
potentials. Our results, however, do not support this hypothesis.  
Our paper contributes to the relevant literature in several ways. First, we extend 
the existing literature which document the large loss around the bankruptcy filing period 
(Clark and Weinstein (1983), Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995), etc) and poor long-term 
after bankruptcy performance (Hotchkiss (1995), Coelho and Taffler (working paper, 
2008), etc) by investigating the period during Chapter 11. This period draws our interests 
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as investors are lured into the market by noticing a record low stock price upon 
bankruptcy filing, but is the deal really as sweet as it looks?  
Second, differing from Li and Zhong (working paper, 2009) and Coelho and 
Taffler (working paper, 2008) which also focus on stock performance during Chapter 11 
is the comprehensive way we look at the holding period return. Investing in bankrupt 
stocks is not purely a financial activity, as it involves the uncertainty of the Chapter 11 
legal process. The returns are also determined by the distributions listed in the 
reorganization plans, which are largely out of most investors’ control. Therefore, the 
simple holding period return which only uses stock price is a biased measure of the return 
over the full Chapter 11 period. Combining the final distribution to the investors with the 
stock price information provides a more accurate understanding of the return scheme for 
bankrupt stock.  
Third, our regression analysis uses lagged information in the year before 
bankruptcy filing, in order to test whether investors can rely on this available information 
when they invest in the bankrupt stocks. In addition to some traditional accounting 
variables, such as liquidity, profitability and leverage, we also explore whether a 
company files for bankruptcy due to financial distress or other strategic purposes, and the 
volatility inherent in the stock. More interestingly, we add a dummy variable for hedge 
fund participation, as hedge funds are run by veteran investment managers and may offer 
higher returns. We are interested in finding out whether the involvement of hedge fund in 
a bankrupt situation results in stronger performance for that firm.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
literature review. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. Section 4 shows 
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descriptive statistics of our sample. We analyze our major results in Section 6, and we 
conclude the entire paper in Section 6. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The effect of a Chapter 11 filing on distressed companies’ stocks has been well 
explored. Clark and Weinstein (1983) find large losses occur during the bankruptcy filing 
month. Those losses are especially concentrated in the three trading day interval 
surrounding the filing. Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995), who explore the impact of a 
bankruptcy announcement on stock and debt holders, find a significant negative stock 
price reaction to the announcement. Dawkins and Rose-Green (1998) investigate the 
relationship between any prior WSJ discussions of possible bankruptcy filings and the 
price reaction to an actual filing. They also find significant negative abnormal returns 
around the bankruptcy filing date. The price reaction to bankruptcy filings is smaller for 
firms having prior WSJ stories of potential bankruptcy filings. Rose-Green and Dawkins 
(2002) explore the tendency of the stock market to differentiate between strategic 
bankruptcies and financial bankruptcies. Financial bankruptcy is characterized by short- 
or medium-term financial distress, such as default on interest or principal payment. 
Strategic bankruptcy is characterized by filing for Chapter 11 against one identifiable 
stakeholder (such as unionized employees), aiming to benefit the firm at the expense of 
the interest of that specific stakeholder. They find significantly less negative abnormal 
returns for strategic bankruptcies around the filing dates. Dawkins, Bhattacharya, and 
Bamber (2007) find, on average, the more negative the filing period price reaction, the 
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more favorable the immediate post-filing returns.  Coelho and Taffler (working paper, 
2008) also document negative abnormal and raw returns at the Chapter 11 filing date. 
Related to our paper, many studies discuss the long-term performance of the stock 
of bankrupt firms after they emerge from Chapter 11, although the results are mixed. 
Morse and Shaw (1988) find that while trading in bankrupt stocks has become much 
more common, three year average returns for firms emerging from bankruptcy are 
positive and large but not significantly so, implying that no abnormal return is likely to be 
available. Hotchkiss (1995), who studies the operating performance of bankrupt firms 
after they emerge from Chapter 11, finds that over 40% of the firms continue to suffer 
operating losses in the first three years after emergence. Covering a more recent time 
period, Hotchkiss and Mooradian (2004) find that more than two thirds of their sample 
underperform industry peers for up to five years after emergence.  Coelho and Taffler 
(working paper, 2008), who explore the long-term reaction to Chapter 11 filings, find 
strong negative and statistically significant post-Chapter 11 abnormal returns of at least -
28% over the 12-month period after the Chapter 11 announcement. On the other hand, 
Eberhart, Altman, and Aggarwal (1999), who examine the equity performance of firms 
going through Chapter 11, document large positive excess returns over the 200 trading 
days following emergence.  Kalay, Singhal, and Tashjian (2007) find that their sample 
experiences significant improvement in operating performances during Chapter 11. While 
Alderson and Betker (1999) report that the five year average annualized post emergence 
return of reorganized firms neither under- nor out-perform the S&P 500.  
The characteristics and factors that impact the distressed bond/stock returns of 
bankrupt firms have been extensively studied. Morse and Shaw (1988) show that filing 
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for bankruptcy generally does not change systematic risk significantly but does 
significantly increase return variance. Datta and Iskamdar-Datta (1995) investigate both 
bond and stock returns. They find that three different classes of debt holders react 
differently to the information revealed by the bankruptcy filing. The secured debt holders 
are unaffected by the announcement. The unsecured and the convertible debt classes, in 
contrast, show significant adverse price reaction to the announcement. In addition, in the 
21-day event period, the secured debt holders gain significantly while all other classes 
suffer substantial losses. Duration and complexity of the reorganization process both have 
a negative impact on the excess returns of bonds. Leverage is positively related to 
securities’ excess returns. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) examine the relationship between 
book-to-market equity, distress risk, and stock returns. In the most distressed group, the 
return difference between high and low book-to-market is more than twice as great as that 
of the other groups. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) explore the determinants of 
the pricing of financially distressed stocks. They find such stocks have delivered 
anomalously low returns since 1981. Those stocks have lower returns but much higher 
standard deviations, market betas, loadings on value and small-cap risk factors than do 
stocks with a low risk of failure.   
 
2.3 Hypothesis, Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Hypothesis 
While the negative performance of bankrupt stocks is well documented, most of 
them are calculated based on stock performance only. However, the entire Chapter 11 
process is full of rich content, such as plan of reorganization, disclosure statement, and 
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etc. The information generated during the Chapter 11 process should not be neglected.  
Therefore, we should take the above information into consideration also. If we combine 
the stock price and the reorganization treatment information to the common stock class, 
we should be able to see the entire story of the performance of bankrupt stocks. In 
addition, the largely negative stock performance is an overall performance. It does not 
indicate that making a profit by investing in the bankrupt stock is totally impossible. 
Therefore, we test the following two hypotheses in this paper: 
Hypothesis 1: Investing in bankrupt stocks would generate a larger loss 
considering both stock price and the final distributions to old common stock holders, 
compared to the existing literature which largely uses stock prices only to compute 
returns.  
Hypothesis 2: Stocks with profit potential behave differently compared to the 
ones without such potential. 
2.3.2 Data 
Our sample collection process is outlined in Table 2.1. We obtain our initial list of 
2776 bankruptcy filings from 1978 to 2008 from the bankruptcydata.com database. First, 
we checked their records on the Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
The 1007 cases that were not found in CRSP were eliminated. Second, we checked how 
many of the remaining firms have trading information during their Chapter 11 process 
thereby eliminating 1209 firms that were delisted prior to or upon their bankruptcy filing. 
Of the remaining 560 firms, 80 additional cases were removed because their data were 
unavailable or they were still in Chapter 11 in 2010. Nineteen firms were also excluded 
as they have missing trading information during the bankruptcy period, and 7 more firms 
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were removed as their first available trading date is longer than 5 days after the Chapter 
11 filing.  Following Fama and French (2001), we exclude 55 financial (SIC code 6000-
6999) and utility firms (SIC code 4900-4999), as the financial decisions of utility firms 
are affected by regulation and the financial ratios of financial firms are not comparable to 
those of other industrial firms. Accounting information from Compustat is also required, 
thereby eliminating another 104 firms. Our final sample consisted of 295 firms.   
2.3.3 Return to existing common stock holders 
We assume that the investor buys the stocks as soon as a trouble company files 
Chapter 11, probably expecting that it can successfully reorganize and resume trading on 
major stock exchanges. Such investors are assumed simply to buy the bankrupt stocks 
and hold them until the resolution date of Chapter 11 case.  
We consider three measures for the returns to existing common stock holder 
starting with the simple holding period return (S-HPR), which only uses the trading 
information (stock prices) available from CRSP:  
                          S-HPR = PriceLast / PriceFirst – 1                    (1) 
in which PriceLast is the last available stock price, and PriceFirst is the stock price on the 
bankruptcy filing date. S-HPR is the most straightforward way to look at the returns as 
stockholders simply buy-and-hold the bankrupt stocks.  
Our second measure also takes account of the final distributions to the pre filing 
common stock holders. Of these 295 firms, we are able to obtain the Chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization for 71 firms primarily from PACER.  The company’s reorganization plan 
contains a detailed discussion of each class of claim holders’ treatments. Generally the 
existing common stock holders will be compensated according to the terms provided that 
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the required majority of creditors vote to accept the plan. Otherwise, the shareholders will 
receive no more from the company than they would have received in liquidation (usually 
nothing). In 49 out of 71 bankruptcies in our sample the old common shares were 
cancelled on the effective date giving existing shareholders nothing. While cash is almost 
never distributed to those holding old shares, a combination of new shares and warrants 
may be distributed.  The stock in the reorganized company almost always goes largely or 
exclusively to its creditors.  
A comprehensive way of calculating the return to the old stockholders should 
include the distribution to the old shareholders listed in the plan of reorganization, which 
requires information on: 1) the resolution of Chapter 11 filing; 2) type and amount of 
securities received; and 3) price of the securities on the effective date. The 
comprehensive holding period return (C-HPR) to old shareholders is calculated as: 
C-HPR = [Ending Value – Beginning Value] / Beginning Value       (2) 
in which, Ending Value = Distribution per share made to old common stock holders 
           = [# of new shares received × Price of new shares on effective date +  
               # of warrants received × Value of warrant on effective date + Cash] 
Beginning Value = Stock price in bankruptcy filing date 
If the old shareholders retained their existing stock, the ending value will be the 
stock price on the effective date.  
Our third measure follows Carhart (1997), which assumes that a stock’s expected 
return is explained by the market portfolio and three factors designed to mimic the risk 
factors related to size, book-to-market, and momentum. The model takes the form: 
     ri,t  - rf, t =  αi + bi(rm,t – rf,t) + si SMBt + hiHMLt + wi UMDt + εi,t       (3) 
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 where ri,t is the return on stock i at time t, rf,t  is the risk-free rate at time t. rm,t – rf,t, 
SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt are the risk premium on the market portfolio, the difference 
between the returns on portfolios of small stocks and large stocks, the difference between 
the returns on portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks, and the difference 
between the returns on portfolios of high prior returns and low prior returns. We obtained 
the SMB, HML, and UMD from Kenneth French database. We estimate a time-series 
regression for each bankrupt stock using its daily returns over the entire period during 
Chapter 11, and use intercept αi as risk-adjusted return for stock i.  
 
2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
2.4.1 Duration 
Duration, defined as the number of calendar days spent in Chapter 11, from the 
bankruptcy filing date to the final resolution date, is examined in Table 2.2. Our 295 
firms have an average duration is 762 days, with a median of 511 days and maximum and 
minimum of 6342 days and 39 days respectively. The factors that influence duration vary 
from case to case. For example a company with a prepackaged bankruptcy or one that 
quickly converts to Chapter 7 will have a very short duration. We find that the largest two 
groups are from 251 days to 500 days and from 501 to 750 days, taking 30.8% and 23.1% 
respectively. Thus over half of our cases take approximately one to two years.  
Next, in Table 2.3, we report the different Chapter 11 outcomes and 
corresponding duration for each of the following outcome categories: 1) emerged or 
reorganized; 2) liquidated or convert to Chapter 7; 3) sold, purchased, or acquired; 4) 
private; 5) dismissed; and 6) unknown results. The largest two groups are emerged or 
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reorganized and liquidated or convert to Chapter 7, representing about 27.5% and 33.2% 
of our sample respectively. The emerged or reorganized group has a shorter mean 
duration (661 days) than the liquidated or convert to Chapter 7 groups (808 days), but the 
median duration is longer for emerged or reorganized group (570 days) compared to 
liquidated or convert to Chapter 7 group (464 days).  
Bankrupt stocks may be delisted from a major stock exchange during Chapter 11 
when they cannot meet the listing standard, such as having insufficient capital or a stock 
price falling below acceptable levels. Trading on such stocks may, however, move to the 
Pink Sheets. In Table 2.4, we show the Chapter 11 outcome and the number of trading 
days for our sample. The average number of trading days is 226, which is much shorter 
than the average duration of 762 days, and a median of only 66 days, which is even 
shorter than the median duration of 511. Not surprisingly, the most successful category, 
emerged or reorganized, has the longest median number of trading days among all the 
identifiable categories. In unreported results, we have 22 firms whose trading days are 
less than five. Ten of them have only one day trading available in CRSP. 
2.4.2 Stock price on the Chapter 11 filing date 
The stocks of bankrupt firms often attract investors because of their low stock 
prices (often called penny stocks) as compared to their pre distressed levels. In Table 2.5, 
we report our sample’s average stock prices on their Chapter 11 filing date. We identified 
259 firms with stock prices available on their filing date. The overall average is $1.16, 
with a median of $0.60. The lowest filing date stock price was two cents. We also 
checked their stock prices one year before filing. For each stock, we take the time series 
average of its daily stock price in pre-1 year and then average across all the firms. One 
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year before Chapter 11, their average stock price was $6.28 and median of $3.93. 
Compared to the price on the bankruptcy filing date and their pre-1 price level, they 
decrease by $5.12 (81%) in the mean and $3.04 (85%) in the median, which are both 
highly significant at the 1% level and representing huge price deteriorations.  
We also divide the stock prices into six difference ranges. A majority of the stock 
prices, about 69.5%, are below one dollar, with a mean of $0.43 and median of $0.35. 
Another 18.9% have stock prices between $1 and $2. These two groups include almost 
90% of our sample.  The results in Table 2.5 show that these bankrupt stocks exhibit what 
may seem like attractively low prices, leading to the illusion for some unsophisticated 
investors that if they invest in these stocks, they cannot lose much. But of course losing 
100% of what is invested is possible regardless of how low the purchase price is. In an 
unreported result, we also calculate the price of old stocks on emergence based on their 
final distributions for those 71 firms with identifiable plan of reorganization. The average 
value of those old stocks is $0.59, with a median of $0.00, as 49 out of 71 firms cancel or 
extinguish their old stocks which make them worthless.  
2.4.3 Sample characteristics 
Table 2.6 reports the summary statistics of our variables one year before the 
official bankruptcy filing. The median asset value of our sample is $96.14 million with 
standard deviation of $3,542 million. Thus our sample does not appear to over represent 
either small or large firms. Not surprisingly, we find that our sample tends to suffer from 
negative net income, low book equity, and high book-to-market. We also construct four 
variables to represent the major areas of interest. We use Altman’s Z-score to measure 
the overall bankruptcy risk. CA/TA is calculated using current assets divided by total 
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assets, which is a liquidity measure. EBIT/TA is calculated using earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by total assets, which is a profitability measure. TL/TA is calculated 
using the total liability divided by total assets, which is a leverage measure. We see these 
four variables as most directly related to our sample firms’ performances. We find that 
our sample suffers from poor operating conditions, shown in negative Z-scores, 
indicating high levels of bankruptcy risk, negative profitability, and high leverage.  
Table 2.7 shows the correlations between all the variables. The overall bankruptcy 
risk measures Z-score is highly correlated with profitability measure EBIT/TA. Therefore, 
putting them into the same regression would result in a high level of multicollinearity.  
 
2.5 Results and Discussions 
2.5.1 Holding period return (HPR) 
Table 2.8 contains statistics for our S-HPR, C-HPR, and alpha. To make the 
results comparable, we also calculate the annualized HPR for S-HPR and C-HPR. Not 
surprisingly, we find negative returns over the holding period overall. The average 
annualized S-HPR, which only uses the stock price information, is -25.1%, with a median 
of -78.9%. The average annualized C-HPR, which involves both the stock price and the 
final distribution from the company to existing shareholders, is -76.9%, with a median of 
-100.0%. We find that the way we calculate the C-HPR generates a more severe loss 
compared to S-HPR. Therefore, looking at the stock price alone is not sufficient and will 
give investors a biased (too optimistic) result. If an investor holds the stock until the final 
resolution date, the distributions specified in the reorganization or liquidation plans are 
usually not favorable to the common stockholders, as they have the lowest priority status 
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among the claims. Secured claims, secured tax claims, priority non-tax claims, and some 
DIP claims, enjoy first priority. Usually their status will be unimpaired and they will be 
paid in full. Other creditor claims come next followed by preferred stock. Under absolute 
priority they are entitled to a full recovery before any distribution to common. Common 
stock, which is in the class of equity interest, is at the end of the distribution list. Even if 
they have the right to receive some distribution, the distribution will only be available if 
all the prior classes have been satisfied. Not only is the equity class impaired, the 
common stock will usually be extinguished or cancelled on the effective date, and will 
thereby become worthless. In the worst (but likely) scenario of being cancelled, the 
shareholders will lose every penny they have invested (-100% return).  
In Table 2.9, we show the results for the groups of firms that have been 
eliminated from our final sample to explore whether our elimination process itself adds 
any bias to our results. We are able to identify three groups: 1) more than 5 is the group 
of seven firms whose first trading day is more than 5 days after their Chapter 11 filing; 2) 
Fin & Uti is the group of 55 financial and utility firms whose SIC code is between 6000 
and 6799 and between 4900 and 4950; 3) No Acct is the group of 104 firms whose 
accounting information is not available in Compustat. We are able to obtain a plan of 
reorganization to calculate the C-HPR for 6 firms from the finance and utility group, and 
18 firms from the no accounting information group. The results for these three groups are 
quite comparable in the magnitude to those of our main sample. Therefore, eliminating 
these firms does not appear to create a selection bias.  
In Table 2.10a and 2.10b, we decompose the overall performance results by their 
ranges and final outcomes. Table 2.10a reveals that 80% of our sample generated a loss 
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for the old stockholders. Clearly, making a profit by investing in the bankrupt stocks is 
challenging, to say the least. We find that 149 firms in our sample suffer from an average 
of -90.1% loss in annualized S-HPR and 28 firms experience a loss of -100%. In 
annualized C-HPR, 49 firms have -100% return, resulting from stocks being cancelled or 
extinguished and stock holders receiving no distribution. Alpha, a measure of excess 
returns, also has 213 losses out of 266 with an average return of -4.5%. In Table 2.10b, 
the results are grouped by the Chapter 11 outcomes. In the annualized results, emerged or 
reorganized, and private groups suffer less compared to the other groups. Emerged or 
reorganized firms have -11.5% in annualized S-HPR and -64.5% on C-HPR. Firms that 
become private have -9.3% annualized S-HPR and -65.9% in C-HPR. Firms that 
liquidated, or convert to Chapter 7 is the groups that generally suffer the greatest loss.  
2.5.2 Regression results 
Although investing in bankrupt stocks is very likely to show losses, 60 firms 
enjoy a positive S-HPR and 52 firms enjoy positive alphas. In this section, we explore 
what factors contribute to whether an investor can profit by investing in bankrupt stocks. 
We categorize our HPR into positive and negative groups. Our first regression focuses on 
the accounting performances only, which is estimated as  
      HPRi = α + β1* CA/TAi, pre1 + β2* EBIT/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1 +  
                   β4 * Log (Total Assets)i, pre1 + β5* B/Mi, pre1  + εi                                           (4) 
in which we investigate three major measures of accounting performance, liquidity which 
is represented by CA/TA, profitability which is represented by EBIT/TA, and leverage 
which is represented by TL/TA, in one year before the bankruptcy filing. We also control 
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for size and book-to-market at the same time. We run the regression for all HPR and for 
both positive and negative HPR.  
The results are shown in Table 2.11. For all the HPR, we obtain significant 
regressions for S-HPR and alpha. For both of these two measures, CA/TA, which is our 
liquidity measure, is significantly positively related to S-HRR with a coefficient of 0.435 
and alpha with a coefficient of 0.079, indicating that firms with higher liquidity before 
filing for bankruptcy tend to generate a higher stock returns during the Chapter 11 period. 
These results show that, overall, liquidity is more likely to be a key factor in determining 
the holding period returns for the distressed stocks. EBIT/TA, our profitability measure, 
is only significantly positively linked to alpha, and TL/TA, our leverage factor is not 
significant in our regression results.  
Further, we categorize our returns into groups of positive and negative ones to test 
whether our explanatory factors play different roles between these two groups. For C-
HPR, we only have five firms that offer positive HPR, therefore, we are not able to run 
the regression for positive C-HPR. For the positive returns, our model is good for S-HPR, 
but not for alpha. For S-HPR, profitability measure EBIT/TA is the key explanatory 
factor. The coefficient estimate is 1.718 and significant at 5% level, showing that higher 
profitability generally contributes to higher returns. However, liquidity and leverage are 
not significant in explaining the positive S-HPR. For the negative returns, the three 
regressions are significant at least at the 10% level. Liquidity is a key factor here as it is 
significant for S-HPR, C-HPR, and alpha. All three coefficient estimates are significantly 
positive, 0.202 for S-HPR, 0.207 for C-HPR and 0.045 for alpha, revealing that greater 
liquidity tends to contribute to higher returns for investors. Profitability is also an 
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important factor for C-HPR and alpha. We find a coefficient of 0.003 for C-HPR and 
0.028 for alpha and both a significant, demonstrating that higher profitability is also 
associated with higher returns. Leverage is only significant in the regression for S-HPR, 
0.081, indicating that higher leverage will lead to higher returns for investors. The results 
for C-HPR and alpha are quite comparable, as we believe that C-HPR and alpha are more 
comprehensive ways to show the returns, compared to S-HPR which only takes account 
of the stock price. Another finding surprises us is that the three accounting variables 
along with the two control variables produces a good model for the positive S-HPR, as it 
explains 23% of the return, while for the negative return, the same model can only 
explain about 6%-8% of the returns.   
Investing in bankrupt stocks involves high risks, which mainly results from the 
information uncertainty inherited in the stocks and the situation for the company. As 
discussed by Li and Zhong (working paper, 2009), the uncertainty comes from two parts. 
First, as many firms are delisted from major exchanges due to their inability to meet the 
requirement for continued listing, and many institutional investors are restrained from 
holding bankrupt stocks, public information coverage becomes very limited after the 
official bankruptcy filing. Second, the complexity of the Chapter 11 process adds more 
uncertainty to the investment due to the nature of the legal process and the lower rank 
status of common stock holders. Therefore, we want to incorporate information 
uncertainty into our analysis. Zhang (2006) noted that information uncertainty mainly 
results from two sources. One is the volatility of a firm’s underlying fundamentals and 
the other is poor information. He advances six proxies of information uncertainty: firm 
size, firm age, analyst coverage, dispersion in analyst forecasts, return volatility, and cash 
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flow volatility. Following his methodology, we use Stdev Pre-1 Ret, which is the 
standard deviation of daily returns in the year prior to the bankruptcy filing as our proxy 
for the information uncertainty inherent in our bankrupt company stocks.  
Another interesting factor is the motivation for the bankruptcy filing. 
Traditionally, firms may file bankruptcy because of severe financial difficulties, such as 
an inability to pay its financial obligations as they come due. As discussed in the previous 
literature, some bankruptcy cases may be filed as a tactic for dealing with legal disputes, 
labor contracts, or for other strategic purposes. The troubled firms may be doing well 
financially, but need to file bankruptcy to address operating troubles. Therefore, in our 
second regression, we add a dummy variable, Distress, which takes the value of 1 if the 
EBIT falls below zero one year prior to bankruptcy, indicating that the firm really suffers 
from financial distress, and zero otherwise. Our second regression is estimated,  
    HPRi = α + β1* CA/TAi, pre1 + β2* EBIT/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1 +                             
                       β4* Distressi, pre1 + β5* (Stdev Pre-1 Ret)i, pre1 +  
                       β6 * Log (Total Assets)i, pre1 + β7* B/Mi, pre1  + εi                                     (5) 
 The overall results, shown in Table 2.12, are quite similar to what we have 
obtained in Table 2.11. Our model is good for S-HPR and alpha, but not for C-HPR. 
Liquidity still plays a positively significant role in explaining the holding period returns. 
One of our newly added variables, Distress, is significant in explaining alpha. With 
coefficient of -0.028, the result suggests that firms that file for bankruptcy due to the real 
financial distress, rather than strategic purposes, do tend to suffer worse stock 
performance. For the positive HPR, similar to the results from our first regression, the 
profitability measure, EBIT/TA is still significantly positive for S-HPR. The coefficient 
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is 1.530 and significant at 5% level. The stdev pre-1 ret is also an important explanatory 
factor in S-HPR. The coefficient is -17.891 and highly significant at the 1% level, 
revealing that the higher the volatility, the higher the information uncertainty inherent in 
the stock, which contributes to more negative returns. Compared to our previous 
regression, adding distress and stdev pre-1 ret variables make the entire regression 
explain 35% of the positive returns in S-HPR, increasing from 23% in our first 
regression. Therefore, profitability and information uncertainty are two important factors 
in explaining the positive HPR. For the negative returns, the results are quite similar to 
what we have obtained in our first regression. We still find a significantly positive 
coefficient for our liquidity measures, CA/TA, and profitability measure, EBIT/TA, for 
C-HPR and alpha. C-HPR has 0.197 as the coefficient for CA/TA and 0.003 for 
EBIT/TA, while alpha has 0.042 as the coefficient for CA/TA and 0.023 for EBIT/TA. 
However, the distress dummy and the return volatility one year prior to bankruptcy do 
not reveal a significant effect in explaining the negative returns.  Therefore, profitability 
and information uncertainty play a significant role in explaining the positive returns, 
while liquidity and (un)profitability are the major key issues in negative returns.   
2.5.3 Involvement of hedge funds 
We also investigate the influence of hedge funds on the bankrupt stock 
performance. Hedge funds have become more and more active in corporate investment. 
Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) investigate the involvement of hedge funds in 
corporate governance and whether their efforts impact the firm’s performance. They find 
that hedge fund activists propose strategic, operational and financial solutions to the 
corporate firms and, in a majority of the cases, achieve at least partial success. Hedge 
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funds play a significant role in increasing the target firms’ payout, operating 
performance, and CEO turnover. Clifford (2008) compiles a sample of active and passive 
hedge fund activists based on their Schedule 13D or 13G filings. He finds that the target 
firms of active hedge fund activists enjoy larger excess returns and increases in operating 
performance than the ones of passive hedge fund activists.  The results imply that hedge 
fund activism has a positive effect on wealth creation.  Boyson and Mooradian (working 
paper, 2010) focus on intense hedge fund activists. They document improvements in 
operating performance for up to three years following activism. Specifically they find 
such activism is associated with reduced cash position, growth in sales, reduced 
expenses, and increases leverage. The target firms also experience better short-term stock 
performance following the announcement of hedge fund involvement.        
In our sample of 295 firms, we are able to identify 27 firms with 43 hedge fund 
investment in one year before bankruptcy from 13D/13G filing in SEC. They include 
some of the most famous hedge funds, such as Citadel, D. E. Shaw, Atticus Capital, and 
Amaranth Capital. The descriptive statistics of their holding are listed in Table 2.13. 
Hedge funds on average hold 7.5% common stocks of the bankrupt firms, with the largest 
holding 18.5%. The average holding period is about 279 days, with a median of 331 days. 
Another interesting fact about hedge fund investment in distressed firms is that the 
clustering effect, indicating that one distressed firm can attract investment from several 
hedge funds. In an unreported result, each target firm has about 1.6 hedge investors, with 
the highest one with 4 hedge fund investments.   
In Table 2.14, we show the holding period return for the hedge funds. We are able 
to identify both the purchase date and exit date for 29 out of 43 hedge funds. Only 2 
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hedge funds hold the stocks through Chapter 11 cases, in which the bankrupt firms cancel 
their old stocks, resulting in a -100% return for these two hedge funds. For the other 
hedge funds, we use the stock price information on their purchase date and exit date to 
calculate the S-HPR. The return results for hedge funds are not optimistic, resulting in -
94.6% as the mean of annualized S-HPR, and -99.6% as the median, indicating the hedge 
funds almost always lost all of their investment in the bankrupt firms. For alpha, we get -
2.8% and -2.6% for mean and median respectively.  
If investors believe that hedge funds have hot hands and they can pick up the 
winning stock, they will be more willing to invest in the firms with hedge fund 
investment. In Table 2.15, we compare the returns between firms with hedge fund 
investment and those without. Consistent with the results in Table 2.14, the firms with 
hedge fund investments actually suffer larger losses compared to the ones without hedge 
fund investments. The difference in annualized S-HPR is -27.9%, which is highly 
significant at 1% level.  We also find evidence in the mean of C-HPR and annualized C-
HPR, and both mean and medians of alpha. The results suggest that hedge funds might 
not have hot hands when investing in bankrupt stocks.  
Table 2.16 shows the results of the following regression, 
HPRi = α + β1* CA/TAi, pre1 + β2* EBIT/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1 +                                
                   β4* Distressi, pre1 + β5* (Stdev Pre-1 Ret)i, pre1 +  
                   β6 * Log (Total Assets)i, pre1 + β7* B/Mi, pre1  +  β8* HFi, pre1  +  εi                (6) 
We add one more dummy, HFpre1 to our regression, which takes the value of 1 if a 
firm has hedge fund investment one year prior to its bankruptcy filing, and zero otherwise. 
The results of three accounting variables and two dummies of Distress and Stdev Pre-1 
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Ret are pretty similar to the ones we obtained in Table 2.12. The first result to notice is 
that, by adding HF dummy into our regression, we get higher R-squares and more 
significant models. For example, for negative alpha, the R-square increases from 9%  in 
Table 2.12 to 24% in this table, and the F-Value also increases from 2.19 to 6.33, 
indicating that HF is indeed an important explanatory variables for the stock performance 
of bankrupt firms. Second, consistent with what we have obtained in Table 2.14 and 2.15, 
is that receiving hedge fund investment does not necessarily indicate better stock 
performances. We have significant results for overall alpha, and negative C-HPR and 
alpha, with coefficient of -0.070, -0.157, and -0.105, which are all significant at least at 
the 5% level. The negative coefficients reveal that firms with hedge fund investments 
actually suffer from worse stock performances compared to the ones without. Therefore, 
we do not find evidence of hot hands from hedge funds when they are involved in 
bankrupt stocks.  
In summary, one major conclusion we have based on previous analysis is that 
investing in bankrupt stock by holding a long position will lead to severe losses, therefore, 
it is not as sweet as it looks when investors get into the market attracted by the record low 
stock price. One might believe that, as the stock price continues to plunge during 
bankruptcy and the final distribution may be also not in favor of common stock investors, 
holding a short position would change the scenario completely. However, the SEC has 
put new restrictions on short selling since Feb 24, 2010. First is a revised uptick rule. The 
old uptick rule, which states that you can only short sell at price above the last trade price, 
or after the last price is higher than the previous price, was eliminated by SEC on July 6, 
2007. Under the old uptick rules, short selling bankrupt stocks is very limited as it is 
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more likely to have zero or down ticks rather than upticks. In addition, short selling 
requires borrowing stock in the very first step. Branch and Russel (2001) point out that 
the supply of bankrupt shares may be too limited to be borrowed, which may constrain 
short selling opportunities. In this case, one might think of naked short selling, which is a 
case of short selling without arranging the borrowing, but SEC has prohibited naked short 
selling since 2008. After the sub-prime mortgage crisis and market turmoil in 2007-2008, 
they impose a revised uptick rule that investors cannot short sell unless someone is 
willing to buy it for more than the national best bid. For bankrupt stocks, as the 
proceeding of its bankruptcy has great uncertainties, investors will be very hesitant to pay 
higher than the best bid considering the risks involved. Second is a “circuit breaker” 
element in the new restriction rules, which curbs the short selling when a stock price falls 
more than 10% from previous day’s close price. This will also result in a constraint in 
short selling bankrupt stocks as when the distress company is close to a bankruptcy filing, 
its stock price usually plunges. For example, General Motors stock decreased from $1.12 
on May 28, 2009 to $0.75 on May 29, 2009, about 33% plunge in stock price at two days 
before they officially filed for Chapter 11 protection,. Therefore, the revised uptick rule 
and “circuit breaker” element restrains short selling opportunities. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Herein we investigate the returns from investing in bankrupt stocks. Besides the 
traditional holding period rate and alpha from the Carhart four-factor model, we also 
calculate a comprehensive HPR that takes account of the final distribution specified in 
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the reorganization or liquidation plan. This information also plays a significant role in 
determining the ultimate returns to the common stock holders.  
Our sample firms’ stock, generally continues to be listed on major exchanges for 
about 226 days, with the average stock price falling to $1.16 on the bankruptcy filing date, 
which experiences a significant decrease compared to their level one year prior to the 
bankruptcy filing. The low stock prices attract unsophisticated investors who rush into 
this extremely volatile and uncertain market. Not surprisingly, investing in bankrupt 
stocks tends to generate large annualized losses: an average of -25.1% simple holding 
period return, and -76.9% if we take account of the final distributions.  
However, we also find that achieving positive returns from investing in bankrupt 
stocks is possible. We run two regressions to see which factors contributed the most to 
whether we can make a profit or not. We find that overall speaking, liquidity is always a 
key factor in explaining the returns. Higher liquidity will help the firms generate higher 
stock returns. When separating the returns into positive and negative ones, profitability 
and information uncertainty plays a significant role in explaining the positive returns, 
while liquidity and (un)profitability are the two key issues in negative returns. In addition, 
the involvement of hedge funds does not show signs of better stock performance.  
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Table 2.1 Sample Collection Process 
This table shows the steps to identify the samples to be included in this study. Initial sample of 2776 
bankruptcy filing from 1978 to 2008 was obtained from bankruptcydata.com. We require that our sample 
remain listed on major stock exchanges after bankruptcy filing, and have trading information available in 
CRSP during their Chapter 11 process. No missing or still in Chapter 11 cases. Finance and utility firms 
and those without Compustat information are excluded from our sample.  
 
Number of Firms Percentage 
Initial Samples         2776   100.0% 
- No CRSP Data         1007     36.3% 
- No trading during Ch 11         1209     43.6% 
- Data N/A or still in Ch 11             80       2.9% 
- Missing trading info             19       0.7% 
- First trading date is more than 5 days after Ch 11 filing               7       0.3% 
- Financial and Utility Firms             55       2.0% 
- No Compustat Data           104       3.7% 
Final Sample           295     10.6% 
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Table 2.2 Overall Duration 
Duration is the time (calendar days) spent in the entire Chapter 11 cases. In most cases, it is calculated as: 
duration = effective date – filing date. If the case is converted to Chapter 7 from Chapter 11, the duration = 
conversion date – filing date. If the case is dismissed, the duration = dismiss date – filing date. 
 
Duration    N      Pct  Mean Median   Min   Max Std Dev 
Less than 100 days   17     5.8%      57      60      39      95      25 
100 to 250 days   35   11.9%    182    185    111    249      42 
251 to 500 days   91   30.8%    376    369    255    497      70 
501 to 750 days   68   23.1%    616    614    504    745      67 
751 to 1000 days   24     8.1%    858    837    752    988      75 
More than 1000 days   60   20.3%  2013  1708  1040  6342  1110 
Total 295 100.0%    762    511      39  6342    831 
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Table 2.3 Bankruptcy Outcomes and Duration of Chapter 11 Process 
We compare duration in cases with different outcomes. We have six categories of outcomes: 1) emerged or 
reorganized; 2) liquidated or convert o Chapter 7; 3) sold, purchased, or acquired; 4) private; 5) cased 
dismissed; and 6) unknown. 
 
Outcome   N      Pct  Mean Median  Min Max Std Dev 
Emerged or Reorganized   81    27.5%    661    570    39 2539    525 
Liquidated or Convert to Ch 7   98    33.2%    808    464    48 5508    975 
Sold, Purchased, or Acquired   33    11.2%    722    539    79 3597    796 
Private   11      3.7%  1055    490  187 6342  1786 
Dismissed   18      6.1%  1291  1165    64 3588    962 
Unknown   54    18.3%    618    476    52 2616    489 
Total 295  100.0%    762    511    39 6342    831 
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Table 2.4 Bankruptcy Outcomes and Number of Trading Days in Chapter 11 
Number of trading days is calculated as the last available date with trading information minus the 
bankruptcy filing date.  
 
Outcome   N      Pct Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
Emerged or Reorganized   81    27.5%   338   190   1 2538    426 
Liquidated or Convert to Ch 7   98    33.2%   106     36   1 1431    208 
Sold, Purchased, or Acquired   33    11.2%   200     84   8   864    244 
Private   11      3.7%   596       9   2 6144  1841 
Dismissed   18      6.1%   177     62   4   728    231 
Unknown   54    18.3%   235   143   1 1178    257 
Total 295  100.0%   226     66   1 6144    462 
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Table 2.5 Stock Price on Bankruptcy Filing Day 
Of our 295 sample firms, 259 have stock price on Chapter 11 filing date available in CRSP. Pre-1 price is 
the average stock price of our sample in one year before bankruptcy. For each stock, we take the time series 
average of its daily stock price in pre-1 year. Then we take the average across all firms. The significance 
levels are indicated with asterisks. ***, **, and * indicate that the variable is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
 
Price Range   N     Pct          Mean       Median             Min           Max      Std Dev
P < $1 180   69.5%  $         0.43   $         0.35   $         0.02   $        0.97   $        0.26 
$1 <= P < $2   49   18.9%  $         1.37   $         1.33   $         1.00   $        1.94   $        0.30 
$2 <= P < $5   22     8.5%  $         3.20   $         2.81   $         2.00   $        4.88   $        1.01 
$5 <= P < $10     4     1.5%  $         7.09   $         7.00   $         5.75   $        8.63   $        1.43 
$10 <= P < $15     2     0.8%  $       12.81   $       12.81   $       10.88   $      14.75   $        2.74 
P >= $15     2     0.8%  $       16.44   $       16.44   $       16.00   $      16.87   $        0.62 
Overall 259 100.0%  $         1.16   $         0.60   $         0.02   $      16.87   $        2.09 
Pre-1 Price 256  $         6.28   $         3.93   $         0.18   $      49.15   $        7.02 
Diff 256    $        -5.12***  $        -3.04***  $      -48.22  $        7.62   $        6.65 
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Table 2.6 Sample Characteristics: Summary Statistics 
All the financial variables are collect from Compustat for one year prior to bankruptcy. CA/TA is current 
assets divided by total assets, which is a liquidity measure. EBIT/TA is earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets, which is a profitability measure. TL/TL is total liabilities divided by total assets, 
which is a leverage measure.  
 
    N    Mean Median       Min      Max  Std Dev 
Total Assets (MM$) 238   986.87   96.14         6.75 25197.00 3542.00 
Net Income (MM$) 238  -150.36  -14.13  -3960.35       44.36   590.22 
Book Equity 238     23.24   16.30  -2824.00   1550.20   445.31 
Book/Market 238       3.25     2.54    -239.20     143.57     23.55 
Z-score 238    -36.69    -1.48  -6664.82       16.57   432.85 
CA/TA 238       0.46     0.48         0.00         0.97       0.25 
EBIT/TA 238      -0.91    -0.06    -170.72         0.22     11.07 
TL/TA 238       0.88     0.79         0.08         5.05       0.56 
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Table 2.7 Sample Characteristics: Correlation Matrix 
Here shows the coefficients of Pearson correlations. Significance levels of the coefficients are in 
parenthesis.  
 
  Total Assets Net Income Book Equity B/M Z-score CA/TA EBIT/TA TL/TA 
Total Assets   1.00  -0.46   0.00   0.06   0.02  -0.24   0.02   0.02 
 (0.00)  (0.97)  (0.35)  (0.73)  (0.00)  (0.73)  (0.74) 
Net Income  -0.46   1.00   0.50   0.11   0.42   0.20   0.43  -0.02 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.73) 
Book Equity   0.00   0.50   1.00   0.29    0.42   0.00   0.42  -0.11 
 (0.97)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.96)  (0.00)  (0.09)
B/M   0.06   0.11   0.29   1.00   0.04   0.01   0.04  -0.39 
 (0.35)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.49)  (0.88)  (0.54)  (0.00) 
Z-score   0.02   0.42    0.42   0.04   1.00   0.09   1.00   0.06 
 (0.73)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.49)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.35) 
CA/TA  -0.24   0.20   0.00   0.01   0.09   1.00   0.09   0.08 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.96)  (0.88)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.23) 
EBIT/TA   0.02   0.43   0.42   0.04   1.00   0.09   1.00   0.07 
 (0.73)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.54)  (0.00)  (0.18)  (0.31) 
TL/TA    0.02  -0.02  -0.11  -0.39   0.06   0.08   0.07   1.00 
   (0.74)  (0.73)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.35)  (0.23)  (0.31)   
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Table 2.8 Returns of Bankrupt Stocks 
S-HPR is the simple holding period return, which is calculated as S-HPR = PriceLast / PriceFirst – 1. C-HPR 
is the comprehensive holding period return, which is calculated as C-HPR = [Ending Value – Beginning 
Value] / Beginning Value, in which ending value takes care of both stocks price and final distributions to 
the common stock holders from the company, and beginning value is the stock price on the bankruptcy 
filing date. Alpha is calculated as the intercept of Carhart four-factor model. AHPR is the annualized 
holding period return.       
 
  S-HPR C-HPR    Alpha 
      HPR     AHPR       HPR     AHPR 
Mean   -22.3%    -25.1%    -69.7%    -76.9%    -2.8% 
Median   -40.0%    -78.9%  -100.0%  -100.0%    -1.8% 
Min   -99.4%  -100.0%  -100.0%  -100.0%  -75.0% 
Max  528.6%   250.1%   206.9%     78.8%   92.4% 
Std Dev    82.1%   110.8%     74.3%     48.4%   10.7% 
Skewness     3.96      1.67      3.07      2.26     0.99 
Kurtosis    21.46       1.49       8.95       4.26   33.22 
t-statistics     -4.65      -3.88      -7.90    -13.38    -4.20 
N       295        295        71        71      266 
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Table 2.9 Statistics of Other Groups 
More than 5 is the group of seven firms whose first trading date is more than 5 days after Chapter 11 filing. 
Fin & Uti is the group of 55 financial and utility firms whose SIC code is between 6000 and 6799 and 
between 4900 and 4950. No Acct is the group of 104 firms whose accounting information is not available 
in Compustat. We are able to obtain plan of reorganization to calculate the C-HPR for 6 firms from finance 
and utility group, and 18 firms from no accounting group. 
 
  Mean Median 
  More than 5 Fin & Uti  No Acct More than 5 Fin & Uti No Acct 
Duration    1069     705     697     636     581     545 
Trading Days Mean     576     296     239     129     96     85 
Price on Filing Day     5.04     1.67     1.07     0.63     0.44     0.75 
S-HPR  -42.1%**  -24.0%**  -12.1%  -40.5%*  -40.0%***  -35.0%*** 
S-AHPR -44.1%*  -16.1%    -5.5%  -26.7%*  -70.6%***  -60.0%*** 
C-HPR     n/a  -12.2%  -45.1%**     n/a  -45.9%  -97.4%*** 
C-AHPR     n/a  -36.7%  -55.6%***     n/a  -47.9% -100.0%***
Alpha     2.6%    -2.6%    -1.5%*    -2.0%    -2.0%***    -2.1%*** 
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Table 2.11 Regression - Accounting Performances Only 
Coefficients and p-values (in parenthesis) of the following regression: 
HPRi = α + β1* CA/TAi, pre1 + β2* EBIT/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1  
+ β4 * Log (Total Assets)i, pre1 + β5* B/Mi, pre1  + εi 
where HPR is S-HPR, C-HPR or alpha. We categorize the holding period returns into positive and negative 
groups. CA/TA, EBIT/TA, and TL/TA are the three accounting measures for liquidity, profitability, and 
leverage in one year before bankruptcy filing. B/M is the book-to-market.      
                                
  Overall Positive Negative 
  S-HPR C-HPR Alpha S-HPR Alpha S-HPR C-HPR Alpha 
Intercept  -0.282  -1.028   0.056*   0.378   0.203*  -0.467***  -0.355***   0.002 
 (0.2085)  (0.1009)  (0.0679)  (0.5406)  (0.0726)  (<.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.9360) 
CA/TA   0.435**   0.475   0.079***   0.009   0.195*   0.202**   0.207**   0.045* 
 (0.0507)  (0.5049)  (0.0071)  (0.9887)  (0.0571)  (0.0175)  (0.0265)  (0.0543) 
EBIT/TA   0.003   0.001   0.028**   1.718**   0.031   0.001   0.003*   0.028***
 (0.5619)  (0.9328)  (0.0470)  (0.0318)  (0.7238)  (0.4400)  (0.0542)  (0.0087) 
TL/TA   0.132   0.041   0.002   0.587   0.011   0.081**   0.020  -0.016 
 (0.2015)  (0.8480)  (0.9049)  (0.1659)  (0.8065)  (0.0386)  (0.6392)  (0.2050) 
Log(Total Assets)   0.028   0.092  -0.008*   0.080  -0.011  -0.010  -0.044***  -0.001 
 (0.3641)  (0.2000)  (0.0592)  (0.5054)  (0.5919)  (0.3826)  (0.0007)  (0.7327) 
B/M   0.003   0.002   0.000   0.029**   0.000   0.002*   0.000  -0.001 
 (0.2941)  (0.6805)  (0.9633)  (0.0436)  (0.6068)  (0.0643)  (0.9507)  (0.1306) 
R-Square   4%   8%   5%   23%   11%   6%   8%   7% 
F-Value   2.17*   0.91   2.25**   2.62**   0.86   2.14*   3.10**   2.56** 
N   238   56   214   49   40   175   42   174 
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Table 2.12 Regression – Accounting, Distress and Uncertainty 
Coefficients and p-values (in parenthesis) of the following regression: 
HPRi = α + β1* CA/TAi, pre1 + β2* EBIT/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1 + 
β4* Distressi, pre1 + β5* (Stdev Pre-1 Ret)I, pre1 + β6 * Log (Total Assets)i, pre1 + β7* B/Mi, pre1  + εi 
Distress is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the EBIT falls below zero in one year prior to 
bankruptcy, indicating that the firm really suffers from financial distress, and zero otherwise. Stdev Pre-1 
Ret is the standard deviation of daily returns on one year prior to bankruptcy. 
 
  Overall Positive Negative 
  S-HPR C-HPR Alpha S-HPR Alpha S-HPR C-HPR Alpha 
Intercept  -0.324  -0.767   0.043  -1.400   0.190  -0.505***  -0.381***   0.029 
 (0.2646)  (0.3282)  (0.2677)  (0.1631)  (0.1762)  (<.0001)  (0.0014)  (0.3597)
CA/TA   0.396*   0.326   0.067**   0.364   0.194   0.196**   0.197**   0.043* 
 (0.0815)  (0.6535)  (0.0252)  (0.5646)  (0.0743)  (0.0253)  (0.0412)  (0.0727)
EBIT/TA   0.003   0.000   0.020   1.530**  -0.013   0.001   0.003*   0.023**
 (0.5459)  (0.9679)  (0.1757)  (0.0495)  (0.9030)  (0.4126)  (0.0536)  (0.0434)
TL/TA   0.117  -0.038  -0.002   0.322   0.000   0.076*   0.014  -0.013 
 (0.2663)  (0.8693)  (0.8682)  (0.4305)  (0.9977)  (0.058)  (0.7517)  (0.3214)
Distress  -0.136  -0.439  -0.028*   0.018  -0.051  -0.008  -0.028  -0.014 
 (0.2280)  (0.1175)  (0.0752)  (0.963)  (0.4807)  (0.8384)  (0.5417)  (0.2325)
Stdev Pre-1 Ret    1.998   1.590   0.377 -17.891***   0.519   0.540   0.598  -0.243 
 (0.2860)  (0.7943)  (0.1258)  (0.0099)  (0.4482)  (0.4123)  (0.4147)  (0.3221)
Log(Total Assets)   0.027   0.071  -0.008*  -0.254*  -0.012  -0.008  -0.043***  -0.003 
 (0.4260)  (0.3544)  (0.0997)  (0.0733)  (0.6022)  (0.5374)  (0.0023)  (0.3735)
B/M   0.003   0.001   0.000   0.036**   0.001   0.002**   0.000  -0.001 
 (0.2148)  (0.8160)  (0.7764)  (0.0102)  (0.4438)  (0.0493)  (0.9054)  (0.1834)
R-Square   5%   13%   8%   35%   15%   6%   8%   9% 
F-Value   2.12*   1.02   2.38**   3.18***   0.75   1.59   2.24**   2.19** 
N   238   56   214   49   40   175   42   174 
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Table 2.13 Hedge Fund Investment Holding and Duration 
 
       Pct Duration 
Mean     7.5%    279 
Median     6.5%    331 
Min     5.0%      61 
Max   18.5%    608 
Stdev     2.8%    146 
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Table 2.14 Hedge Fund Investment Returns 
 
S-HPR Mean S-HPR Median Alpha 
   HPR  A-HPR    HPR  A-HPR   Mean Median 
HF  -84.3%*** -94.6%***  -90.0%*** -99.6%***  -2.8%*** -2.6%*** 
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Table 2.15 HPR Comparison between With-HF and No-HF Firms 
 
  S-HPR Mean S-HPR Median C-HPR Mean C-HPR Median Alpha 
    HPR A-HPR   HPR  A-HPR    HPR  A-HPR   HPR A-HPR  Mean Median
With-HF -34.4% -27.3% -45.8% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0%  -8.5% -3.0% 
No-HF -21.0% -24.9% -38.7%   -72.1%    -60.1%   -69.7% -100.0% -100.0%  -2.2% -1.8% 
Diff -13.4%   -2.4%   -7.1% -27.9%*** -39.9%*** -30.3%***      0.0%      0.0% -6.3%*** -1.2%**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 129 
 
Table 2.16 Regression – Accounting, Distress, Uncertainty and Hedge Fund 
Coefficients and p-values (in parenthesis) of the following regression: 
HPRi = α + β1* CA/TAi, pre1 + β2* EBIT/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1+ β3* TL/TAi, pre1 +β4* Distressi, pre1 +  
β5* (Stdev Pre-1 Ret)i, pre1 + β6 * Log (Total Assets)i, pre1 + β7* B/Mi, pre1  + β8* HFi, pre1 +  εi 
Distress is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the EBIT falls below zero in one year prior to 
bankruptcy, indicating that the firm really suffers from financial distress, and zero otherwise. Stdev Pre-1 
Ret is the standard deviation of daily returns on one year prior to bankruptcy. HF is a dummy variable, 
which takes the value of 1 if a firms receives hedge fund investment in one year before bankruptcy filing 
and zero otherwise.  
 
  Overall Positive Negative 
S-HPR C-HPR Alpha S-HPR Alpha S-HPR C-HPR Alpha 
Intercept -0.363  -0.808  0.029 -1.393  0.192 -0.506***  -0.414***   0.001
 (0.2131)  (0.2984)  (0.4449)  (0.1732)  (0.1825)  (<.0001)  (0.0005)  (0.9676) 
CA/TA   0.365*   0.254   0.061**   0.362   0.195*   0.196**   0.173*   0.037* 
 (0.0736)  (0.7235)  (0.0394)  (0.5726)  (0.0799)  (0.0270)  (0.0701)  (0.0956) 
EBIT/TA   0.003   0.000   0.021   1.540*  -0.012   0.001   0.003*   0.022** 
 (0.5635)  (0.9954)  (0.1532)  (0.0563)  (0.9108)  (0.4148)  (0.0605)  (0.0318) 
TL/TA   0.131   0.054   0.003   0.325   0.001   0.077*   0.031   0.004 
 (0.2165)  (0.8209)  (0.8285)  (0.4350)  (0.9832)  (0.0621)  (0.4871)  (0.7779) 
Distress  -0.130  -0.386   0.361   0.019   0.537   0.538   0.481  -0.243 
 (0.2497)  (0.1662)  (0.1354)  (0.9627)  (0.4545)  (0.4169)  (0.5081)  (0.2793) 
Stdev Pre-1 Ret   1.932   0.678  -0.025 -17.861**  -0.053  -0.008  -0.020  -0.010 
 (0.3018)  (0.9111)  (0.1069)  (0.0112)  (0.4836)  (0.8412)  (0.6616)  (0.3525) 
Log(Total Assets)   0.034   0.080  -0.005  -0.253*  -0.013  -0.008  -0.038***   0.000 
 (0.3238)  (0.2969)  (0.2579)  (0.0806)  (0.6051)  (0.5473)  (0.0076)  (0.9804) 
B/M   0.003   0.002   0.000   0.037**   0.001   0.002**   0.000   0.000 
 (0.1865)  (0.7298)  (0.6594)  (0.0210)  (0.4475)  (0.0500)  (0.8011)  (0.2673) 
HF  -0.230  -0.439  -0.070***   0.042   0.009  -0.002  -0.157**  -0.105***
 (0.2188)  (0.1585)  (0.0042)  (0.9507)  (0.9195)  (0.9795)  (0.0257) (<.0001) 
R-Square   5%   17%   11%   35%   15%   6%   11%   24% 
F-Value   1.76*   1.17   3.21***   2.72**   0.64   1.38   2.64***   6.33*** 
N   238   56   214   49   40   175   42   174 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HEDGE FUND INVESTMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Hedge funds and bankruptcy, two seeming unrelated subjects, have attracted 
much attention recently. As hedged funds have grown in importance and popularity, 
research has focused on their return, risk, and influence on the portfolio performance of 
other institutional investors. An increasing number of studies have investigated hedge 
fund activism as it relates to corporate governance, both active and passive, intense and 
non-intense. The debate is centered on whether hedge funds can effectively monitor the 
performance of their target firms and whether hedge fund involvement can help the target 
firms enhance their operating performances. We are interested in extending the literature 
by investigating the impact of hedge funds investing in bankrupt firms proceeding 
through Chapter 11. Hedge funds categorized as “event driven’ or “long/short equity” are 
the types that are likely to seek out investment opportunities in bankruptcies. Hedge 
funds are known for their ability to offer extraordinary returns (sometimes). The main 
question we address in this paper is - what is the role of hedge fund investments in those 
troubled firms.    
Hedge fund involvement in the bankruptcy process can be categorized as either 
financial or strategic. The major objective of a financial player is to acquire assets that 
throw off cash without putting up much cash of their own. Strategic players, in contrast, 
seek to acquire control of the bankrupt firm, and then achieve synergies by combining it 
with other related holdings. Being a financial player is the major role that hedge funds 
play in the bankruptcy process. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) report that hedge 
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funds rarely seek control in their target firms. Their average holding percentage is around 
5.4% to 8.8%. They try to enhance shareholders’ value through facilitating value-
enhancing changes, without taking on management responsibility for the target firms.   
We find that hedge funds tend to target firms with less bankruptcy risk and higher 
profitability than other firms that file. Prior to filing for bankruptcy protection, these 
firms suffer mostly from financial distress rather than economic distress. That is, their 
problems largely stem from too heavy a burden from debt service rather than an 
unprofitable strategic position. Hedge funds can help such troubled companies by 
providing liquidity and improve the profitability through financial restructuring. 
However, because hedge funds do not intend to acquire controlling stakes in the troubled 
firms and are organized as highly return-oriented entities, they generally only help the 
bankrupt firms improve in their short-term performance, usually limited to the initial 
post-bankruptcy year. However, these improvements are often not sustainable in the 
longer-run. Therefore, the involvement of hedge funds as vulture investors, who attempt 
to earn profit from investing in bankrupt or credit-impaired companies, in the bankruptcy 
process can usually only help with balance sheet issues, not strategic problems. Our 
conclusion is supported by both the accounting and stock performances of hedge fund 
invested firms.  
Our paper extends the existing literature in several perspectives. First, most of 
current literature explores activism from the hedge fund perspective. This literature, 
however, usually excludes bankruptcy cases. As pointed out in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and 
Thomas (2008), the motivation, financing, and outcomes of hedge funds in bankruptcy 
cases are typically quite different from that of non-bankruptcy cases. However, 
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bankruptcy filings are important economic events (Coelho and Taffler (working paper, 
2008)). As an active player in the market, the participation of hedge funds in bankruptcy, 
or distressed investment should not be ignored.  Second, previous bankruptcy literature 
(Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997)) documents that vulture investors do have impact on 
the post-bankruptcy performance. However, it does not differentiate various vulture 
investors, such as private equities and hedge funds. This is important as they may have 
different motivations, investment strategies, and face different regulations. Hedge funds 
are characterized as highly secretive investment vehicles that offer or at least seek to offer 
high returns, open to very limited qualified investors, and are loosely regulated. Whether 
these differences will impact their roles in those troubled firms is an interesting question. 
Last but not the least, the current literature demonstrates that hedge funds can actually 
help the targeted firms experience increases in payout, operating performance and stock 
performance. However, when they turn to distress investment, our results show that they 
do not perform as optimistically as we expected. Their roles are focused on providing 
liquidity and improve profitability. These impacts, however, only show up in the short-
term. Therefore, we should not be too optimistic when hedge funds invest in 
bankruptcies.   
We discuss the literature review the next section. Section 3 talks about our data 
and some descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses our main results and we conclude our 
paper in section 5.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
Researchers have investigated various areas in assessing the effectiveness of 
Chapter 11, including size, DIP, duration, judge effects, etc. Hotchkiss (1993) reported 
that firm size, measured by pre-petition assets, is the most important characteristic 
determining whether a firm will successfully reorganize. Many of the emerging firms 
downsize during Chapter 11. Denis and Rodgers (2007) find that larger firms are more 
likely to survive the Chapter 11 process and emerge as independent companies because 
they have greater resources for survival. He also finds that firms are more likely to 
reorganize and emerge as independent firms if they significantly reduce their liabilities 
while in Chapter 11. Both Carapeto (1999) as well as Dahiya, John, Puri, and Ramirez 
(2003) found that DIP financing success increases the probability of reorganization 
success. They demonstrate that having DIP financing increases the probability of 
emerging from Chapter 11. Li (1999) reports that the longer a firm stays in Chapter 11, 
the less likely is it to reorganize successfully. Denis and Rodgers (2007) found that firms 
with smaller size, better operating performance, and higher operating margins generally 
spend less time in Chapter 11. 
One of the interesting factors impacting the efficiency of Chapter 11 and the post- 
bankruptcy performance of those that emerge, is the involvement of vulture investors. 
Investors, such as certain private equity and hedge funds, tend to be particularly 
interested in buying bankrupt or credit-impaired firms. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) 
explore whether a vulture investor who remains active in the governance of distressed 
firms after they emerge from Chapter 11, has a measurable impact on post-bankruptcy 
performance. Improvement in performance is observed if the vulture investors join the 
 134 
 
board, become the CEO or Chairman, and/or have control of the firm, while no 
significant improvement is found with passive involvement of the vulture investors. Of 
all the different categories of vulture investors, hedge funds draw particular attention, 
especially after the sub-prime mortgage crisis and Madoff investment scandal. Alexander 
(2008) studies the involvement of hedge funds in the bankruptcy process when hedge 
funds buy bonds, loans, or equity of companies in Chapter 11. Such activity can enhance 
liquidity for the distressed firms’ securities.  
Hedge fund activism is well documented in the recent literature. Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) investigate the involvement of hedge funds in corporate 
governance and whether their efforts impact the firm’s performance. They find that hedge 
fund activists propose strategic, operational and financial solutions to the corporate firms 
and, in a majority of the cases, achieve at least partial success. The extent of hostility is 
low in their sample of 2001-2006, in which hedge funds seldom seek control of the target 
firms. The announcement of activism also has a positive effect. Hedge funds play a 
significant role in increasing the target firms’ payout, operating performance, and CEO 
turnover. Clifford (2008) compiles a sample of active and passive hedge fund activists 
based on their Schedule 13D or 13G filings. He finds that the target firms of active hedge 
fund activists enjoy larger excess returns and increases in operating performance than the 
ones of passive hedge fund activists.  The results imply that hedge fund activism has a 
positive impact on wealth creation.  Boyson and Mooradian (working paper 2010) focus 
on intense hedge fund activists. They document improvements in operating performance 
for up to three years following activism. Specifically they find such activism is associated 
with reduced cash position, growth in sales, reduced expenses, and increased leverage. 
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The target firms also experience better short-term stock performance following the 
announcement of hedge fund involvement.        
In addition to the improved operating and stock performances, hedge funds also 
play a unique monitoring role in corporate governance. Hedge funds are managed by 
highly incentivized professional managers and are subject to very limited regulation. 
They can usually take a larger position than other institutional investors as they are not 
required to maintain high levels of diversification. The use of leverage helps hedge funds 
acquire more effective ownership of target firms. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 
(2008) show that hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are non-
confrontational, hence, they have few conflicts of interest thereby allowing them to act as 
more effective corporate governance monitors.  Bratton (2007) and Kahan and Rock 
(2007) argue that because of their more concentrated positions compared to mutual funds 
and public pension funds, hedge funds may have greater incentives to monitor the 
corporate governance of their holdings.         
 
3.3 Hypothesis and Data 
3.3.1 Hypothesis 
We aim to test the role of hedge funds in bankrupt firms. If they are able to offer 
strategic, operational and financial assistance to the bankrupt firms, they should be able 
to help these firms achieve sustainable improvements after emergence. In addition to 
hedge funds, other types of vulture investors such as private equity or venture capital 
funds may be players in the area of bankrupt firms. Their motivations and roles may vary 
compared to hedge funds. Therefore, we test the following two hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1: Bankrupt firms with hedge fund investments during Chapter 11 
perform better after emergence compared to the ones without any vulture investment. 
Hypothesis 2: Bankrupt firms with hedge fund investments during Chapter 11 
perform better after emergence compared to the ones with other vulture investors, such as 
private equity or venture capital funds.   
3.3.2 Data 
Our sample collection process is described in Table 3.1. We obtained our initial 
sample of 1,117 firms that filed for bankruptcy between January 1978 and December 
2006 from Professor Edward Altman of New York University. It contains bankruptcy 
filing firms with liabilities at default of $100 million or greater. We added 99 filings in 
2007 and 237 filings in 2008 from bankruptcydata.com to extend our database to the 
most recent period. Therefore, we begin with 1,453 bankruptcy filing cases from 1978 to 
2008. Next we determined the bankruptcy outcome, filing date, confirmation date, and 
emergence date (if any) from Lexis-Nexis, New Generation Research, and form 10-K 
filings with the SEC. We restricted our sample period to the 1986- 2008 period as the 
New Generation Research database begins with 1986 thereby excluding 68 firms that 
filed prior to 1986. In addition, we excluded 110 firms that were acquired or purchased, 
286 firms that were either liquidated during their bankruptcy process, or converted to 
Chapter 7. Forty two dismissed cases and 266 undetermined cases were also dropped.  
From the remaining 681 reorganized firms, we obtained a sample of 254 firms that 
successfully emerged as public companies listed for trading in NYSE, NASDAQ, 
AMEX, or OTC markets. We require members of our sample to have trading information 
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in CRSP and accounting information in Compustat both before filing and after emergence 
from Chapter 11. We identified 172 companies with the required data.  
Next, we manually checked the 13D/13G filings of those 172 firms during their 
Chapter 11 process in order to obtain a list of involved parties. 13D and 13G filings are 
required by the SEC when an investor acquires more than 5% of any class of securities of 
a publicly traded company. If a firm reports that it intends to try to influence, change the 
management, or seek control of the target firms, a Scheduled13D filing is required. 
Otherwise, a Schedule of 13G may be filed. After this step, we filter a hedge fund, either 
at advisor or fund level, if it satisfies one of the following: (1) the name matches the ones 
in CISDM or TASS database; (2) the party is featured by news article in Factiva or Lexis-
Nexis as hedge fund, or hedge fund advisor; (3) the party’s own website identifies it as 
hedge fund management company or hedge fund is one of its major lines of business. Of 
our 172 firm sample, we identify 16 with hedge fund(s) involvement. They include both 
“pure” hedge funds, such as Loeb Partners Corp, and investment firms with hedge funds 
as their major line of business, such as D.E Shaw. Following Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang 
(working paper, 2010), we exclude full-service banks who also engage in hedge funds 
business, such as Goldman Sachs Asset Management.  
Table 3.2 reports the industry of our sample firms. Our sample largely consists of 
manufacturing, transportation or services firms. Companies from mining and construction 
and wholesale appear not to attract much attention from hedge fund investors in our 
sample. Following Fama and French (2001), we exclude financial firms (SIC code 6000-
6999), and utilities (SIC code 4900-4999), as the financial decisions of utility firms are 
affected by regulation and the financial ratios of financial firms are not comparable to 
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those of other industrial firms. Our final sample has 142 firms with no hedge fund 
investment and 12 firms with hedge fund investment. Of 142 no hedge fund investment 
firms, we further divide them into two groups. One is 122 firms with no 13D or 13G 
filing, indicating no party invested more than 5% during their Chapter 11 process and the 
other 20 firms with significant investment not from hedge funds, but from other vulture 
firms, such as private equities and venture capitals.  
In our 12 firms with hedge fund investment, 6 of them filed 13D, and the 
remaining 6 filed 13G. Ten of the hedge funds acquire common stock while one acquired 
preferred stocks and one debentures. The average percentage is 8.1%, with the highest at 
23.8% and lowest at 5.1%. The six with 13D filings are required to disclose the purpose 
of the transactions. They can be categorized into “maximize shareholders’ wealth”, 
“investment purpose”, and “capital structure.” The average holding period of these 12 
hedge fund targeted firms is 869 days, with a median of 652 days, approximately 1.7 to 
2.3 years. Clearly this hedge fund investment is not short-term oriented.  
In our 20 firms with other vulture investors, 3 of then filed 13Ds, and the 
remaining 17 filed 13Gs. All the asset classes that they purchased are common stock. The 
average holding is 11.7%, with highest at 33.3% and lowest at 0.7%. The purposes 
disclosed in the 13D file include purely investment, or to get involved in the restructuring 
and to try to acquire the target firm. The average holding period is 433 days, with a 
median of 371 days, which is shorter than for hedge funds investors. 
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3.4 Results and Discussions 
3.4.1 Characteristics comparison between with-HF and no-vulture investors 
We first investigate absolute values in the accounting performances between firms 
with hedge fund investment (12 with-HF investors) and firms without any vulture 
investment (122 no-vulture firms). As most of the data are not normally distributed, we 
report both t-tests for differences in means and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for differences 
in medians. Table 3.3 contains the results before and Table 3.4 reports the results after 
emergence from Chapter 11. Ten variables are used to represent different performance 
aspects, shown in Appendix.  
For the absolute values before Chapter 11 in Table 3.3, in pre-3, which is three 
years before bankruptcy filing, all 10 variables show no significant difference between 
with-HF and no-vulture, implying that both groups tend to be in similar shape at that 
time. When they approach bankruptcy, in both pre-2 and pre-1, we find the with-HF 
group performs significantly better than no-vulture group in median Z-score. The median 
differences are 1.556 two years before bankruptcy and 3.952 one year before bankruptcy, 
both of which are significant at the 1% level. Thus the overall bankruptcy risk is 
generally less severe in the with-HF group before filing for Chapter 11. In pre-2, the 
with-HF group outperforms the no-vulture group in the medians of two profitability 
measures, with significance 0.052 differences in both EBIT/Sales and ROA. In pre-1, the 
with-HF group also exhibits stronger performance in liquidity, profitability, and 
solvency, with significance 0.133 difference in WC/TA, 0.086 difference in EBIT/Sales, 
and 0.199 difference in Equity/TA. Therefore, compared to the no-vulture group, the 
with-HF firms tend to be in better shape before their Chapter 11 filing. 
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The Z-scores in Table 3.4 reveal that in the post-bankruptcy years, the overall 
level of bankruptcy risk is comparable between the two groups, in both mean and median. 
The mean and median Z-scores are not significantly different, between the two groups for 
one year, two years, and three years after emergence from bankruptcy. The with-HF 
group shows stronger performances in three profitability measures, EBIT/Sales, ROE and 
NI/Sales, one year after emergence. The differences are 0.054, 0.185, and 0.064 
respectively, which are significant at least at the 10% level. However, the advantage 
disappears two and three years after emergence. In TL/TA and Equity/TA, with-HF 
group exhibits a certain level of higher leverage and solvency risk. Other variables show 
no significant performance differences. These results suggest that hedge funds, which are 
generally return-driven, may help the reorganized firms improve their profitability in 
order to achieve the highest holding period return on their own investment. In the longer 
run, however, these hedge fund investors are inclined to take their profits and move on. 
This conclusion is also suggested by the reported purpose of their transaction contained 
in their 13D files. The major goal identified is “investment purpose.” Therefore, the 
hedge funds’ long term interest in the reorganized firm may not be sustained. 
In order to capture the dynamics of those characteristics, we track the change in 
the ten variables, and compare them across two groups, shown in Table 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. 
Year over year, the decrease in the median Z-scores are significantly higher in the no-
vulture group, -0.543 from pre-3 to pre-2 and -2.767 from pre-2 to pre-1, indicating that 
deterioration in bankruptcy risk is less severe for with-HF group. From pre-3 to pre-2, no-
vulture group shows signs of decrease in liquidity, -0.018 in ∆WC/TA, in solvency risk, -
0.053 in ∆Equity/TA, in profitability, -0.103 in ∆ROE, and increase in leverage, 0.049 in 
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∆TL/TA. From pre-2 to pre-1, the deteriorations are more dramatic in no-vulture group. 
We find a significant decrease in six out of the nine variables, including -0.150 in 
∆WC/TA, 0.177 in ∆TL/TA, -0.177 in ∆Equity/TA, and -0.095 in ∆ROA and -0.071 in 
∆NI/sales. In addition, the magnitude is much larger compared to the decrease from pre-3 
to pre-2.  For the with-HF group, the change from pre-3 to pre-2 is not obvious. In pre-2 
to pre-1, which is the most distressed period before bankruptcy, the decrease is primarily 
in profitability measures, -0.150 and -0.153 for mean and median in ∆ROA, and -0.238 
and -0.065 for mean and median in ∆NI/Sales.  When we compare the with-HF with the 
no-vulture group, we find that the pressure for the no-vulture firms is much larger, as its 
performance decreases in almost all the aspects we investigated when they approach 
bankruptcy, while the pressure primarily comes from profitability for the with-HF group.   
In Table 3.6 and 3.7, we track the changes in all the difference characteristics both 
between years after emergence and between post-bankruptcy and pre-bankruptcy. We 
also add a regression analysis using the following equation when comparing the with-HF 
and no-vulture: 
         ∆variable = α + β1HF + β2LogSize + β3Book/Market + ε                       (1) 
where ∆variable is the change the ten performance measures. HF is a dummy variable set 
to 1 if a firm has hedge fund investment and 0 if a firm does not have any greater than 5% 
investment during its bankruptcy process. We also control for size and book-to-market 
with LogSize which is the demeaned natural log of a firm’s total assets and Book/Market 
is the demeaned book to market ratio of the firm. Following Petersen (2009), to control 
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
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We first examine the changes over years after emergence in Table 3.6. From post 
1 to post 2, the with-HF group experiences significant decreases in Z-scores, -1.163 in 
mean ∆Z-scores and -1.309 in median ∆Z-scores, showing that more severe overall 
bankruptcy risk beyond one year after emergence. Moreover, the underperformances in 
leverage, solvency risk and profitability are also significant compared to the no-vulture 
group, with the significant differences of 0.117 in ∆TL/TA, -0.021 in ∆EBIT/Sales, -
0.092 in ∆Equity/TA, -0.069 in ∆ROA and -0.304 in ∆ROE. From post2 to post3, reveals 
no significant decrease for both groups. We find some weak evidence that the no-vulture 
group actually increases turnover and profitability by a limited magnitude. The regression 
results also show that hedge fund targeted firms do not generally enjoy better 
performance compared to the firms with no vulture investment. The decrease over the 
years after emergence rejects our Hypothesis 1 in the way that hedge funds may not play 
an effective role in helping distressed firms to improve in a sustainable manner.  
Next, we take a look at the performance in different years after emergence 
compared to its pre-bankruptcy level in Table 3.7. Comparing post 1 to pre1 level, both 
groups enjoy significant improvements in a majority of the different aspects, such as 
liquidity, leverage, solvency risk, profitability, and overall distress risk. The with-HF 
group has 0.146 in ∆WC/TA, -0.329 in ∆TL/TA, 0.291 in ∆Equity/TA, 0.247 in ∆ROA, 
0.782 in ∆ROE, 0.109 in ∆NI/Sales, and 1.638 in ∆Z-scores. The no-vulture group enjoys 
0.220 in ∆liquidity, -0.360 in ∆leverage, and different amounts of increase in various 
profitability measures. Comparing post 2 to pre1, the scenarios starts to change between 
the two groups. We find that the significant increases only come from the no-vulture 
group. Two years after emergence, this group still enjoys substantial improvements in 
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liquidity, leverage, solvency risk, profitability, and overall bankruptcy risk. However, for 
the with-HF group’s performance level two years after emergence seems no different 
compared to the level at one year before bankruptcy.  This scenario remains the same 
when we compare the performances between three years after emergence and one year 
before bankruptcy filing. The three regressions reveal the same results when comparing 
post-bankruptcy with pre-bankruptcy performance, that is, hedge funds seem to play a 
significant role in increasing the liquidity of the bankrupt firms, with coefficients of 
1.486 for post1 – pre1, 2.301 for post2 – pre1, and 2.803 for post3-pre1 periods. Another 
interesting result we obtain from the regressions is that the involvement of hedge funds 
tends to decrease the turnover ratio of the bankrupt firms, with -2.265 for the post1 – 
pre1, -3.298 for the post2 – pre1, and -4.445 for the post3- pre1 periods. These results 
further imply that the improvements in the with-HF firms tend to take place in the short-
term, even though the hedge fund investment period may not be short. The major role of 
hedge funds in the bankruptcy process tends to be to provide liquidity.    
Combining all of the results above, both in levels and changes over time, the with-
HF group is generally in better shape compared to no-vulture group before the filing for 
bankruptcy. Hedge funds tend to target the firms with greater financial distress, such as 
only deterioration in profitability, rather than distress in different performance aspects. 
After emergence from bankruptcy, both groups make significant progress during the 
restructuring process, and take on comparable levels of overall risks. However, the 
overall improvement is stronger for the no-vulture groups, possibly because the with-HF 
group is less distressed before Chapter 11. The increase is significant in the with-HF 
group in the short run, one year after bankruptcy, but not in the long run. Therefore, 
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hedge funds seem to be more of financial players, providing liquidity for the troubled 
company, rather than a strategic player in the bankruptcy process.   
3.4.2 Characteristics comparison between with-HF and other-vulture firms 
In addition to hedge fund, other vulture investors, such as private equity and 
venture capital funds are also active players in the distressed firms arena. In this section, 
we explore whether their involvements have different impacts on bankrupt firms. 
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 show the levels of different characteristics between hedge 
funds and other vulture investors both before and after Chapter 11. For the three years 
before bankruptcy, the with-HF and other-vulture firms tend to suffer comparable levels 
of overall bankruptcy risk, as the differences between the two groups are all insignificant. 
Compared to other vulture investors, hedge funds tend to target firms with higher 
leverage, profitability, and solvency risk. The medians of TL/TA and EBIT/Sales are 
significantly higher for the with-HF groups in years before bankruptcy, 0.087, 0.188 and 
0.162 in the median difference for TL/TA, and 0.072 and 0.025 for the median difference 
in EBIT/Sales. The mean and medians of Equity/TA for the with-HF group is 
significantly less than the ones for other-vulture groups.  
In the years after emergence from Chapter 11, the overall scenario looks the same 
as the one before bankruptcy. The Z-scores show no significant difference between the 
two groups, indicating that both hedge fund and other vulture investors tend to target the 
firms with similar distress levels. Based on TL/TA and Equity/TA, with-HF firms still 
have higher levels of leverage and solvency risk compared to the other-vulture firms, in 
both means and medians. Hedge fund targeted firms enjoy better short-term performance 
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in one profitability measure, EBIT/Sales. They outperform other-vulture firms by 0.068 
one year after emergence, but the advantage disappears in the following years.  
Table 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 contain the results in the change of all the 
characteristics over time. We also run a similar regression in Table 3.11 and 3.12 as the 
ones in Table 3.6 and 3.7, which is, 
         ∆variable = α + β1HF + β2LogSize + β3Book/Market + ε                       (2) 
All the variables remain the same except for HF, which will be set to 1 if a firm 
has hedge fund investment and 0 if one has other vulture investment.  
From pre-3 to pre-2, other-vulture firms experience a significant decrease in Z-
scores, -3.645 in mean and -1.595 in median. They also show worse performance in 
liquidity and profitability, as the with-HF outperform it by 0.018 in median ∆WC/T and 
0.060 in median ∆EBIT/Sales. From pre-2 to pre-1, the situation is worse, as other-
vulture firms suffer from decrease in Z-scores, liquidity, profitability, solvency, and 
increase in leverage, with -1.651 in ∆Z-score, -0.095 in ∆WC/TA, -0.028 in 
∆EBIT/Sales, -0.079 in ∆Equity/TA, -0.342 in ∆ROE, and 0.079 in ∆TL/TA. For the 
with-HF group, the decrease is not significant from pre-3 to pre-2. They do show a 
significant decrease in liquidity and profitability from pre-2 to pre-1, with -0.092 in 
∆WC/TA, -0.153 in ∆ROA and -0.065 in ∆NI/Sales. The scenarios here are quite similar 
to the ones between the with-HF and no-vulture groups. That is, other-vulture firms 
suffer from poor performance in almost all aspects before bankruptcy, while hedge fund 
targeted firms suffer mainly from liquidity and profitability.  
We investigate the long-term performances in Table 3.11 and 3.12. For years after 
emergence, especially from post 1 to post 2, we find a significant decrease in Z-scores for 
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both groups, median of -1.309 for the with-HF and -2.804 for the other-vulture firms. In 
addition, both groups suffer from higher leverage, solvency risk, and lower profitability. 
The decreases are significantly higher for other-vulture firms, with 0.138 in ∆ROA and 
0.152 in ∆NI/Sales. From post2 to post3, both groups tend to perform similarly.  
When comparing the post-bankruptcy performance to pre-bankruptcy level, in 
post 1 – pre 1, we find significant improvement for both groups in a majority of the 
aspects. The with-HF group enjoys a 1.638 increase in median ∆Z-score, and 3.014 for 
other-vulture firms. Besides Z-score, they also show better performance in liquidity, 
leverage, solvency, and profitability measures. Both groups make comparable 
improvements. Next, when we compare two years after emergence with pre-bankruptcy 
level, again, the with-HF group does not show significant differences, while the other-
vulture firms show improvements in liquidity, leverage, and solvency. This improvement 
can even continue for three years after emergence for the other-vulture firms. The 
comparison between the with-HF and other-vulture firms is quite similar to the 
comparison between with-HF and no-vulture firms. We find that other-vulture firms 
exhibit long term improvement, which can last for three years after emergence. The 
regressions only generate significant results for post 3-pre 1, in which the HF firms enjoy 
higher liquidity and lower turnover ratios. However, we need to be cautious about the 
regression results here as the sample size for both the with-HF (12) and other-vulture 
firms (20) are small in the comparison here.  
Based on the results above, we find that the overall bankruptcy risk is comparable 
between firms targeted by hedge funds and the ones by other investors. The most obvious 
result is that hedge funds tend to focus on the firms with higher leverage, higher 
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profitability, and higher solvency risk. After their emergence from bankruptcy, the with-
HF group still suffers from higher leverage and solvency risk, but their profitability is 
comparable for the two groups, which may be because the other-vulture firms improve, 
or the with-HF firms decrease in this measure. Both hedge funds and other investors play 
an effective monitoring role in the restructuring process as a majority of the 
characteristics improve from their pre-Chapter 11 levels to their one year post-Chapter 11 
levels, and results are equally favorable for the two groups. However, the improvements 
are more sustainable in the other-vulture firms, which can last up to three years after 
emergence, while with-HF firms only usually last up to one year.  
3.4.3 Short-term and long-term stock performance between the with-HF and other 
two groups 
In this section, we explore the market reaction around the filing date of hedge 
fund or other vulture investments, and the impact of these players on the stock 
performance of bankrupt firms. The reason why we use the filing date instead of the 
announcement date is that we do not have the information of when the news of stake 
holding will become officially public, therefore we use the filing date of 13D/G form in 
SEC, and we investigate several different time windows around the filing date.  
We show the average holding period for the with-HF and other-vulture firms in 
Table 3.13. We find that the holding period of hedge funds is generally longer than the 
one for other vulture investors. Hedge funds hold their position in the bankrupt firms for 
average 869 days, median of 652 days, or around two years. Other vulture investors hold 
their positions for an average of 433 days, and a median of 371 days. These holding 
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period numbers show that hedge fund investment in bankrupt firms are not generally 
short-term oriented.  
The annualized holding period return is showed in Table 3.14. For both with-HF 
and other-vulture groups, the annualized returns are not significantly different from zero, 
and the differences between them are not significant.   
In Table 3.15, we report the market-adjusted return (MAR), which is the 
difference between the actual daily return and the market return, around the purchase date 
for both groups. We use three market return measures, CRSP value-weighted return, 
CRSP equal weighted return and S&P500 return. As we do not know the actual date 
when hedge funds or other vulture investors purchase more than 5% of the stake, we use 
the 13D, or 13G filing date as the purchase date and test different time windows around 
that date. The strongest evidence comes from the [-25, +25] event window. The with-HF 
group gains significant positive mean market-adjusted returns, 0.341 as to CRSP value-
weighted, 0.303 as to CRSP equal-weighted, and 0.342 as to S&P500. Other-vulture 
firms experience significant negative market-adjusted returns, both in means and 
medians. We find a mean of -0.141 as to CRSP value-weighted, -0.178 as to CRSP equal-
weighted, and -0.140 as to S&P500, and median of -0.144, -0.199, and -0.139 for 
corresponding bench marks. Comparing the with-HF and other-vulture firms, we 
conclude that the with-HF firms enjoy significantly higher market-adjusted returns in the 
[-25, +25] event window, in both mean and median. The differences are 0.482, 0.481, and 
0.481 in means, and 0.504, 0.550, and 0.499 in medians for corresponding bench marks, 
which are all significant at least at the 5% level. In the [-10, +10] event window, we still 
see higher market-adjusted returns in the with-HF group compared to the other-vulture 
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group, with 0.348, 0.329 and 0.351 in the mean difference for different benchmarks. 
However, for the remaining event windows, [0, +2], [0, +10], and [0, +25] we do not find 
a significant difference in market-adjusted returns between the two groups.    
Next, we calculate the CARs for both the with-HF and other-vulture firms in 
Table 3.16. We identify matching firms for both of these groups based on SIC codes, size 
and book-to-market. However, we do not find any significant results, possibly due to the 
small size of our sample.  
Table 3.17a to 3.17d show the long-term stock performance both before and after 
Chapter 11. We calculate both absolute annual return and excess annual return compared 
to S&P500. Table 3.17a contains the results for the with-HF and no-vulture firms before 
Chapter 11. The no-vulture firms show signs of significant negative returns, both in 
annual return and excess return, for two years before bankruptcy, mean of -0.198 and 
median of -0.407 for annual return, and mean of -0.272 and median of -0.386 for excess 
return. In one year before the official filing, both the with-HF and no-vulture groups 
exhibit significantly large negative returns. In pre-1, the with-HF firms tend to suffer less 
compared to the no-vulture firms, with a significant positive median difference of 0.321 
in annual return and 0.168 in excess return. Table 3.17b shows a similar result between 
the with-HF and other-vulture firms. Other-vulture firms also start showing negative 
annual returns and excess returns two years before Chapter 11. Both the with-HF and 
other-vulture firms suffer negative annual stock returns and excess returns, significant at 
the 1% level. However, the severity between the two groups are comparable, as we see no 
significant difference, both mean and median, in annual returns and excess returns for 
these two groups. Therefore, combining Table 3.17a and 3.17b, firms that later receive no 
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vulture investment are the ones that suffer the most in stock return decrease, while firms 
that receive hedge fund or other vulture investment suffer less in magnitude, which in 
turn suggests that vulture investors, no matter whether hedge or private equity funds tend 
to target firms with lower stock performance decreases. Table 3.17c contains the stock 
performance between the with-HF and no-vulture firms after emergence from Chapter 11. 
In the first year after emergence, we do not see a significant difference between these two 
groups. Surprisingly, we see that the with-HF firms actually underperform the no-vulture 
group two and three years after emergence. The difference is -0.725 in median annual 
return, and -0.519 in median excess return in post2, and -0.617 in median annual return in 
post3. Even though the with-HF outperforms the no-vulture before Chapter 11, the 
situation is reversed in the post Chapter 11 period. We find similar results in Table 3.17d. 
The with-HF firms are comparable to the other-vulture firms one year after emergence, 
however, they underperform the other group two years after leaving Chapter 11. The 
mean difference is -0.744 and median is -0.887 for annual returns, and -0.664 is the mean 
difference for excess returns and -0.751 for median difference excess returns, all of which 
are significant at 5%. Therefore, the with-HF group is comparable with both the no-
vulture and other-vulture firms in the short-run, one year after emergence. However, the 
with-HF group is the worst performing group two to three years after Chapter 11.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Herein, we investigate the role of hedge funds in the bankruptcy process. After 
they acquire more than 5% of the stake in targeted troubled firms, we are interested in 
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their impact, compared to those with no vulture investments and the ones with 
investments from vultures other than hedge funds.  
From accounting performance measures, we find that firms targeted by hedge 
funds tend to be in better shape compared to firms without vulture investments. The 
overall quality between hedge fund and other vulture targets are similar. Hedge fund 
firms tend to focus on firms with financial distress, primarily liquidity and profitability. It 
is also shown that these two areas are the major working areas for hedge funds during the 
bankruptcy process, as we find significant improvements in these two aspects after 
emergence from Chapter 11. However, hedge funds do not seem to help the bankrupt 
firms through a systematic restructuring. Moreover, improvements are only obtained in 
the short-run. Taking an average 8.1% stake in bankrupt firms, hedge funds are more of 
financial players, rather than strategic players.  
The above results are also suggested by the stock performances. Even though 
hedge funds are not short-term investors, with an average 869-day holding period, their 
outperformance in the pre-bankruptcy period does not hold for the post-bankruptcy 
period. Before Chapter 11, the with-HF group is the group that suffers the least in the 
decrease in stock returns, however, the scenarios are completely reversed in the post-
Chapter 11 period. That is, compared to the no-vulture and other-vulture firms, the with-
HF group underperforms both of the other two groups after emergence.  
Overall, the major benefit of hedge fund investment in bankruptcy cases is to 
provide liquidity for the troubled firms, and help them improve profitability in the short-
term. Profitability orientation is understandable as short to medium term return is the 
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primary goal of hedge funds. Without acquiring a significant controlling stake in the 
firms, it may be difficult to play a systematic role in restructuring the distress firms. 
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APPENDIX  
TEN VARIABLES USED TO REPRESENT DIFFERENT  
PERFORMANCE ASPECTS 
WC/TA = Working Capital / Total Assets, a liquidity measure 
Sales / TA = Sales / Total Assets, a turnover measure 
TL / TA = Total Liabilities / Total Assets, a leverage measure 
EBIT / Sales = Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Sales, a profitability measure 
Equity / TA = Shareholders’ Equity / Total Assets, a solvency measure 
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets, a profitability measure 
ROE = Net Income / Shareholders’ Equity, a profitability measure 
NI / Sales = Net Income / Sales, a profitability measure 
Book / Market = Book Value of Equity / Market Value of Equity 
Z-score = 6.56*WC/TA+3.26*RE/TA+6.72*EBIT/TA+1.05*Book Equity/TL, an overall 
bankruptcy risk measure 
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